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This dissertation examines the influence of authoritarianism and gender on the 
political behavior of white Americans. Authoritarianism and gender are two prominent 
variables in the formation of political preferences. Authoritarianism is regarded as a 
dynamic psychological disposition toward order and structure in social relations. 
Meanwhile, gender reflects external cultural markers attached to sex to indicate 
appropriate social behavior. Environmental factors like resource disparities and social 
conventions contribute to the production of gender. Both gender and authoritarianism 
have become increasingly contentious subjects in the context of contemporary 
partisanship. Scholars believe that each variable uniquely contributes to polarization, and 
have studied the effect of each variable separately on partisanship.  
This dissertation fills a gap in the literature by examining the interactive effect of 
gender and authoritarianism on political behavior through the lens of social identity 
theory. In recent years, scholars have increasingly understood partisanship through the 
psychology of social identity. This shift in emphasis away from purely rationalist 
assumptions of political behavior reflects the contemporary need to explain the personal 
dimension of politics. Gender and authoritarianism both impact identity. Given the 
expansive scope of party affiliation to affect preferences in the context of polarization, it 
is hypothesized that gender and authoritarianism interact to influence political behavior 
as the norm.  
This dissertation relies on Miller and Shank’s casual process model to develop 
hypotheses (1996). The casual process model predicts that internal psychological factors 
weigh heavier on political preferences than external environmental factors. One posits 
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that gender influences political beliefs more forcefully in the absence of authoritarianism 
influences. The rate of change in preferences due to the effect of authoritarianism will not 
be the same for men and women as conventional gender norms socializes men to prefer 
more authoritarian social arrangements. Regression models test for this proposed relation 
across three relevant domains of partisanship: cultural issues, economic issues, and 
affective evaluations. The results offer limited, qualified support for the thesis. The 
interactive relation manifests as expect in cultural preferences related to social 
arrangements, but partisanship outweighs the influence of individual gender and 
authoritarian preferences elsewhere.  
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The events of January 6th, 2021 will forever be remembered as a singular, 
infamous day in American history. For the first time, a violent, domestic mob sacked the 
Capitol with ambitions to assassinate elected officials in order to steal the presidency for 
Donald Trump (Graham 2021). Its novelty lacks comparable events to register its 
shockwave and comprehend the gravity of the situation beyond the Civil War itself. The 
Founding Fathers often compared the United States to the Roman Republic to understand 
their historical moment. Likely, they would have compared the events at the Capitol to 
the assassination of Tiberius Gracchus. In that situation, a violent mob had brought 
weapons into the sacrosanct core of Rome to exact extra-constitutional ends for the first 
time. This assassination set in motion the political storm before a storm of civil wars, 
which ultimately led to the collapse of the Roman Republic. This analogy conjures a 
bleak outlook for American democracy. One cannot, therefore, understate the magnitude 
of the attempted coup. 
This type of event is unfathomable to Americans because it does not occur in the 
United States; so, it is a novel exercise to account for what happened. Anyone who seeks 
to understand the events of January 6th must understand the tectonic forces that resulted 
in the rise the of Trump. The most prominent explanation is found in an article from the 
2016 election cycle presciently presaging the rise of the Trump coalition and the 
dynamics of the politics to follow. This piece found that one trait alone could predict 
whether someone would be attracted to support Trump: authoritarianism.  
In his research, MacWilliams found that authoritarian voters bolstered the Trump 
campaign, and represented his core supporters (2016). They provided Trump the initial 
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fuel to exploit a disunified Republican Party. His strongman rhetoric allowed him to 
consolidate support among other discontented Republican factions who may not have 
been authoritarians. For instance, his popularity soared among blue-collar white men, 
many of whom were previously Democratic voters (Williams 2016). Ultimately, his 
authoritarian support secured Trump the presidency in 2016 and the leverage of a 
political party to challenge the 2020 election results through violent means. 
Authoritarianism is essential to understand this political moment. Typically, 
authoritarianism is a psychological concept used to describe one’s need for authority to 
structure one’s life (Altemeyer 1981). The need for structure in the authoritarian leaning 
voter manifests as a desire for social conventionalism, strong leadership, and aggression 
toward nonconforming groups (MacWilliams 2016). This specific type of voter rallied 
around Trump’s bravado and appearance of strength. He made his campaign evocative 
and intelligible through a lack of nuance in discussions of policy matters. His framing of 
political conflict in us-versus-them terms encouraged the simplistic thinking. 
Authoritarians have difficulties with nuance, and are acutely sensitive to threats. Trump 
benefited tremendously from the fact that fear of terrorism from decentralized groups like 
ISIS had reached its highest point in the United States since 9/11 in December 2015 
(MacWilliams 2016). This anxiety coincided with the beginning of the primary season. 
Trump solidified support for his demagoguery in this atmosphere. His strongman persona 
captured authoritarians along with other Republicans who perceived imminent threat in 
the world. 
MacWilliams cited the key central qualities of Trump that pressed authoritarian 
voters into his campaign (2016). However, he missed a critical aspect of Trump’s appeal 
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to authoritarians. Despite an encompassing list, he omitted the fact that Trump is a white 
man. The significance of this point may not be immediate. However, the untraditional 
nomination of a woman for president in the Democratic Party appears to have repulsed 
authoritarians as much as Trump’s machismo attracted them. The traditional mold for a 
president is a white man. Only Barack Obama has bucked the trend in the course of 
American history. His victory symbolized a breakthrough in race relations, yet 
simultaneously racialized mass politics in both parties (Schaffner et al. 2016; Tesler 
2016, 145). Authoritarians looking to make white men president again despaired at both 
Obama’s victories and Clinton’s nomination. Obama’s race hurt his standing among 
authoritarians, and Clinton’s sex would appear to have hurt her fortunes with them, too. 
 This inquiry fills a gap in the literature by launching a comprehensive analysis of 
the relation between gender and authoritarianism in the partisanship of white Americans. 
The omission of Clinton’s sex as a factor in authoritarian decision-making was not an 
intentional oversight in MacWilliams’ piece. In fact, scholars have only recently 
produced the first piece of research finding an interaction between gender and 
authoritarianism (Lizotte 2019). The failure to combine both topics exists despite the 
increasing use of authoritarianism and gender in the literature of political psychology in 
recent decades as a lens of analysis. The centrality of each theme to the outcome of the 
2016 election and subsequent toxic partisanship adds further intrigue. One can account 
for the oversight of scholars to analyze the two topics together given some context. The 
two concepts have remained unconnected due to the longstanding prominence of 
ideological, rationalist assumptions to explain political behavior. The window has only 
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recently opened to link gender and authoritarianism in the milieu of theories of social 
identity thanks to these heterodoxic psychological perspectives. 
The theoretical approach to the study of mass political behavior is undergoing 
conceptual modification. Scholars are abandoning sanitized economic axioms of rational 
choice, and are gravitating toward analysis through social identity theory instead. This 
approach reevaluates citizens based on a more complete iteration of political life in terms 
of social motivations. The focus of this approach centers on how psychological 
attachments anchor behavior in mass politics. Identity takes a central role in belief 
systems in lieu of economic considerations and material self-interest. This new outlook is 
not to discredit rational choice theories. It is to broaden the perspective of those theories 
through the lens of intergroup behavior (Huddy 2018). The focus on political psychology 
opens new avenues to reinterpret both the motivations of the mass electorate and secular 
changes in the development of modern partisanship. 
 The surging emphasis on identity has resuscitated the use of the psychological 
concept of authoritarianism in political analysis. Authoritarianism refers to individuals 
who are averse to uncertainty, and require order to structure their lives. Authoritarianism 
has a checkered history in the literature as a theory, but has regained prominence in the 
past two decades. It is now one of the leading psychological theories of behavior that 
arrays individuals based on their propensity for autonomy or conformity (Feldman 2003). 
These individuals have difficulty living in a liberal democracy. The rehabilitation of 
authoritarianism to explain political phenomena can enlarge the collective understanding 
of political behavior within social identity theory.  
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The integral nature of the concept of authoritarianism to the social identity 
approach has been demonstrated recently. Luttig demonstrates that strong authoritarians 
are strong partisans, and readily conform to elite cues (2017; see also Johnston 2018). 
The spectrum of authoritarians thus helps to explain mass partisanship. Additionally, 
researchers have tied it to racial identity; however, researchers are limited to studying the 
concept in white Americans for reasons of methodology. Currently, a Likert scale 
measuring child-rearing values proxies as the measure for the authoritarian dynamic. The 
proxy is only valid for the attitudes of white respondents since the metaphor of head of 
both the household and of society only applies to white Americans (Pérez and 
Hetherington 2014). A Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale alternatively exists, yet 
it is faulted as being a tautology of what it is measuring (Stenner 2005). As a result, the 
findings of studies that use the RWA scale are flawed and are unreliable. 
 Curiously, the focus on identity and authoritarianism has overlooked any potential 
relation to gender despite the importance of gender to identity. In all human societies, sex 
and age form the only two non-arbitrary distinctions between human beings (McDonald 
et al. 2011). Individuals inform their behavior based on considerations of one’s sex. 
Consequently, gender is of concern to this political analysis. It is the cultural differences 
applied to the sexes that create gender (Huddy et al. 2008, 32). Gendered distinctions 
between the sexes inform self-interest. Political conflict magnifies these distinctions 
when they form the basis of policymaking, and make them a matter of investigation for 
political scientists (Magnussen & Maracek 2012). The failure to link authoritarianism and 
gender within the nexus of social identity theory presents an opportunity to produce a 
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more developed understanding of the concept of authoritarianism and its role in 
contemporary politics.  
The thrust of this inquiry will center on answering how authoritarianism and 
gender interact in the context of social identity to affect political behavior. This 
investigation will probe the extent to which the impact of authoritarianism on political 
behavior is conditioned by gender distinctions. It is argued that authoritarianism is a 
prime mover of political preferences as a psychological mechanism whereas gender 
results from interactions with one’s environment through the use of causal pathway 
models (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller & Shanks 1996, 192). Gender is less 
consequential to preference formation than authoritarianism, but still matters. One 
expects gender to exert its strongest effect on political behavior in the absence of 
influence from authoritarianism. The central thesis is that the influence of gender and its 
interaction with authoritarianism will be different depending on one’s sex. One expects 
this result due to the importance of party affiliation to one’s social identity. 
Party affiliation is central to substantiate the thesis. One should expect this 
relation between gender and authoritarianism across political issues due to the rise of 
affective polarization in modern partisanship. Affective polarization is the process 
whereby elite ideological polarization induces mass partisan affiliation to assume a social 
dimension (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Policy issues are not distinct and judged on 
separate considerations in this context, but matter insofar as they benefit one’s party. 
Individuals treat their party affiliation as a social identity, and evaluate objects through 
personal identity instead of rational reflection (Mason & Wronski 2018). Consequently, 
this process generates strong emotional attachments to fellow partisans and derogation of 
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opponents. The basis of social identity in affective partisanship ties the mechanisms of 
authoritarianism and gender to political preferences. Elite polarization intensifies the 
relation between gender and authoritarianism in partisanship. Party elites frame their 
policies in the trappings of gender. Elite stances on tolerance and other social 
arrangements have also induced authoritarians to sort between the parties (Hetherington 
& Weiler 2009).  
One expects in the context of extreme partisanship that gender and 
authoritarianism will interact across issue domains. This predicted outcome will not 
manifest as expected in the results of hypothesis testing. The tests attempted to 
demonstrate that gender moderates preferences across the authoritarian dynamic on issues 
of cultural preferences, partisan competition, and economic redistribution. One finds that 
authoritarianism and gender interacted as expected in relation to abstract issues of social 
arrangements and cultural preferences. The intelligibility of these issues to respondents is 
assumed to have produced the anticipated results. Yet, intelligibility cannot explain why 
the results did not manifest as expected with regard to economic issues. In this situation, 
one concludes that the influence of partisanship outweighed the influence of gender and 
authoritarianism. The overriding impact of partisanship helps explain the lack of a 
relation between authoritarianism and gender in questions of affective evaluations of 
politics. It is no surprise that partisanship matters to position staking, yet it is surprising 
how its influence prevailed over psychological influencers like authoritarianism. The 
results direct one to reconsider the operationalization of these tests broadly and the 
expansive conception of authoritarianism narrowly.  
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Chapter 2: The History and Applications of Authoritarianism 
The central focus of this study is authoritarianism. Therefore, one must articulate 
a concept of it before all else. Customarily, scholars will note only a few characteristics 
of authoritarian behavior before advancing to their experimentation (Hetherington & 
Weiler 2009, 36). The discussion of the MacWilliams article introduced broad 
characteristics of authoritarian voters. Additionally, one has discussed the wider political 
context in which popularity for the use of authoritarianism as a theoretical lens has been 
revived. A lot more intimacy with the concept is required before being able to formulate 
hypotheses. 
Definitions of authoritarianism vary because scholars disagree on a construction 
of the concept (Altemeyer 1988; Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Stenner 2005). This lack 
of consensus complicates the matter. In many cases, models are reduced to their 
methodology (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 2003). Despite a large empirical literature, 
authoritarianism is still somewhat controversial for this imprecise theoretical conception 
(Lavine et al. 2005, 220). Indeed, foundational questions remain in dispute on how to 
properly understand authoritarian motivations in a narrow psychological sense and in the 
broader human experience (Shuman et al. 1992). It is crucial to any inquiry of the 
political effects of authoritarianism to therefore articulate a conception. Stenner notes the 
cost of theoretical permissiveness to date in the literature: 
Without careful distinction among the causes, essential elements, and 
consequences of authoritarianism, we risk mistaking one component for 
another or for the whole, and deceiving or confusing ourselves regarding 
its nature and dynamics (2005, 5). 
 
 One must take stock of the looseness of received theories. The advantage is that it 
has allowed researchers to innovate. However, it is critical to arrange a working 
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definition before analyzing data in conjunction with other influences on preference 
formation like gender. A solid foundation is especially important for political analyses in 
relation to public opinion surveys to understand the electorate. One must compare and 
discuss different concepts of authoritarianism with the goal of evaluating the models 
based on the most thorough and logically defensible studies of authoritarianism. To this 
end, one will take the approach of deconstructing models into component parts (Allison 
& Zelikow 1999). The emphasis of this focus evaluates premises, inference patterns, and 
the methodology. One must compare the theoretical distinction, predicted characteristics 
of the behavior, and the experimental designs of models to gauge them. This exercise 
produces only one theory of authoritarianism fit for the rigors of experimentation. 
This account intends to go beyond other academic discussions on authoritarianism 
by briefly examining the philosophical roots of the concept to aid in evaluating modern 
theories. Scholars rarely cite the history of ideas in which authoritarianism was formed in 
defense of their understanding, but this tradition directed the original pioneers of 
authoritarianism. If scholars do cite the philosophy aspect, it is in passing (Feldman & 
Stenner 1997, 741). The sloppiness of this first empirical study of authoritarianism 
estranged scholars from its philosophical endowment, yet one can draw guiding insights 
by exploring its intellectual development. This process is a worthwhile first step to 
introducing various theories of authoritarianism, and goes beyond the aim of this inquiry 
by distinguishing authoritarianism from other quite similar concepts like prejudice and 
intolerance. 
Authoritarianism became a popular concept in psychology due to the efforts of 
Theodore Adorno and his colleagues (Van Ijzendoorn 1989). It was a core concept of 
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philosophers and sociologists in the Frankfurt School tradition before then, but Adorno 
and his colleagues undertook the first academic inquiry of the idea in the late 1940s. The 
School was a clearinghouse for progressive sociologists during the interwar period. In 
many ways, authoritarianism is one of many ideas to emerge from the School. In other 
ways, it is a culmination of multiple strands of its thought. The road toward the inception 
of the School begins with the upheaval of the First World War. The War shattered faith in 
the promise of the Enlightenment to deliver human progress through reason. The social 
turbulence also contributed to the rise of fascism, and the violence associated with 
totalitarian regimes. The Frankfurt School incorporated to understand why the prevailing 
trust in reason had misled society to ruin. These academics sought to account for the 
decline of bourgeois liberal-democratic regimes, and the apparent loss of individuality 
associated with advanced, capitalist societies (Hammer 2006; Wolin 2006). 
Adorno’s philosophical corpus reads as an indictment of the developments of his 
day. Adorno is a cultural Marxist with Freudian psychological views who held an 
existentialist outlook on ontology and aesthetics (Hammer 2006). Authoritarianism is, by 
nature of affiliation, submersed in a perspective of struggle and becoming. One 
characterizes the Frankfurt School itself as a continuation of Marxist thought. Marx 
argued that history necessarily unfolded according to stages in the conflict between 
economic classes. Frankfurt scholars sought to understand why Marxist predictions had 
yet not come to fruition (Arato & Gebhardt 1978).  
They search to understand what was missing from their ideologies. Marx 
documented how the bourgeois exploited their privileged position in control of capital to 
legitimize their economic hegemony, but he and his adherents overlooked how capitalist 
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institutions affected culture. Frankfurt scholars like Adorno realized this oversight, and 
the need to enlarge the critical scope of their subject-matter (Wolin 2006, 52). The 
bourgeois entrenched their position in economic relations by manipulating culture in a 
given society. The levers over cultural power allowed them to perpetuate their self-
interest in the maintenance of capitalism (Friedman 1981, 65; Tar 1977). It was argued 
that the bourgeois mobilized the institutions of state and civil society to inculcate false 
interests among the populace.1 Mass media, in particular, ensconced subservience in 
society by eliminating independent artisans and propagandizing art to normalize 
exploitation. 
Adorno followed this Marxist critique of culture. He believed that advanced 
capitalism eventually eliminated all unregulated aspects of human life, and thus the idea 
of private sphere for individuals. The public and private needs of individuals in 
developed capitalist societies were collapsed into one dimension through the 
standardization of production, and left meaningless outside the interests of capitalist 
contexts (Tar 1977, 76; 162-166). Production in these types of states established a 
pernicious conformity through standardization at the expense of human originality and 
initiative. 
The focus of the Frankfurt School gradually shifted in the 1930s away from 
totalitarian systems towards the individuals within them. The growing hostility of Nazi 
Germany particularly motivated persecuted members of the Frankfurt School, nearly all 
of whom were Jewish, to understand individual endorsement of totalitarian regimes. 
Their psychological reasoning drew its philosophical inspiration from existentialism. 
 
1 This nascent critical theory would, in fact, continue to influence social reformers like those in the feminist 
movement decades later. 
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Existentialist ontology is the belief that existence precedes essence. One makes who they 
are to become. The existentialist aesthetic is therefore the will to live authentically 
(McDonald 2017). Authenticity comes from living deliberately without losing oneself in 
the finite of conformity or the paralysis of the infinite. However, the freedom to become 
one’s own self is considered dreadful and plagued with anxiety. Philosophers from 
Augustine to Kierkegaard to Camus have consequently concluded that it is often easier to 
seek refuge in the safety of conformity by outsourcing one’s self to the shelter of group 
affiliations (Ferreira 2009, 119).  
A consequential figure in German philosophy at the time, Nietzsche echoes these 
themes of becoming in his discourses on freedom and morality. He believed that the 
success of the Enlightenment had made it incompatible to be reasonable in Modernity 
while holding mystical beliefs in so-called true-world theories (Young 2010, 366). 
Nietzsche’s views inspired the famous lamentation that God is dead, and that men must 
become gods simply to console themselves for the greatest of all losses. The destruction 
of metaphysical claims leaves individual free to will their own existence in life.2 
Nietzsche recognizes that people will still need to believe in something, however 
(Friedman 1981, 63). Individuals will flock toward divined real-world theories to 
compensate for the loss of God and thus metaphysical certainty. These theories range 
from economic ideology to racial bigotry Conformity for Nietzsche eventually becomes 
fanaticism.  
“What opposes Nietzschean freedom of spirit is fanaticism, understood as 
a vehement commitment to some faith or value-set given from without, 
 
2 The existential concept that people exist before they create who they are influenced early discourses on 
authoritarianism. Fromm encapsulates this concept in his work (1941). His discourse mirrors this synopsis. 
He argues that people who do not seek authenticity will instead try to escape from freedom. This escape 
means that they abscond by hiding behind authoritarian directives of who to be. 
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which is motivated by a need to believe in something because one lacks 
the self-determination to think for oneself” (Anderson 2017). 
 
Frankfurt scholars enmeshed the existentialist outlook with their project to 
rehabilitate Marx. Their philosophical synthesis adopted Freud’s psychology to account 
for conformity in the nature of the human condition (Adorno et al. 1950, 5; Friedman 
1981). The development of thought in the later years of the Frankfurt School heavily 
incorporated psychoanalysis to describe social phenomenon (Wolin 2006, 46). Freud 
popularized the concept of the subconscious, which opened the theoretical space to study 
false consciousness. He argued that individuals require a sense of meaning and of an 
authority in charge. Without these goods, individuals ameliorate their condition through 
the sublimation of the self by way of group immersion (Arato & Gebhardt 1978, 120). 
However, certain individuals are more prone to conform than others. Freud explored 
childhood experiences with discipline to explain conformist propensities and other 
personality syndromes. This basis of authoritative parental pedagogy pervades Frankfurt 
School thinking (Horkheimer 2002, 100). The modern iteration of this idea heavily 
influences experimental designs in certain iterations of authoritarian theory. 
These philosophical currents intersected in the social milieu of the Interwar period 
to result in the idea of authoritarianism (Arato & Gebhardt 1978, 96). They culminate 
with the first empirical study of authoritarianism as a personality (Adorno et al. 1950). 
The purpose of this study was to determine if Nazis still existed in post-war Germany 
despite the defeat of Nazism. The collaboration attempted to construct personality types 
of intolerant individuals based on a battery of questionnaires known as the F-scale. The 
scales tapped items like anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, beliefs about hierarchy, 
aggressiveness, concern about the behavior of others, and tradition. They were devised in 
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response to in-depth interviews with tolerant and intolerant individuals. They conclude 
that “stereotyped, hierarchical, and dichotomous thinking and behavior in terms of 
ingroup-outgroup relationships and superordinations and subordinations is characteristic 
of the authoritarian personality—the origins of which go back to the parent-child 
relationship” (Tar 1977, 108-109). 
The brief exegesis of Frankfurt School philosophy highlights the importance of 
conformity with regard to original conception of authoritarians to distinguish it from 
mere intolerance. The dour inaccessibility of metaphysical truths will lead certain 
individuals to suffer ontologically without seeking affiliation with some divined group. 
Conformity is an essential component to understand the origins of authoritarianism. This 
perspective need not carry the particular biases associated with the original concept like 
Marxism or Freudianism. The act of conforming in and of itself is what appears to 
matters. It is perhaps the most fundamental trade-off in a person’s life and politics: how 
much autonomy should one sacrifice to the larger society (Miller 2003, 20). In this light, 
authoritarianism becomes a matter of political interest. Therefore, one can deploy it to 
study the electorate with a proper theoretical basis.  
Toward An Academic Theory 
Authoritarianism is characterized as the “union of Germany theory and American 
empiricism” (Tar 1977, 102). One has skimmed the philosophy behind the idea to present 
some essential meaning to the term. This search for roots gives rise to a conception of 
authoritarianism as conformity for protection amidst unknowns. It suggests that 
individual decisions to relinquish autonomy are not so much deliberate as they are an 
underlying psychological mechanism. The next step is evaluating how this mechanism 
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operates. The matter of what parts to expunge and what parts to retain in the theoretical 
model is the goal of this section. The sophistication of research studies and national 
surveys has forced scholars to inductively revise the mechanics of authoritarianism as the 
study of public opinion matured. Scholars identified new avenues for its application at the 
same time. Any theory must withstand the demands of scrutiny and applicability against 
this development.  
A theory is critical for authoritarian studies in isolation and along other concepts 
that influence preference formation. The popularity of the concept has generated an 
extensive literature, so there are choices of models available. Authoritarianism met with 
instant acclaim in the post-war academic scene (Van Ijzendoorn 1989). The expanse of 
the literature offers multiple ways to conduct a review moving forward. A chronology 
through the major revisions to prevailing models seems to be the most logical procedure 
to cover 70 years of material. In the chronology, one will evaluate the varying 
psychological motivations underpinning authoritarianism. These psychological aspects 
engender how one perceives the mechanics of conformist behavior. The intended purpose 
is to critically introduce the various models, and to compare and contrast them along the 
way. 
It is only sensible that one commences this discussion with Adorno and his 
colleagues’ Freudian concept of authoritarianism. The consensus on this model is 
resounding: the proposal of an authoritarian personality left outstanding theoretical and 
methodological concerns for the lasting viability of the original model. Critics 
immediately aspersed the integrity of the study (Martin & Westie 1959, 521). The idea of 
a personality syndrome, in which an individual derogated other people from different 
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groups due to misplaced affect from childhood, did not produce uniform results across 
similar populations (Allport 1960; Singer & Feshbach 1959, 404). Scholars could not 
reproduce the results with different subjects in different environments (Masling 1954). 
Observed fluctuations in the aggregate of number of authoritarians and their preferences 
pointed to the fact that a problem existed at a fundamental level (Altemeyer 1988, 22-24). 
This problem would continue to plague models of authoritarianism. Personality should 
not change readily for its role as an essential identity in an individual. Preferences should 
also remain similar if they are characteristics of a personality type. The Freudian 
psychology that imbued the concept also sabotaged its viability.  
The fault in the original work on authoritarianism is that the reasoning was not 
based on any inductive method. The application of psychoanalysis carried with it a 
distinct non-falsifiable property in interpreting results (Altemeyer 1988). One did not test 
to negate the claim that core concepts like childhood trauma or other psychological 
illnesses led to authoritarian personalities. Conversely, any outcome could be explained 
after the fact as having an ulterior psychological basis, and could not be empirically 
linked to an underlying authoritarian personality directly (Titus & Hollander 1957, 62). 
The focus on personality limited analysis in the face of changing environmental 
conditions, and left the model unable to account for variations in observation. Moreover, 
the dubious construction of the F-scale left scholars uncertain of what they were 
measuring in subjects (Christie & Jahoda 1954). The F-scale had internal consistency, but 
lacked validity and uni-dimensionality. The wide reach of the questionnaires for the scale 
tapped too many other latent concepts besides the nebulous concept of authoritarianism.  
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Despite its flaws, the concept seemed irresistible to shelf. Scholars applied it to 
contemporary political events through the middle of the 20th century. The original 
publication introduced psychology to the study of ideologues, which was in vogue during 
the Cold War (Tar 1977, 62). The novelty of the concept generated speculation about the 
links between personalities and private, intolerant, interpersonal behavior in the new 
domain of public research. The application quickly moved beyond the focus of racial 
bigotry and anti-Semitism. The looseness of the theory meant that it was applied in 
variety of other places. For instance, scholars attempted to find a link between 
authoritarianism and leftist ideologies of socialism and communism (Eysenck 1954; 
Shills 1954; later Ray 1983, Stone 1980). Lipset attempted to link class status with 
authoritarianism by noting that poorer individuals tended to have higher levels of support 
for illiberalism (1959). Yet, the search for left-wing authoritarianism fizzled for the same 
methodological reason that failed to link right-wing authoritarianism to personality. The 
F-scale did not access an underlying personality syndrome. The questions regarding 
specific intolerant preferences instead left the methodology open to the criticism that it 
measured political attitudes (Stenner 2005, 16). 
This initial translation of authoritarianism from philosophical idea to 
psychological model would arrest its maturation in the literature. The tainted construction 
of its research program led a generation of serious researchers to discredit the theory 
(Duckitt 1989, Wolfe 2005). Fortunes changed for the viability of authoritarianism with 
fundamental alterations to its underlying structure. The rehabilitation of the concept has 
generated two contemporary models. Altemeyer formulated the first of these new models 
with the adoption of a different psychological basis and methodology (1981). In the first 
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instance, he re-imagined authoritarianism as an attitude. He accomplished this end by 
removing personality as the basis for the model. The replacement of the personality 
component de-essentializes the underlying mechanics of authoritarianism in individuals, 
and makes it a reaction to social conditions instead. One is no longer thought of as being 
authoritarian but of becoming authoritarian. The attitudinal model reestablished the 
concept by placing it in the domain of social learning theory, as a result (1988, 62-65). 
This model is problematic. One can understand the defects of understanding 
authoritarianism as social learning by disaggregating the model and reviewing its 
features. Altemeyer’s model rests on three co-varying components: attitudes on 
leadership, social customs and traditions, and different social groups. The extent to which 
one is authoritarian is operationalized in terms of net preferences for each of these three 
categories (Altemeyer 1981). Scholars commonly typify authoritarian behavior by way of 
these categories. However, they disagree on how authoritarianism interacts with the 
external world to produce those attitudes. The inference pattern for personality was that 
individuals held authoritarian attitudes because those attitudes are part of their intrinsic 
character. The inference pattern for the social learning theory is that a person is 
authoritarian because they developed motivated responses to external stimuli over time. 
These attitudes are capable of changing. Conformity results from observing others 
conform, though. It is not an internal motivation, and should not obviously show change. 
Another aspect to parse is the methodology of Altemeyer’s model. The social 
learning model of authoritarianism is faulted for its reinterpretation of the classic F-scale 
test. Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) test implements the attitudinal 
conceptualization to probe different aspects and instances of authoritarian preferences in 
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an individual at a given time. Intrinsically, it follows the belief that the F-scale was valid, 
but needed to be fashioned to actually measure authoritarian attitudes (1981, 25). The 
popularity of this formulation is evident in its continued use to this day in the field of 
psychology. However, this shift had the perverse effect in the literature to make the 
definition of authoritarianism synonymous with the methodology of the RWA scale 
(Duckitt 1989, 65).  
The social learning model of authoritarianism constitutes a sizable portion of the 
research literature. It is especially prominent in the field of psychology, but political 
scientists, mostly in non-American contexts, also make use of the model (Bizumic & 
Duckitt 2013; Brandt & Henry 2012; Harteveld et al. 2015). However, it has been 
challenged and criticized in political science. Some argue that attitudinal model lacks any 
underlying vision on which to build the foundation of a theory (Duckitt 1989; Feldman 
2003). The preference for authoritarian social relations undermines the need for 
psychological theory as authoritarianism becomes a reflection of political preferences. It 
is essentially sterilized from its original intent when one views authoritarianism as a 
basket of attitudes. The idea becomes minimally separated from the concept of prejudice 
and intolerance, and often serves as shorthand for it, as a result. It is not distinct in this 
way, and one searches for a reason to refer to it as authoritarianism.  
This argument against Altemeyer’s model joins the critique of the methodology 
for the social learning model. Feldman pointedly states that the RWA scale is not valid 
(2003, 45-46). Like the methodological construct of the F-scale, the RWA scale contains 
numerous questions that are suspiciously close to the dependent variable that 
authoritarianism purports to influence. The RWA conflates authoritarianism with 
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attitudes of intolerance consequently, and does not tap an underlying construct (Stenner 
2005, 5). Authoritarianism needs a basis for organizing an inference pattern and 
methodology that is not a tautology of what it measures. The failure of the RWA scale to 
measure authoritarianism portends consequences to consider for this inquiry. A majority 
of researchers favor the RWA scale to operationalize their experimental design. For this 
reason, this inquiry will not incorporate conclusions from the research of scholars who 
use the RWA scale as anything more than speculation. 
One must disregard the social learning model of authoritarianism, and disqualify 
its use in political analysis. The model is irreparably limited. Another notable critique is 
that, like the original model, Altemeyer’s model fails to capture the autonomy trade-off 
between an individual and society as a dynamic process for individuals (Brown 1995; 
Feldman & Stenner 1997, 742). It fails for two reasons. First, one must also doubt that 
attitudes change as quickly as they do to explain fluctuations in research (Stenner 2005, 
16). Altemeyer’s reinterpretation transformed authoritarianism into learned, patterned 
behavior. Attitudes are acquired and maintained through social interaction. They are 
capable of changing in the short-term unlike the Freudian model, but the model of social 
learning does not offer an explanation to account for sudden changes in individuals or 
wide fluctuation in the aggregate measures either. One may defend the model by stating 
that the attitudes change in response to a powerful catalyst. However, such a defense runs 
counter to the claim that child rearing practices and long-term interactions with others 




In relation to the first critique, researchers secondly cite the lack of dynamism in 
the social learning model as an inherent flaw. This critique is a recent one as new 
conceptions of personality have emerged. It was never originally posited in response to 
problems with theorizing authoritarianism. The concept of dynamism took nearly a half-
century of development to percolate through the field of psychology, and nest in the 
literature on authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner 1997). Researchers introduced the 
concept in response to constant and troubling findings of varying levels of 
authoritarianism within other proposed models such as the attitudinal model (Stenner 
2005). Previously, theories of authoritarianism lacked any mechanism to explain change 
in relation to one’s interaction with their environment. They envisioned the individual as 
a stable entity in his/her environment whether in terms of personality or attitudes. 
Dynamism imagines an individual having a stable personality with preferences that 
change based on ephemeral events. These preferences revert to something resembling a 
status-quo ante position after a bout with turbulence when the effect of the stimulus fades 
(Cantor & Synder 1998).  
Dynamism explains the shortcomings of the previous models based on a revised 
conception of personality. The preferences of authoritarians tend to remain strong and 
constant over time despite situational changes in one’s environment (Hetherington & 
Weiler 2009, 41; Hetherington & Suhay 2011). The same response does not happen with 
other individuals on the authoritarian spectrum, however. They react according the 
potency and direction of outside stimuli with regard to their authoritarian inclinations 
(Lavine et al. 1999, 338; Stenner 2005, 61). Sales and Friend observe this problem 
tangentially in their argument against personality as an internally-regulating system. They 
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found that the presence of anxiety in a test environment raised levels of authoritarianism 
(1973). This outcome is outside the explanatory capacity of both the Freudian personality 
or social learning model. The failure to identify this problem sooner is that researchers 
looked at macro-level data with the notion that authoritarians and authoritarianism were 
synonymous (Doty et al. 1991; McFarland et al. 1995). This realization of a distinction 
prompted one to view authoritarianism as an interactive process instead between an 
individual and societal conditions. People will maintain their authoritarian disposition, 
but levels of support for authoritarian social arrangements and cultural preferences will 
fluctuate (Stenner 2005). 
The concept of dynamism pioneered a breakthrough for the research of 
authoritarianism. Ultimately, it renders only one model fit for consideration. This model 
relies on the concept of ephemeral changes of preferences in the face of developing social 
events. Its causal mechanism will be essential for mapping the psychological processes of 
authoritarianism. It will provide the basis to understanding the potency of social identities 
like gender in political conflict. The foregoing review was beneficial to these ends by 
removing other models from consideration, and demonstrating the necessity of a 
defensible theory for understanding authoritarianism. One’s knowledge of how 
authoritarianism operates would be limited otherwise. The analysis of the dynamic model 
will serve the same end as before to substantiate it for application to political analysis. 
Detractors of the social learning model advocate for the dynamic model of 
authoritarianism (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). The key innovation of this model is 
dynamism. In this way, one views the individual in the functionalist approach to 
personality as both enduring yet situational (Brown 1995; Cantor & Synder 1998). This 
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perspective is distinct from the internally regulated concept of personality as found with 
Adorno and his collaborator’s psychic model where behavioral responses endure across 
situations. To fully comprehend the consequences of the functionalist view, one must 
deconstruct the processes underway at the individual level between personality and 
environment. Under normal circumstances, one expects an enduring personality to be 
present. Scholars conclude that an individual has a unique predisposition toward 
authoritarianism from this logic (Feldman & Stenner 1997, 744). This predisposition is 
innate and considered to be an enduring characteristic of one’s position toward the 
autonomy-conformity tradeoff. Changes in one’s preference for authoritarian outcomes 
can occur when their predisposition comes into contact with outside events. 
Environmental cues cause the individual to change preferences in the short-term. The 
individual returns to their original set of preferences as the stimulus fades into the long 
term. As a result, one can account for changes in authoritarian political preferences in a 
population without having to explain how the aggregate level of authoritarians changed. 
This model relies on anxiety from an environmental threat as the explanatory 
variable for operationalizing the dynamic. Most forms of threat appear to be relevant to 
interact with authoritarian predispositions to produce higher levels of support for 
authoritarian behavior as long as the threat produces feelings of uncertainty about future 
outcomes (Stenner 2005, 19). Threat alters a person’s temperament toward tolerance 
(Marcus et al. 1995). Feldman and Stenner find economic threat from employment 
uncertainty triggered a change in authoritarian preferences (1997, 764). However, the 
agreement on the degree to which economic anxiety provokes a reaction in manifest 
authoritarian preferences is not settled (Stenner 2005, 68). Political uncertainty from a 
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variety of sources is sufficient to provoke an interaction (Conover & Miller 2015; 
Feldman & Stenner 1997, 765; Greene 2004; Huddy 2002). These sources can range 
from news media uptake to the questionability of the outcome of an election.3 Real or 
imagined threat motivates a short-term deviation in one’s authoritarian preferences. In 
response, individuals across the authoritarian spectrum gravitate toward authoritarian 
preferences. It is believed that only non-authoritarians redouble their commitment toward 
autonomy during threatening situations (Stenner 2005; however, see Hetherington & 
Weiler 2009, 43). 
The dynamic model also utilizes a valid measure to reflect its conceptualization. 
The problem with the RWA scale is that it is a measure of authoritarian preferences. One 
cannot draw logical inferences about authoritarianism from the RWA scale due to this 
flaw. Luckily, the literature posits an alternative measure to operationalize 
authoritarianism. This measure is a scale of four questions regarding child-rearing values, 
the CRV scale. The questions measure one’s pedagogy concerning the upbringing of 
children in a parsimonious manner without tapping political allegiances or policy 
commitments. The CRV scale is valid because it is a non-intrusive probe of the trade-off 
between conformity and autonomy (Feldman & Stenner 1997). The relation of parent to 
child is a microcosm of an individual to society. A conformist to society would prefer 
that one’s child uncritically accept parental authority. Martin and Westie found that 
tolerant and intolerant people more sharply divide over child-rearing pedagogy than any 
other measure for authoritarianism (1959, 555).  The benefit of the CRV scale is that it 
has internal validity with experimentation along with external validity through mass 
 
3 It is highly probably that future research will demonstrate that Trump’s authoritarian supporters formed 
the vanguard of the perpetrators of the January 6th coup attempt. 
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surveys (Stenner 2005). The only limitation is that the scale does not tap latent 
authoritarianism in non-white populations (Pérez & Hetherington 2014). That does not 
stifle this inquiry, though. 
The CRV scale captures an individual’s base propensity for authoritarianism 
while questions about social relations measure concrete preferences at a point in time. 
The distinction in the dynamic model presses one to search for a deeper understanding 
about conformist tendencies to understand authoritarianism. The philosophical tradition is 
replete with discussion about this propensity, but it is necessary to introduce the 
psychology of why individuals have varying comfort levels toward autonomy in the first 
place. Childhood upbringing is acknowledged as one aspect, but one must examine other 
identified motivations in individuals (Duckitt 1989; Jost et al. 2003). An individual’s 
predisposition is not the starting point in this model. It is itself a reflection of the other 
psychological needs. These forces drive individuals toward their base predisposition for 
conformity or autonomy through what is labeled authoritarianism. For a robust 
understanding of the dynamic model, one must therefore analyze the psychology of 
conformity (Feldman 2003, 47). 
Several explanations for the tendencies behind conformity are found in models of 
authoritarianism and the larger psychological literature. These explanations generally rest 
on the innate needs of individuals as social beings. From the perspective of sociality, 
people have a need to belong (Cox & Leary 2008). This need is described as “[having] a 
pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and 
significant interpersonal relationships (Baumeister & Leary 1995, 497). Indeed, Cox and 
Leary find this need as foundational to being human (2008). Through this lens, 
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conformity is corollary to one’s desire to maintain social ties. One relinquishes autonomy 
for social acceptance. This conception of social behavior saturates Duckitt’s perspective 
on authoritarianism. He articulates the premise that individuals prime their 
authoritarianism when group identities are salient (1989, 73). It is not until a threat 
touches on one’s group identity that the issue interacts with one’s predisposition to affect 
authoritarian outcomes (Feldman 2003). This perspective beneficially narrows the range 
of threatening stimuli that alter commitments to autonomy. One can discern this group-
centric perspective in other models. 
The motivation to conform is explicitly addressed by proponents of the dynamic 
model. They cite a need for order in their elaboration on the mainspring of 
authoritarianism (Stenner 2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 34). The need for order is 
not mutually exclusive of the need to belong, but is rather a different frame. The crux of 
this argument is that individuals with a high predisposition toward authoritarianism have 
difficulties with a lack of order. They need certainty, so they affix themselves to any 
authority capable of producing order. This order is divinized for the certainty it provides, 
and individuals form their identity around it. Social norms become fixed instead of fluid; 
natural instead of conditional; permanent instead of temporary. As Grabennesch explains: 
[One] discourages or obviates any activity which would tamper 
with a social world that is superordinate and infused with transcendental 
authority… [This] world is self-justifying. Being morally and 
ontologically superior to men, it demands that men strive to adjust 
themselves to it. [These] institutional orders admit of no legitimate 
compromises, deviations, or alternatives (1972, 864). 
 
It is therefore no coincidence that authoritarians believe in biblical inerrancy in greater 
terms than non-authoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 36; Hogg et al. 2010). 
Traditions provide wisdom beyond the creation of ordinary people, and likely come from 
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some “higher authority” (Feldman 2003, 49). Consequently, one must actively defend 
“the order” from any challenges as a moral imperative. 
The Role of Closure in the Authoritarian Dynamic 
 The need to belong and the need for order represent two powerful arguments to 
explain the motivation behind the authoritarian predisposition in authoritarianism. The 
accounts of each need are convincing and credible for understanding human behavior in 
their own right. However, they do not appear to be the appropriate underlying frame, 
overall. Recent scholarship posits another need as the core human motivation in the 
autonomy-conformity tradeoff (Dhont et al. 2013; Hogg 2014). This scholarship claims 
that the need for closure is the central psychological basis to incorporate to understand 
conformity. The need for closure supersedes and subsumes the other listed needs 
(Keersmaecher et al. 2016; Kruglinski et al. 2006). One should not discard the 
explanatory potential of other needs; however, one should view those needs from the 
perspective of the need for closure (Hogg 2000). One can think of closure conversely as 
the need for certainty or the need to know. The need for closure relies on social identity 
to satisfy epistemological needs, and therefore connects authoritarianism to matters of 
social identity (Hogg & Adelman 2013). This connection to social identity harmonizes 
with previous theorizing on authoritarianism, and provides the lens to theorize about the 
relation between it and gender in modern politics. 
The need for closure forms the basis of uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg 2014, 
338). The central tenet of this theory is that human beings require epistemological claims 
about reality to reduce the fear associated with the larger unknown (Kruglanski et al. 
2006). Individuals turn to groups to meet this demand as groups provide instructional 
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affirmations through identification. Thus, group behavior is “formed or forged to meet 
undefined or unstructured situations” (Blumer 1956, 683). The construction of a shared 
reality is necessary to achieve this end. Shared reality is the basis of identity for group 
members in social psychology. Its legacy is well established in the field (Sherif 1936; 
Festinger 1954; Kahneman et al. 1982).  
Groups offer epistemological protection from uncertainty. Unlike brick and 
mortar structures, though, groups are not physical constructions. They are socially 
acknowledged distinctions with their own values (Commins & Lockwood 1979, 281-
282). Group cohesion exists in the minds of individuals who consider their identity, in 
part, reliant on a connection to others based on some shared method of categorization 
(Tajfel 1981). Human beings are remarkable in their capacity to categorize objects in 
their environment. This categorization extends to other human beings. Affect toward 
other individuals depends on the appraisal of the category in which someone is placed. 
This appraisal applies to one’s self as individuals seek meaningful identities to bolster 
self-esteem. A person’s core identifications will shade how they interpret and perceive 
their social environment. In this way, groups meet one’s need for closure by the degree to 
which they are central to one’s identity.  
Social groups differ in their cohesiveness. Hogg refers to “groups that are well 
structured with clear boundaries, and in which members interact and share group 
attributes and goals and have a common fate” as entitative (2014, 339; see also Hamilton 
& Sherman 1996). Entitative groups exert pressure on individuals to conform to the 
group prototype due to their cohesion (Festinger 1954). Individuals with a high need for 
closure exhibit a higher propensity toward conformity, and seek out entitative groups to 
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meet this need. However, individuals with a low need for closure may also find utility in 
membership in entitative groups. Group members must hold similar attitudes and beliefs. 
They must mutually acknowledge the group as a category otherwise they would not be 
considered linked (Bar-Tal 1990). Robust groups have a distinct culture to inform 
members of the group’s conception and perception of reality. A political party, church 
congregation, or ethnic group is thus more entitative than a mass of sports fans, for 
instance, despite the high levels of cohesiveness in each group. The benefit of the need 
for closure over other explanations is that it directs one to focus on salient group 
identities as order-providers for the explanation of authoritarianism on behavior. 
 The need for closure promotes group-centric behavior (Hogg 2014). It motivates 
authoritarian behavior with its compulsion toward conformity, especially during 
threatening times. One observes independent similarities between the effects of a need for 
closure and documented authoritarian behaviors with regard to submission to authority, 
deference to social conventions, and aggression toward out-groups. Conditions of 
uncertainty foster a general desire for strong leadership (Crisp et al. 2012). In the interest 
of maintaining groupness, individuals who are high in the need for closure will ordain a 
prototypical member to lead the group (Van Knippenberg et al. 1994). This leader will 
provide normative assurances and direction to followers. Cicero and colleagues found 
that individuals with high need for closure rated leaders as more effective and motivating 
when they strongly self-identified with the leader’s group (2005). They also found that 
high need for closure members of a group rely heavily on other members to make sense 
of the world. Such individuals seek an autocratic structure to the group to enforce group 
norms and protect group values. More entitative groups resemble cults in the totality of 
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scope and influence it exerts on individual group members (Baron et al. 2003; Hogg 
2005).  
This tendency to maintain group cohesion results in hostility towards out-groups 
as much as it contributes to favoritism for in-group members. The presence of other 
groups helps in the process of group typifying (Mason & Wronski 2018). Other groups 
elucidate the boundaries between one’s own kind and outsiders. Distinct out-groups are 
not necessarily threatening. Certain out-groups may receive positive affect depending on 
the degree to which its reality aligns with one’s in-group (Kruglanski et al. 2006, 88). 
However, out-groups will elicit negative affect if their own understanding of reality 
conflicts with the constructed reality of the in-group. The more uncertain an individual is 
the more likely that they are to sharpen the contrast between their directive sense of self 
and others (Hogg 2014, 340). 
The need for closure provides a compelling explanation to understand individual 
propensities toward conformist behavior (Kruglanski et al. 2006; Luttig 2018). In this 
way, one should adopt it as a principal agent in the motivation behind authoritarian 
predispositions. Therefore, it is important expound the inference pattern of the need for 
closure as it relates to the dynamic model. Authoritarian predispositions toward 
conformity are a reflection of one’s need for closure. Those individuals with high needs 
should therefore have a high predisposition for conformist behavior in the manner one 
describes as authoritarian. A high need for closure may also reflect low cognitive skills 
(Stenner 2005, 147). Although, it is uncertain which way the causal arrow points in that 
regard. Individuals with a high need for closure will seek entitative groups to maximize 
the reassurance that they receive from group identification. Authoritarian behavior will 
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manifest when threats target their group identity, values, or beliefs based on the 
magnitude of the threat. Threatening situations will reinforce commitments to autonomy 
and pluralism in the case of some individuals with a low need for closure (Stenner 2005). 
These individuals may have higher cognitive abilities, and can manage uncertainty 
without manifesting hostility (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). 
The incorporation of uncertainty-identity theory forms the contemporary 
understanding of authoritarianism as a dynamic. It has important consequences for this 
inquiry. First, one may question whether it is prudent to distinguish at all between the two 
concepts. It is important to keep the two components distinct in following with the larger 
literature. Personality factors, childhood upbringing, narrow life experiences, or one’s 
innate character could all contribute to one’s authoritarian predisposition (Stenner 2005, 
143). The authoritarian disposition is the loose term for all these processes that acclimate 
an individual to their preferred level of personal autonomy. Moreover, authoritarianism is 
conceived as a dynamic process while the need for certainty is not. The need for certainty 
underlies authoritarian dispositions. Both concepts operate through the lens of conformity 
and intolerance. Recently, Luttig has argued that the need for closure produces a 
prejudiced personality (2018). He opts to drop the term authoritarianism altogether from 
the discussion. This move disregards the dynamism taken from the functionalist 
understanding of personality. One becomes statically intolerant as opposed to meting 
intolerance based on certain incoming environmental stimuli targeting one’s group 
identity. This inquiry will not end the discussion, but it supports the understanding the 
need for closure as the compulsion to conform found in authoritarian dispositions. 
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The exploration of the models of authoritarianism and the theories of conformity 
have expounded a working conception of authoritarianism. One should finalize this end 
by additionally noting what authoritarianism is not. First, one must explicitly address 
authoritarianism as a desire for groupness and not a particular group. The literature often 
treats authoritarianism as conservatism. The overlap of certain goals and needs may 
indeed nudge authoritarians toward conservatism. However, groups of the conservative 
order are not to be confused with authoritarian groups (Feldman 2003). The notion of a 
distinction runs counter to prevailing thought. Researchers have long equated 
authoritarianism with conservatism or right-wing ideologies (Jost et al. 2003; Ray 1973). 
Jost and colleagues conceptualize conservatism as a motivated social cognition. In this 
way, they distill what they believe to be the essence of conservatism to the same 
psychological underpinnings that give rise to authoritarianism (2003, 345-346). Any type 
of distinction is lost by using the social learning model of authoritarianism. That model 
equates the function of authoritarianism as right-wing intolerance (Altemeyer 1981). The 
lack of theoretical guidance in both cases allows one to conflate the effects of theory with 
the essence of the theory itself.  
Authoritarianism is not ideological conservatism although authoritarians are 
attracted to conservatism for preserving social structures from change (Stenner 2005; 
Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Conservatism is a set of beliefs about legitimate authority 
in a society. Conservatives may similarly believe that traditions are super-ordinate, and 
above the wisdom of individual people. Therefore, they are agents of tradition and 
custom. However, this defense of practices in a community is not a motivated desire to 
defend conformity for a group (Feldman & Stenner 1997). A conservative may support 
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freedom of speech as an established tradition. This freedom would contradict an 
authoritarian’s desire to quash challenges to homogeneity in thought and actions. 
Moreover, one may arrive at conservative positions after intense reasoning. Individuals 
with low cognitive capacities are challenged to engage in the same reflective process 
(Stenner 2005, 146). In sum, conservativism may share similarities with authoritarianism; 
however, it differs in substance. Conservatives are one group, and authoritarianism is 
about groupness.  
The discussion of cognitive reasoning with regard to authoritarianism requires 
that one discuss the role of education. Several studies purport to demonstrate a link 
between education and authoritarianism. They argue that higher levels of education result 
in lower levels of authoritarianism (Federico & Tagar 2014; Lipset 1959; Altemeyer 
1981; Luttig 2017). The substantive effect of education is diffuse. Education in terms of 
knowledge should introduce one to equally-valid, contrarian opinions. A feature of 
education should be the inculcation of tolerance for difference, therefore. Stenner 
disagrees with this causal arrangement though (2005, 173 & 241). She notes that 
individuals with fewer cognitive capabilities tend to avoid higher education, so a 
selection bias develops. The positive effects of education on one’s disposition accrue to 
those people who had the cognitive capacities to work through the exigencies of higher 
education. By her logic, the intervening nature of education on authoritarianism and 
authoritarian behaviors is spurious. Education only explains three percent of variance 




The previous section explored the development of models of authoritarianism in 
relation to advances in the literature. The review yielded a defensible model for 
authoritarianism based on philosophical and psychological insights. Authoritarianism is a 
propensity for groupness. It influences one’s baseline preferences for the structure of 
society and the extent of personal autonomy. Therefore, conformity and intolerance are 
two behaviors one would expect from authoritarians. These behaviors change when an 
individual reacts to the uncertainty in their environment that threatening stimuli create. 
Typically, most individuals sacrifice some autonomy for conformity, and signal 
favorability toward authoritarian preferences. Not all threats are equally potent, however. 
Authoritarians react proportionally to the threat’s centrality to their identity as members 
of entitative groups. The more potent the threat, the more one expects an individual to 
become intolerant and conformist. This focus on group identity is important. In the next 
section, one will place authoritarianism in the realm of politics through this perspective of 
social identity.  
Groupness and Social Identity Theory 
The articulation of a model of authoritarianism in a manner that emphasizes the 
role of group affiliation pays dividends for applications in recent political research. The 
utility of understanding authoritarianism through the dynamic model is that it allows one 
to ground authoritarianism within the inferences of social identity theory as a casual 
mechanism of political behavior. Social identity theory specifies that individuals 
categorize themselves and others into social groups. This act of typifying serves to inform 
partisan beliefs. Individuals dress themselves in terms of group norms and values to 
identify their own politics (Hankin et al. 2000, 434). This line of reasoning treads a 
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familiar path. Thus, their political preferences reflect the degree to which an individual 
conceives of one’s self in terms of a category or group (Greenwald et al. 2002; Huddy 
2018). This system of categorization underpins and generates intergroup behaviors and 
group identification both politically and non-politically (Tajfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987). 
This theory has gained prominence in recent decades to explain the nature of American 
partisanship. Consequently, the emphasis of partisanship as a social identity allows one to 
evaluate the literature through the insights of the authoritarian dynamic. 
Researchers are increasingly adopting a social identity perspective to understand 
political developments (Achens & Bartels 2016; Green et al. 2002; Hankin et al. 2000; 
Mason 2018). The focus on groups in relation to political action is not a new idea. 
Lazersfeld and colleagues recognized that a person “thinks, politically, as he is, socially” 
on the precipice of the quantitative revolution in the social sciences (1944, 27). However, 
the perspective did not gain traction with researchers in the post-war generation. They 
were not keen to consider a social dimension to partisan affiliation. It lacked theoretical 
guidance. Instead, mass political behavior was interpreted through the fashionable 
inferences of rational choice (Downs 1957). Partisanship was a running tally of 
considerations and political learning (Fiorina 1981; Gerber & Green 1999). This 
conception is biased in favor of a rational voter rather than a rationalizing voter 
(Wattenburg 1996).  
Social identity theory operated outside orthodoxy for nearly five decades in 
political science. The concept of the social dimension of partisanship, though, slowly 
developed in association with the Michigan School of political behavior. The Michigan 
model embraced the group-centric nature of politics (Campbell et al. 1960). However, the 
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macroscopic context of political stability and ideological incongruency between political 
parties during the first fledgling decades of quantitative research biased how researchers 
understood politics on a microscopic scale (Fiorina 1981; Franklin & Jackson 1983). A 
long-view of politics covering different eras simply was not available at the time. The 
hegemony of rational choice theory remains robust even after a long-view developed 
(Abramowitz & Webster 2017). For instance, observed parallel movement in public 
opinion among partisans was cited to discredit cognitive heuristics like social identity in 
framing political perspectives even as the body of research matured (Gerber & Green 
1999, 205). The broad perception of political competition had to change before the other 
models could gain acceptability. 
Advances in social identity theory developed despite this environment. In 
psychology, social identity theory traces its prominence to Tajfel’s work on group 
discrimination. Tajfel sought to explain the infamous, and now discredited, Robber’s 
Cave experiment in the mid-1950s. The Robber’s Cave experiment purported to show 
how the power of social group attachments with regards to something trifling like a camp 
group could lead individuals to derogate and even attack out-group members (Mason 
2018, 2). These outcomes raise an interesting question: at what point in identifying with a 
group does an individual orient one’s behavior around the group? He concluded that a 
minimal-group identity did not exist. Human beings categorize themselves to build 
identities, and those identities mean that categorically one either belongs or does not 
belong to a group (Tajfel 1981, 43). 
The potency of group categorization has consequences for the development of 
self-perceived identities and intergroup relations. Identification with a group influences 
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cognitive decision-making processes. Consequently, one exaggerates the differences 
between and similarities within groups (Tajfel 1979). In turn, individuals are motivated 
by their allegiance to their group to act fraternally with their fellow partisans and 
suspicious toward outsiders (Engelhardt & Utych 2018; McConnell et al. 2017; Tajfel & 
Turner 1986). The process of categorization changes how one feels about others in one’s 
social environment. The triviality or absurdity of the reason behind the group’s cohesion 
does not matter. The mere act of self-categorization results in affect and prejudice (Tajfel 
1970). The process of differentiation could occur over anything arbitrary. Hundreds of 
experiments have demonstrated the underlying tendency of individuals to sort socially, 
and to stereotype others accordingly (Gagnon & Bourhis 1996; Hankin et al. 2000, 435).  
Social identity theory engenders a view of conflict oriented around group 
memberships. This perspective compliments theories of conformity. Tajfel and Turner 
believed that individuals behave in ways to sharpen the contrast between in-groups and 
out-groups (1979). However, scholars are not certain whether to infer in-group affection 
or out-group derogation from the desire to define boundaries between groups. This 
distinction is important to interpret the motivations and designs of political conflict. It is 
possible that in-group affection and out-group derogation need not occur at the same time 
in political action (Brewer & Brown 1998). Yet, this dual process model thus begs the 
questions. What are the circumstances and situations in which one is primed to seek 
positive self-identification with a group as opposed to negative self-identification in 
opposition to another group? The literature provides a rich debate on how conflict results 
from the efforts to differentiate the consequences of social identity theory. 
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The inference pattern of motivations in social identity theory matters for political 
analysis. Scholars are in disagreement over the underlying motivational processes and 
interpretation of intergroup behavior. Social identity theory is premised on the 
assumption that individuals join groups to gain a positive identity (Brown 1995, 174). 
Thus, one must view intergroup behavior as the result of the desire to obtain and maintain 
a positive self-identity. A sizable portion of the literature on social identity emphasizes 
the need for positive self-esteem through group differentiation (Brewer 1999; Turner et 
al. 1987, 42). Originally, Tajfel found that even meaningless group identities produced 
in-group favoritism without corresponding out-group derogation (1970).  
One concludes that individuals sort others in order to elevate one’s sense of 
regard. Brewer takes this opinion in her commentary on the minimal group paradigm. 
She observes that psychologists tend to conclude that bias results from a groundswell of 
in-group favoritism when it does occur (1979, 321). People want to feel better about 
themselves through the groups with which they associate. Identity offers esteem as much 
as affirmation. In this way, Huddy critiques the perspective of group identification as an 
irrational, hollow exercise. Groups provide a positive identity with which to share with 
other people. These bonds bestow a sense of unity of purpose, and offer a common vision 
of the good (2018, 7). Groups provide a source for self-esteem insofar as someone 
identifies with a group. 
The positive differentiation perspective does not stand unchallenged. On the other 
side, scholars conclude that intergroup behavior results from opposition to other group 
identities. These scholars criticize the conditions under which the proponents of positive 
differentiation derive their conclusions. They acknowledge that individuals seek positive 
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self-esteem through identity, and will even accrue esteem from meaningless identities. 
However, bias from increased positive self-evaluation tends to occur in the absence of 
competition (Hogg & Abrams 1988). One may find these conditions present in a 
laboratory, yet the absence of competition is not a tenable assumption in real-world social 
relations. It is the case that “social and economic conditions leading to rivalry between 
groups for various kinds of objective benefits are associated with a diffusion of certain 
derogatory notions about the outgroup” (Tajfel 1981, 224). Competition heightens the 
saliency of group identities as it promotes uncertainty of future events. Identities entrench 
under such conditions. Competition enhances the antagonism between groups in a 
mutually reinforcing pattern. Intense competition can alter the stakes to the point where 
one even acquires self-esteem from the domination of out-groups (Sidanius et al. 1994). 
In these situations, one arrives at derogation as an end unto itself.     
The entrenchment of group identification through conflict alters social calculus. It 
makes domineering the essential motivation for intergroup relations (Conover & Miller 
2015; Mason 2018). The desire to win has perverse effects on the behavior of individuals. 
People will act counter to their pure material self-interest for the intangible gain of having 
their group victorious in competition. In one situation where individuals could choose 
between all participants receiving the maximum benefit, including members of the out-
group, or in-group members taking reduced benefits but also winning the competition, 
Tajfel and colleagues found that “it is the winning that seems more important to them” 
(1971, 172). The irrational nature of this competition means individuals seek to hamper 
out-group members. McConnell and colleagues found that 75 percent of test subjects 
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were willing to forgo a doubling of their reward bonus to avoid the researchers 
concomitantly making a donation to the opposite political party (2017, 15). 
The conflict-oriented perspective does not come without its share of criticism. It 
is a given that individuals will experience competition with others at some point in their 
life. The real question is whether it is tenable to assume that competition automatically 
induces or is motivated by out-group derogation. One imagines that there must be an 
upper limit to the influence that competition has on intergroup behavior in a liberal, 
democratic society (Engelhardt & Utych 2018; Lelkes & Westwood 2017). A liberal quip 
is that Trump supporters would burn down their home if the smoke caused a liberal 
displeasure. However, one can recognize the hyperbole.4 Indeed, McConnell and his 
collaborators saw test subjects forgoing a doubling of their bonus from $3 to $6 in order 
to avoid a rival political party from gaining $3. The sums are inconsequential; so, one can 
engage in identity signaling without consequential material damage. Lelkes and 
Westwood conclude that partisans do avoid hostility, overall. “Partisans willingly engage 
in some behavior that might incidentally cause harm to the opposition… but they are not 
willing to impose harm” (2017, 496).  
Moreover, the desire to defeat an out-group must derive from a motivation to 
score a victory for one’s own side at some level. The proponents of out-group derogation 
fail to acknowledge the presupposition of in-group favoritism. Otherwise, why compete 
in the first place? Competition, therefore, induces a double-down effect by promoting an 
in-group favoritism. The positive identity is primed, and consequently, one is motivated 
to defend it. However, this process may not operate uniformly across different types of 
 
4 This sentence was written before the January 6th Coup attempt where Trump and his supporters did 
metaphorically try to burn down the People’s House. The author stands partially corrected. 
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threat or circumstances. If there are limits to the effects of competition with regard to out-
group derogation, does derogation occur in every situation? The answer could reside with 
the emotion that the out-group inspires in the member of the in-group. Hewstone and 
colleagues comment that: 
“an out-group that violates in-group norms may elicit disgust and 
avoidance; an out-group seen as unjustly benefiting (e.g., from 
government programs) may elicit resentment and actions aimed at 
reducing benefits; and an out-group seen as threatening may elicit fear and 
hostile actions (2002, 580). 
 
Another factor is the entitativity of the groups in question. Individuals acquire a sense of 
shared fate the more central a group’s membership is to them. Someone who has 
internalized the group prototype will be more sensitive to perceived differences and 
detractions both within and without the group (Branscombe et al. 1995). This individual, 
perhaps an authoritarian, may be inclined to register out-group behavior as threatening, 
and react with fear and hostility. Strong group members appear more likely to turn 
negative when the stakes are personal and consequential (Conover & Miller 2015; 
Iyengar & Westwood 2015). 
 The ongoing debate involved with intergroup relations concerning threat and 
competition offers a bridge into the literature on authoritarianism. The discussion of the 
dynamic model of authoritarianism aids in organizing how one understands the literature 
on social identity and, therefore, modern partisanship. The presence of strong identities is 
a requisite starting point. One absorbs multiple identities in the course of daily life, but 
one’s adaptation to uncertainty alters the ends to which these identities are marshalled. 
One’s authoritarian predisposition impacts the need to develop a meaningful identity, and 
thus alters the calculus of intergroup conflict. In the presence of uncertainty, the purpose 
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of sublimating the self with a cohesive group identity is to create meaning (Hogg 2014). 
These identities offer self-esteem, and will need to be defended. The reaction to out-
groups reflects a level of perceived threat to one’s in-group. It is one’s disposition to 
authoritarianism that affects how one responds to intergroup behavior. Authoritarianism 
can account for the factors of identity formation and maintenance, and the outline of 
competition. 
One infers from the dynamic model of authoritarianism that individuals are 
motivated to defend their identity when challenged. They defend their group to preserve 
the affirmations that they derive from group epistemologies. One expects appraisal of the 
group identity as the prime mover (Gomez et al. 2019). One expects out-group 
derogation when these identities are challenged or questioned (Iyengar & Westwood 
2015, 704). The level of threat increases competition by activating individuals who are 
not authoritarian. The threat rationale explains the reason why even non-authoritarians 
will engage in authoritarian behavior. One way to explain variance in out-group 
derogation is one’s propensity toward authoritarianism and sensitivity to threat. 
Individuals with a strong predisposition will appraise the in-group the most favorably for 
its essential role in structuring their lives. Correspondingly, they will derogate members 
of the out-group at higher rates and with greater intensity than individuals with a weak 
predisposition absent threatening cues. Authoritarians are more sensitive to threat, and 
more likely to respond with hostility, overall. A non-authoritarian may have strong, 
central identities, too; however, they should resist responding with intolerance towards in 
most situations unless sufficiently threatened. One might even expect that they strengthen 
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their commitment to evenhandedness and tolerance at times (Lavine et al. 2005; Stenner 
2005). 
Modern politics substantiates these insights. Authoritarianism offers a powerful 
lens through which to predict and interpret the dynamics of inter-party conflict. The 
foregoing discussion parsed the mechanisms behind intergroup relations through the 
insight of authoritarianism, and produced two considerations. First, one must observe 
how closely one associates a sense of identity with a group prototype. The more central a 
group identity is to one’s own identity, the more a desire for positive self-esteem and 
meaning will lead them to venerate the in-group. Second, one must observe threat levels 
to determine the dynamics of competition. Competition will produce out-group 
derogation in service of protecting the in-group. Authoritarianism mediates these two 
propensities. The extremes in both considerations are exactly what one observes in 
American politics. Partisan loyalties and high stakes are present in the struggle to win 
office and the spoils associated therewith. 
An analysis of political identities through authoritarianism must begin with the 
mainspring of political conflict: parties. The contemporary Democratic and Republican 
Parties exist as two fundamentally distinct ideological entities (Grossman & Hopkins 
2015; McCarty et al. 2006; Ura & Ellis 2012). This distinction goes beyond the political 
realm. The party label increasingly contributes to a social identity (Bafumi & Shapiro 
2009, 3; Green et al. 2002; Mason 2018). The social dimension produces affective 
partisanship. It makes the traditional conception of a left-right ideological continuum 
increasingly unintelligible for understanding mass partisanship (Sartwell 2014; Ura & 
Ellis 2012, 283). A more meaningful way to decipher partisanship is to examine the 
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extent to which followers internalize the collective grievances of politicized social groups 
(Bawn et al. 2012; Huddy 2018, 7). This focus pushes one to examine an individual’s 
membership in a group along with that group’s symbolic culture relating to its social 
identity (Ellis & Stimson 2012). Consequently, one must redefine extremism or 
polarization when positive views of the in-group sharply diverge from views of out-
groups. 
Partisanship is one of the most potent social identities in contemporary America 
(Huddy et al. 2015, 3). It is easy to foresee political parties creating a social identity 
within the focus of psychological theories, but one should not overlook the point. Mass 
political parties are especially potent to defining one’s sense of identity as basic values 
and attitudes toward social groups tend to be primed by political conflict (Tesler 2015). 
Parties are always selling their brand to attract public support. Political parties must 
obtain a plurality of voters in an election. As a result, leaders stake positions to attract and 
maintain a base (Aldrich 2011). Parties constantly attempt to expand conflict, and alter 
the calculus in any given political struggle to achieve a majority (Schattschneider 1960). 
The raison d’être of political parties is to convince citizens that the party’s struggle is the 
individual’s struggle and vice-versa. As Achens and Bartels succinctly note: 
[Political parties] construct a conceptual viewpoint by which its voters can 
make sense of the political world. Sympathetic newspapers, magazines, 
websites, and television channels convey the framework to partisans. That 
framework identifies friends and enemies, it supplies talking points, and it 
tells people what to think and what to believe (2016, 268). 
 
The characteristics of political struggle lend themselves to social identity 
formation. First, political parties are constantly in competition. This aspect is crucial for 
inculcating a requisite sense of shared reality and collective fate. Competition crystalizes 
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the boundaries between groups so that members have a vivid, even lurid, understanding 
of what it means to be a prototypical Democrat or Republican. One acts like a partisan 
even if one does not like the parties (Abramowitz & Webster 2018). The scope of issues 
in political conflict and the distance between parties pushes so-called independents to 
associate with one party as fence-straddling becomes less feasible (Iyengar & Westwood 
2015, 7). The atmosphere of competition makes citizens more likely to support party 
positions, especially on important issues (Druckman et al. 2013, 59).  
Parties offer a positive identity through association. Competition reinforces this 
association by defining one’s identity and stance on issues through opposition (Dilliplane 
2014). Goren and colleagues conclude that cues from the opposing party are slightly 
more likely to influence a voter’s position on an issue than overtures from the voter’s 
own party (2009, 805). This motivation for differentiation gives credence to the position 
that positive affect toward in-groups creates a need to disassociate from other groups 
through negative self-identification. Even when a political party fails to win an election, 
strong supporters recommit to partisanship and leaders (Gomez et al. 2019). 
Homogeneity is important to partisans so much so that they additionally conform their 
beliefs to the expected position that they anticipate others in the group to hold (Sinclair 
2012). 
Partisans are remarkably predisposed to the conformist tendencies of intergroup 
competition. The mass electorate provides a telling example. The majority of citizens in 
the electorate have sorted so that they align their ideological political stances with their 
partisan affiliation (Levendusky 2009). Yet, the process of sorting only explains part of 
the dynamic of modern partisan conflict. The typical voter in the electorate has 
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difficulties thinking in ideological terms. However, they are adept at using party 
identification and elite cues as a heuristic to arrive at their political stances (Goren 2013). 
These heuristics inculcate strong support for one’s party as the parties themselves are 
ideologically distinct. The follow-the-leader approach with two diametric parties makes 
politics exceptionally competitive.  Paradoxically, most voters do not vary significantly 
on staking issue positions (Abrams et al. 2009). Around 60 percent of voters hold liberal 
positions, yet half of those voters misidentify as conservative (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 88). 
These mismatched voters self-identify as conservative based on their Republican Party 
association despite their liberal ideological stances and material self-interest. The social 
bonds associated with symbolic attachments outweigh programmatic considers. The 
ultimate irony is that group affiliation makes voters unable or unaware to seek civil 
agreement despite the extensive overlap in policy preferences (Mason 2018, 21). 
The reason for the oversized influence of opposing partisans on belief formation 
emphasizes the idea of uncertainty reduction. Individuals harbor ideas of who other 
members of the in-group are. A set of common causes or connected attributes link them 
(Jenkins 1996, 23). Individuals assume that members of the in-group resemble them and 
how they think (Brown 1995, 54; Theodoridis 2017, 1256). This assumption that others 
share the prototype of the group reduces uncertainty about associating with them (Hogg 
2014, 339). It allays fears that one’s co-partisan will espouse dissonant positions 
(Johnston 2018, 222). The tendency to think in terms of group identity increases the more 
someone identifies with the group identity. Partisan identities are central to offering 
epistemological certainty in most aspects of life because partisan competition has 
expanded to include more a greater number of non-political matters. 
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The presence of competition never wanes in politics due to the nature and number 
of everyday partisan squabbles. Political actors are always rallying their followers. The 
obvious place for competition on display is during elections (Conover & Miller 2015). 
Candidates and allied elites continually present their platform to voters. These platforms 
serve as an idealized vision of the party’s governing philosophy and a policy roadmap if 
the party wins. Political parties tend to seek prototypical members of the party and allied 
social groups to run in elections to assure voters of the party’s dedication to their causes 
(Bawn et al. 2012). This process informs voters of positions with which to associate and 
disassociate. Partisans view themselves as moderate, and view their opponents as extreme 
(Abramowitz & Webster 2018, 626). This perception fosters the incorrect belief that they 
are farther apart on issues than in actually (Mason 2015). As a result, the boundaries 
become firm and often unbridgeable absent cues from elites. The sense of 
irreconcilability depletes trust in the intentions of the other side, and elicits negative 
affect like disgust, aversion, or anger. 
Moreover, partisan bickering continues after elections end even if the intensity 
subsides. The struggle migrates toward the legislative process where elected officials 
battle over policy change. Policy is the prize of politics (Hacker & Pierson 2014). 
However, a voting majority is no guarantee of a legislative majority. The federal and state 
legislatures are designed with a number of choke points to prevent unpopular policies 
from becoming law (Robertson 2018). Elected officials exploit every choke point in an 
attempt to veto policies. Ideologically divergent parties in a state of parity amplify the 
intransigence. The Democratic and Republican Parties compete at nearly equal strength. 
Neither party maintains hegemony in power. Parties adopt a campaign mentality in office 
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without either side able to enforce its will on the other (Lee 2016). The competition 
dissuades compromise to avoid handing one’s opponent a policy victory, and thus a 
potential electoral defeat for one’s own side. One expects identity entrenchment in a 
constant state of close competition. Indeed, contemporary elected officials are much more 
likely to stick to their principles than compromise (Gutmann & Thompson 2012). The 
sharply contrasted stances of both parties allow citizens to clearly register where each 
party stands (Druckman et al. 2013; Levendusky 2009).  
News media enhances the perception of competition. Standard news outlets are 
biased in favor of what is new. They are systemically disposed to follow and break new 
stories without much attention given to older stories afterward (Berry & Sobieraj 2014). 
Media reporters tend to cover political struggles like a sportscaster covers a horse race 
(Ladd 2013, 110). The news is framed through this individualistic and episodic lens to 
capture the limited attention of citizen consumers. They bias against a holistic approach 
to covering pressing social and political problems. In this way, the news rarely presents a 
comprehensive understanding of its coverage. The “drive-by” media leaves viewers 
technically informed of the minutia in daily events. Yet, it never leaves viewers truly 
educated. This type of political coverage heightens anxiety and uncertainty in viewers as 
if they really were watching a sports match rather than the steady development of tectonic 
social forces (Berry & Sobieraj 2014, 99).  
Partisan media accentuates this bias. They attempt to capture the limited attention 
of viewers by increasing the perception of outrage (Berry & Sobieraj 2014). Members of 
a group are sensitive to actions that violate group norms, values, manners, and morality 
(Huddy 2018, 6). Consequently, partisan media highlights or manufactures the most 
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scandalous actions and behaviors of opposing partisans. This type of media feeds the 
perception that partisans are under constant, perhaps existential, threat. Opposing 
partisans are seen as enemies who want to destroy the principles upon which America 
stands (i.e. the in-party’s principles). The spread of this narrative is aided by the fact that 
the two parties have two fundamentally incompatible ideologies for organizing society 
(Grossman & Hopkins 2015, 120). This media keeps the most extreme members of each 
party constantly alert and polarized in their positions (Levendusky 2013). They 
extinguish trust in the motives of their competitors (Ladd 2013). Partisan media promotes 
fear in its viewers with regard to the outcome of political events. In return, they provide 
reassurance and validation in self-constructed echo chambers (Berry & Sobieraj 2014, 
140). Followers believe that only their partisan news media has the “true” and “correct” 
story that has not been warped, spun, or twisted by other media outlets. 
Consequently, news media promotes the entitativity of political social identities. 
Viewers are able to self-select their preferred programs (Holbert et al. 2010; Iyengar et 
al. 2017). Viewers choose providers who allow allied elites to offer policy positions and 
other cues to the public. Elites are able to identify public problems and solutions in 
frames that activate and reinforce partisan identities (Dilliplane 2014). The cheerleading 
for one’s team in the news boosts one’s enthusiasm for the party (Marcus et al. 2000). 
However, the combative presentation of partisan news saps trust in opposing partisans 
and independent institutions (Ladd 2013). The lack of trust in unfamiliar sources reduces 
the chance that a partisan will defect from the party, even in the face of otherwise 
credible arguments (Druckman et al. 2013). The convergence of both positive and 
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negative bias in confirming prejudices reduces any cross-cutting pressures to think 
outside the terms of the party. 
Social polarization augments the strength of politicized identities. Scholars 
recognize that people have multiple social identities in conjunction with their political 
identity. The causal trend is that social identities reinforce partisan identities (Mason & 
Wronski 2018, 260). Typically, group identities attach individuals to political parties 
(Greene 2004, 137). A revisionist theory of parties even claims that parties largely exist 
as bundles of social and economic groups uniting to achieve policy victories (Bawn et al. 
2012). In this inference pattern, one finds negotiations between party leaders, constituent 
groups, and voters over how to compete in politics (Schlozman 2015). Intermediate, 
constituent groups act as a conduit between voters and parties. Groups attach their 
members to political parties to have their collective grievances registered (Baylor 2018). 
These political demands serve to operationalize the lofty principles on which the group 
stands. In return, groups take the broader platform of the party to voters (Schattschneider 
1960, 52-53). The result is a symbiotic relationship between the partisan identity and the 
social identity that attaches members of the public to political parties and, subsequently, 
government policymaking. 
The process of party-group coalition building has produced an enduring 
arrangement in modern politics. Groups and voters have sorted into their respective 
ideological camps (Levendusky 2009). Republicans are the coalition of the whole; that is, 
they represent Christianity and traditional whiteness. On the other hand, Democrats 
represent the coalition of the other. They represent the minority groups who cannot 
broadly be considered straight, white men (Grossman & Hopkins 2015; Iyengar & 
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Krupenkin 2018). Increasingly, these prototypes are permanent. These social identities 
act as gatekeepers of party ideology. Parties have collapsed into the ideological space 
maintained by activists (Noel 2013). The alignment of various social and political 
identities into one congruent identity amplifies the effects of social identity and 
intergroup behavior. The social-party identity nexus is powerful enough to alter deeply 
held beliefs on issues such as abortion (Levendusky 2009). Indeed, it is even capable of 
altering subordinate social identities to align with the prototypical image of the social 
group in the partisan coalition in certain circumstances (Egan 2019). One will elaborate 
on this development in Chapter 3. 
This implication of the social aspect of politics captures the essence of modern 
partisanship. Politics generates more heat than light. Partisans embrace their party 
identity (Green et al. 2002). Simultaneously, they loathe opposing partisans. Iyengar and 
Westwood conclude that partisan animus has no countervailing force in society. If 
anything, elites promote dislike and prejudice as appropriate and commendable (2015). 
Partisans try to segregate themselves from opposing partisans instead of engaging them 
(Lelkes & Westwood 2017). Partisans do not want their children to marry individuals 
from the other political party (Iyengar et al. 2012). During elections, the rivalry between 
parties pushes partisans beyond resentment and toward hostility in extreme cases 
(Conover & Miller 2015). Relations between Democratic and Republican partisans have 
radically deteriorated over the last 40 years (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). According to 
Johnston: 
[In] the twenty-first century [politics] seems more vitriolic than in the 
past: Partisans are divided by things that are easy to conceptualize, 
emotionally evocative, and which underpin one’s broader lifestyle choices, 
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all of which increases the perceived social distance of one’s opponents and 
promotes bias against them (2018, 220) 
 
The spirited nature of intergroup competition based on social identity demands 
that one view partisanship through the structure of authoritarianism. Past studies have 
shown that authoritarians and non-authoritarians are increasingly sorting between the 
parties (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Within the parties, authoritarians are additionally 
becoming partisan warriors (Luttig 2017). Increasingly, however, the structure of 
political contests entrenches partisan social identities across the authoritarian spectrum. 
Party affiliation is a meaningful, entitative identity with purchase in non-political 
environments. The consequentiality of partisanship to social relations influences how 
partisans interact with opposing partisans and each other (Egan 2019; Iyengar & 
Westwood 2015). It is therefore a powerful identity for authoritarian dispositions to use 
to navigate the world. Even individuals who are not authoritarian are pressured to act like 
authoritarians within the current structure of partisan conflict. Competition heightens 
threat, which turns partisanship into more of a sports match than a group of investors 
choosing which stocks in which to invest.  
Authoritarianism is ideal to explain to partisanship as scholars increasingly adapt 
insights from psychology to understand politics. The primacy of spatial models and 
rational choice theory to explain mass partisanship is waning in the contemporary 
literature. It is no longer tenable to infer voters standing outside each party rationally 
comparing the merits of each in a running tally. They are attached to parties through 
identity formation. The citizen is no longer sanitized of social allegiances in this regard. 
Scholars have tried to revitalize the rationalist approach in the face of strong, personal 
attachments to a partisan label, though. However, the spatial view is better suited to 
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studying elites and legislative behavior (Aldrich 2011, Hart 2016; McCarty et al. 1997). 
The limited number of players and a narrow set of highly beneficial goals coalesce to 
make rational expectations more predictive of elite behavior than the interests of a 
diverse citizenry (Mayhew 1974). 
The main approach for these scholars of mass partisanship is now to integrate 
rational choice into a model of social competition (Abramowitz & Webster 2017; 
Abramowitz & Webster 2018; Highton & Kam 2011). This interpretation of a 
rationalizing voter will yield benefits for the study of partisanship through social identity 
theory. Huddy recognizes that individuals vary with regard to their attachment to 
identities (2002; 2018). It is hypothesized that authoritarianism plays an underlying role 
in identity politics. This variance allows other consideration like issue positions and 
economic standing to further broaden the collective understanding of partisanship (Goren 
& Chen 2016). For this present inquiry, the social dimension takes precedence in the 
partisanship of voters. This follows the trend in the literature to place politics in the social 
context of the individual voter (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009). Economic considerations are 
important (Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Bartels 2008; Lewis-Beck & Paldam 2000). 
However, social conflict changes the bases of economic consideration to secondary, 
derivative, or tangential through the prism of group considerations (Johnston 2018, 235). 
In light of the shift of theoretical perspectives in vogue, scholars have recently 
begun bridging the two literatures on partisanship and authoritarianism (Johnston 2018; 
Luttig 2017). The opportunity window has opened in the last decade to incorporate 
authoritarian models with partisan identities. Scholars had to expand their thinking 
beyond rational choice perspectives to allow psychological approaches to mass politics to 
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guide research, and the dynamic model of authoritarianism had to develop. The 
connection between authoritarianism and partisanship is made possible through the focus 
on identity. The milieu for these two concepts is the individual desire for epistemological 
certainty within a cohesive community. This cognitive approach underlies a broader 
understanding between the two concepts. It marries psychological approaches to 
understand political behavior. 
  The personal nature of political competition allows one to draw connections 
between authoritarianism and modern partisanship. Political parties are highly entitative 
groups in competition for real policy prizes and non-tangible benefits like pride in 
winning (Conover & Miller 2015). Each party has developed a distinct ideology, and 
electoral forces interact to promote ideological purity (Noel 2013). One would expect that 
authoritarianism thus structure political conflict in the party system, as a result. Political 
parties have the requisite characteristics to inculcate strong identities in followers. Their 
label is visible and meaningful to citizens. The division between governing and 
campaigning has largely vanished, so individuals have plenty of opportunities to signal 
their partisanship. Critically, each party has a narrative about reality through ideology. 
They identify what issues should matter to the voter based on their unique epistemology 
(Huddy 2018). Conjointly, they offer a platform to redress collective grievances. Partisan 
media helps to maintain the bubble of reality in which party members reside (Berry & 
Sobieraj 2014, 99). The alarmist trend in media reporting ensures that individuals with a 
high need for certainty keep returning to cheer on their team (Lavine et al. 1999; Lavine 
et al. 2005). In sum, political parties form a robust identity within which several 
associated social identities can nest. This consonance of identities makes the political 
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identity even more central to a partisan’s sense of self. Authoritarianism influences the 
internalization of identities. The consequences of this influence will cascade into political 
decision-making. 
In sum, this section dissected the concept of authoritarianism as it has developed. 
It identified a model to account for the cognitive processes that make individuals 
predisposed to authoritarianism. The same processes involving social identity allow one 
to understand the contours of modern partisanship through the lens of authoritarianism. 
The dynamics of political competition make each party identity particularly salient 
among other identities in society as government policy has expanded to affect nearly 
every aspect of life. This section laid the foundation to deepen the connection between 
partisanship and authoritarianism through the lens of social identity theory. 
On this note, it is useful to present descriptive statistics to give an understanding 
of the nature of authoritarianism in contemporary politics. The tables below investigate 
the distribution of authoritarianism in white Americans by sex and party. The tables are 
arrayed in such a way to offer a comprehensive view of authoritarianism in this 
population. Starting broadly, one can infer that there are more women than men and also 
more Republicans than Democrats. A remarkable feature of all of the tables is the near 
even distribution of authoritarian types among men and women. The percentages for each 
box in the columns for men and women hardly deviated from the percentage in the row 
total. Table 1 exemplifies this trend. The distribution of authoritarian types among men 
and women is nearly uniform. The greatest deviation from the row total may only be two 
percentage point. Moreover, one observes that there are more non-authoritarian types 
than authoritarian types. Non-authoritarians and weak authoritarians account for 66 
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percent of respondents both overall and for men and women individually. True 
authoritarians are not numerous. Their limited number underscores their outsized 
influence on modern partisanship. 
Table 1: Authoritarianism among Men and Women in White Americans 































Source: 2016 American National Election Survey 
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses 
 
The breakdown of authoritarians among men and women in the Democratic and 
Republican Party in Tables 2 and 3 respectively adds nuance to the picture painted in 
Table 1. The spread of authoritarian types among men and women are again remarkably 
symmetric between men and women in both parties. There is no discernable imbalance 
between the sexes when controlling for party affiliation. The most prominent difference 
is the spread of authoritarian types between parties. Non-authoritarians account for half 
of the Democratic Party while they are less than a quarter of the Republican Party. This 
compositional statistic validates Hetherington and Weiler’s observation that 
authoritarians are increasingly sorting into the GOP (2009). Non-authoritarians are 
increasingly finding a home in the Democratic Party in addition to authoritarian types 
finding a home in the Republican Party. The Republican Party is not completely 
comprised of authoritarians. The Republican Party is split in half by authoritarian and 
non-authoritarian types. Each type is nearly evenly distributed. Meanwhile, only one in 
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ten Democrats are true authoritarians. It is the Democratic Party which is heavily skewed 
in their composition.  
Table 2: Authoritarianism among White Men and Women in the Democratic 
Party 































Source: 2016 American National Election Survey 
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses 
 
Table 3: Authoritarianism among White Men and Women in the Republican 
Party 































Source: 2016 American National Election Survey 
Percentages by column are listed in parentheses 
 
It is prudent to examine the spread of sex by party affiliation for the next chapters. 
Table 4 documents the distribution of men and women in the Democratic and Republican 
Party without controlling for authoritarian dispositions. The most striking fact is the 
overall sex imbalance in favor of women. There are nearly five percentage points more 
women than men in the survey. This general imbalance reflects in the distribution of sex 
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by party affiliation. Whereas men are not a majority of the population, they are a majority 
in the Republican Party. The sex balance skews in favor of men, but it is nowhere near as 
large as the sex imbalance in the Democratic Party. Democrats are overwhelmingly 
women. There is a 15-percentage point spread between men and women in the 
Democratic Party. Circumstantially, these statistics portray the Democratic Party as the 
party of women and non-authoritarian.  To a much lesser degree, they portray Republican 
Party as the party of men and authoritarians. This information will be useful in the next 
section. 
Table 4: White Men and Women by Party Affiliation 



















Source: 2016 American National Election Survey 
Percentages are listed in parentheses 
 
In the next chapter, this inquiry will advance to demonstrate the importance of 
gender with regard to partisanship and authoritarianism alike. Gender is an organizing 
principle in the private lives of individuals, and a political divisive issue in the public 
arena. Its potency and reach as an identity interact with authoritarianism to condition 
authoritarian preferences for social arrangements. This inquiry has taken the first step to 
test this proposed interaction by developing the theoretical contours of authoritarianism. 
The discussion of modern partisanship presented evidence to substantiate the claim that 
one should view politics through the lens of authoritarianism and social identity. This 
evidence will be supplemented and substantiated in a later section on the development of 
polarization where it is shown that elites have sorted on issues of gender and authoritarian 
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postures. Elite polarization has produced mass affective partisanship based on the 
increased currency of political identities as social identities. In turn, this point reinforces 
the claim that authoritarianism structures modern partisanship. One must first introduce 





Chapter 3: Gender and American Politics 
 The concept of authoritarianism has influenced seven decades of academic 
research. It is not the only classic to influence this inquiry. One year prior to the 
publication of the Authoritarian Personality, Simone de Beauvoir published her opus on 
gender, the Second Sex. The instant classic systematically unmasked the impoverished 
nature of the female condition throughout history. It addressed the origins and 
continuation of female oppression and inequality. De Beauvoir traced how the customs 
and upbringing of individuals engender ideas about manliness and femininity (1989). She 
sought to undermine the longstanding myth about the sexes throughout history: that the 
differences in and the division between the sexes were wholly natural. Those claims 
buttressed an essentialist argument for keeping women inferior to men. Her efforts 
highlighted the reflexive attempts to make women out of women. The work is itself 
credited as the opening salvo for post-war feminism, and as the foundation for gender 
analyses in the following decades.  
At first glance, an onlooker would not discern a link between the two seminal 
pieces. The Authoritarian Personality is a constant attempt to develop a method to test 
for fascist personalities. However, the Second Sex originates in the same philosophical 
endowment as authoritarianism. Both draw on the same ideas of being and becoming 
from philosophers. The novelty of De Beauvoir’s work is two-fold. She applied the 
concept of gender to existentialism in order to bring existentialism to bear on the gender 
constructs that ensnare each sex. She highlighted how society restrains individual 
autonomy by assigning characteristics to each sex. In this way, De Beauvoir’s philosophy 
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sought to remove barriers to authenticity as Adorno and his colleagues strove to 
understand individual endorsement of conformity. 
The legacy of De Beauvoir and Adorno explicitly intertwine to make this inquiry 
imaginable. The central dilemma for humanity concerns the tradeoff between individual 
freedom and social compliance. Gender, as a set of cultural expectations, and 
authoritarianism, as a psychological process, both alter an individual’s position toward 
autonomy. The potency of these variables is magnified in political contexts. The structure 
of American partisanship links gender and authoritarianism in a heretofore unexplored 
manner as they both impact behavior. However, no one has yet to purposefully explore 
the relation between the two concepts in these terms. In short, it is hypothesized that the 
cultural constructs of gender influence preferences differently for men and women given 
one’s propensity for authoritarianism. This concept is not novel once all the pieces are in 
places to hypothesize connections; however surprisingly, the link between gender and 
authoritarianism remains underexplored.  
Previous attempts have grazed the surface. Two studies include efforts to analyze 
perceptions of gender roles among authoritarians in relation to abortion and feminism 
(Sarup 1976; Duncan et al. 1997). However, they assume that sex has no influence on 
position-taking. Additionally, they were based on a faulty operationalization of 
authoritarianism. Brandt explores gender gaps in authoritarian behavior in societies of 
varying degrees of gender equality (2012). His theorizing is closer to that of this inquiry, 
but his methodology is based on the RWA scale. Thus, it is not a study of 
authoritarianism either despite his focus on differences of opinion between the sexes on 
issues of gender. Only one study has investigated if gender interacts with 
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authoritarianism to structure preferences differently for men and women. In a promising 
sign, Lizotte concludes that gender moderates gun control preferences for male and 
female across the authoritarian spectrum (2017, 386). This limited example provides 
credence that gender interacts with authoritarianism to influence political positions.  
The central thesis for this inquiry is that gender identity modulates political 
preferences differently for men and women based on authoritarianism dispositions. The 
internal psychological mechanisms in authoritarianism, which affects the desire to 
conform, should be present in both sexes equally. Indeed, the sexes are roughly equally 
distributed along the authoritarian spectrum. However, authoritarianism is an interactive 
process with one’s environment, and thus offers a pathway for environmental influences 
like gender to impact an individual’s preferences. The root of this relation is found in the 
politicized grievances of gender identity for men and women. The sexes have unique 
political interests due to socialization, and these interests lead to gender gaps. One can 
understand these gender gaps as the result of decades of political development. This 
process has increased the potency of social identities with regard to partisanship. It is 
argued authoritarianism underlies social identity politics (Luttig 2017, 387). Thus, the 
effect of gender will moderate political preferences between men and women of the same 
authoritarian disposition (Lizotte 2019). While individuals internalize gender at the 
personal level, partisan affiliation now also carries gendered connotation. Therefore, the 
relation of gender to authoritarianism for each sex is multifaceted in the milieu of 
partisanship. To comprehend the full relation, one will first identify gender and its role in 
political preference formation exclusively in this chapter. In the next chapter, one will 
DiMariano 63 
 
situate the relation of gender and authoritarianism in light of the macroscopic 
developments of polarization. 
This portion of the inquiry embarks in light of a relatively poor integration of 
gender in the political science literature. One believes that a reason for the neglect of 
gender in authoritarian studies is due to an overall particularized focus of gender in the 
literature. It is hard to believe that the topic of gender is not more central to topics of 
political analyses after decades of effort (Ritter 2008). The atomistic focus on gender has 
produced a narrow view of its relation to other trends. Researchers choose to produce 
segmented studies of gender rather holistic accounts. This tendency persists despite the 
energies devoted to emphasizing gender in relation to social behavior. An analysis of 
gender is robust if it contextualizes the interplay of psychological processes with 
environmental factors in historical space (Bos & Schneider 2019, 173; Burns 2008, 50). 
Robust treatises matter, especially in light of the fundamental importance and relevance 
of gender to everyday life (Shapiro 2003; Waylen 2012).  
The study of authoritarianism through the perspective of gender addresses 
outstanding issues in the literature on gender studies. Authoritarianism is a psychological 
process. Therefore, it provides a means to explain variations in preferences in and 
between each sex. It allows one the novel chance to understand the relation of gender 
identity with authoritarianism in political terms. Conversely, modern politics conduces 
authoritarian conflict (Cizmar et al. 2014; Johnston 2018). It promotes political contests 
over questions of identity, which are evocative and accessible to lay citizens. The 
evolution of political institutions accounts for the encouragement of the authoritarian 
structure of politics, and also the existences of gender gaps within it. Therewith, one 
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includes a more complete set of actors, institutions, and behavior to comprehend 
gendered behavior (Celis et al. 2013). The inclusion of authoritarianism provides an 
opportunity to advance the literature in this way. Its application is one way to advance the 
diffuse literatures into a more cogent narrative. 
This narrative necessarily requires a definition of gender. Sex distinctions lie at 
the root to understand gender. Sex is the most basic category for identity. Sex distinctions 
have provided for differentiation in every culture and throughout history. The cultural 
behaviors associated with sex are deemed gender. One may not immediately recognize 
the significance of gender as most instances of everyday gendered behavior go unnoticed. 
Gender is described as the “air we breathe” (Deaux & LaFrance 1998, 778). It exists most 
of the time without one aware of its presence. It is likened to a social performance; an act 
in which everyone participates (Butler 1988, 521-522). However, gender tends to be 
more of an “[un]organized and unself-conscious unity” than a “self-consciously, mutually 
acknowledging collective with a self-conscious purpose” (Young 1994, 724). Individuals 
absorb gender notions, and follow their prescriptions like second nature. This fact makes 
gender an omnipresent variable. 
One’s recognition of one’s own biological sex is contingent to one’s construction 
of gender identity (Eckes & Trautner 2000). However, one should not imply that gender 
is uniform in its construction in everyone’s life despite its constant presence. Whereas sex 
is biological, gender is cultural in nature. It is the cultural characteristics attached to one’s 
sex that creates gender identifiers; thus, the production of gender always varies (Huddy et 
al. 2008, 32). One describes gender as being constructed for this reason. One must 
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conscientiously take steps to avoid conflating the two variables, or using them 
interchangeably (Hatemi et al. 2012).  
Sex is unique as a category of differentiation. The only other distinction that 
transcends all societies and throughout time is age. All other categories like race or class 
are arbitrary types (McDonald et al. 2011). However, gender is not merely a standalone 
category due to its cultural nature. Gender suffuses other categories of identities. This 
point is especially true with regard to salient identities like race. An analysis of gender 
and authoritarianism beyond white Americans, if possible, would yield different results. 
Race and gender interact in their effect on self-understanding. The choice to examine 
whiteness and gender has consequences, as a result. White Americans predominantly 
occupy the apex of the institutions of civil society (Pérez & Hetherington 2014). The 
forms of the racial caste system in the United States have historically privileged whites 
above other racial categories despite the leveling norms of egalitarianism. This social 
differentiation reflects in self-perception and behavior. Whiteness and sex conflate to 
modify interests for individuals who occupy both categories, as a result. 
Moreover, gender is not an individual trait like sex. Researchers in the United 
States are criticized for failing to capture the broader social context, and study gender in 
the paradigm of individualistic terms instead (Deaux & LaFrance 1998). The cultural 
aspect of gender makes gender a mass phenomenon. Gender distinctions vary in the 
aggregate, across time, and in applicability on the social level as well as on the individual 
level (Burns 2008). At times and in particular moments, though, characteristics of gender 
appear to carry universal applicability. This illusion makes gender appear innate. The 
problem that one risks is taking cultural differences as the result of biological or 
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psychological differences (Eagly & Wood 2012, 459). This error essentializes gender. 
Conversely, one can also risk misattributing biological differences in behavior to gender. 
It is therefore imperative to scrutinize discussions of gendered behavior to avoid 
committing either type of mistake. A thorough dissection of the concept will prevent 
confusion for political analyses. 
The sides in the debate all recognize that biology and sociology influence the 
construction of gender (Eagly & Woods 2012; Lizotte 2017, 53; Sidanius & Kirzban 
2003). One must therefore endeavor to understand how sex distinctions manifest to affect 
behavior for this inquiry. The literature is particularly fissured on this topic as different 
approaches highlight the side of biology or sociology (Hatemi et al. 2012; Wood & Eagly 
1999). Sex distinctions affect individuals innately as biology influences behavior 
(Brizendine 2006, 2010; Benenson & Markovitz 2014). The cultural expectations of each 
sex influence individuals exogenously through socialization. These two routes lead to 
different understandings of behavior, which generates contention. Only the latter option 
is feasible for theoretical and experimental reason, though. One must necessarily 
understand gender as a cultural influence that affects preferences after core psychological 
processes, not in conjunction with them as a biological reading of political behavior 
implies.  
One must focus on approaching gender as an exogenous trait. This understanding 
of gender as the property of a group or structure offers a viable path forward for the 
scientific inquiry of social relations (Ritter 2008, 12). The bases of culture influence 
behavior by socializing individuals for the roles that others expect them to perform. One 
acknowledges gender, therefore, as a reflection of the valuation of traits for men and 
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women in interaction with other individuals in one’s environment (Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 
2009, 485). These ideas are captured in the social role model (Bos & Schneider 2019; 
Wood & Eagly 1999). Individuals are socialized with gender norms to fit the roles 
available to them in society (Eagly & Wood 2012, 460). In this way, the cultural aspect 
of gender would affect one’s authoritarian preferences in conjunction with the influence 
of one’s authoritarian predisposition. 
A social role perspective links gender behavior to a larger environmental context. 
Social role theorists infer gender differences as the result of individual experiences with 
broader socio-cultural forces. These advocates point to the presence of social constraints 
and power differences resulting from structural inequalities that affect the range of 
acceptable behavior available to each sex (Lizotte 2017, 55-56). Gender is constructed 
and reproduced through the interplay of institutional forces bearing on individuals (Burns 
2008). In turn, shared agreements of acceptable gender norms influence culture and 
institutions. These lived differences modify perceptions of what is possible and desirable 
to become (Celis et al. 2013). The broader cultural context alters the calculus of behavior, 
and explains why men and women hold different interests. This theory of gender is 
suitable for research, and is possible to operationalize. The constant presence of social 
cues makes the adoption of learned gender norms a legitimate variable to study in its own 
right.  
The study of the cultural effect of sex through gender has ramifications. Cultural 
norms arise to give a sense of expectation of self and others. These norms translate into 
social roles to instruct one on how to behave for their sex. Individuals commonly view 
masculine and feminine as two distinct, mutually exclusive set of traits (Bem 1981; 
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Foushee et al. 1979; Winter 2010, 590).  The characteristics of social dynamics inform 
how members of each sex organize their private lives. The private organizing beliefs of 
masculinity and femininity engender understandings of political questions when applied 
to solving collective problems (Lizotte 2017; Ridgeway 2011; Winter 2016, 190). 
Manifestations of political conflict likewise magnify and accentuate sex-based 
distinctions (Magnussen & Maracek 2012). Gender and authoritarianism both impact 
one’s appraisal of political preferences as the two concepts affect how one believes 
society should be structured. The presence of gender gaps in political issues reveals that 
men and women differ in their conception of the good society and the means to obtain it 
(Lizotte 2017b).  
Gender as an organizing belief pattern relates to authoritarianism as an organizing 
belief structure. Gender myths project a set of desirable, prototypical qualities for men 
and women, and thereby induces political gender gaps. One accepts as legitimate or 
accidental the nature of gender identity by the forces that produce gender roles for each 
sex. Consequently, individuals of similar authoritarian dispositions will vary in their 
support of associated gender roles by sex, and, therefore, prescriptions of gender will 
condition authoritarian preferences. The cultural influences of gender are sufficient to 
make one reconsider any assumption of a parity of preferences between the sexes given 
the same authoritarian predisposition. Men and women are accultured to value certain 
interests over others. The ubiquitous presence of gender on its own in the construction of 
an individual’s identity merits an analysis of its interaction with authoritarianism. One 
will accomplish this end by analyzing the manifestations of gender in political 
orientations through social role theory.  
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The remainder of this chapter documents gender gaps in opinion as they exist in 
contemporary politics. The aim of mapping the political context is to uncover where and 
how authoritarian preferences and gender intertwine within the context of mass 
partisanship. One will demonstrate that differences of opinion between sexes create 
gender gaps across multiple issues. The following sections will support the claim that the 
gendering of politics is sufficient to predict manifest differences of opinion for each sex 
with regard to authoritarianism. One expects substantive differences on preferences along 
the spectrum of authoritarianism by sex absent and present the priming of partisan 
identities. However, social sorting in party membership has intensified with regard to sex 
(Mason & Wronski 2018). Each party has responded to the imbalance of sex ratios 
among their ranks by framing itself in accordance with or against conventional 
masculinity. As a result, party affiliation carries gendered connotations, and will be 
considered for its influence on gender (Winter 2010, 596).  
With two avenues for gender to influence preferences, one must designate a 
model to understand the sources and intensity of relevant variables in the decision-
making process. One way gender connotations are attractive to individuals is based on 
one’s authoritarian psychology. The gender prescriptions of each sex affect perspectives 
on tolerance and authority. Partisanship is also gendered at the elite and mass levels. Each 
variable touches individuals through identity. One resolution to order the magnitude of 
influence of these variables is to adopt the casual pathway model. The logic of causal 
pathway models classifies variables that touch preference formation based on their 
proximity to identity. In this model, underlying psychological mechanisms like 
authoritarianism and other fundamental needs are closest to the core of influence. 
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Cultural variables coming from one’s environment like gender are more peripheral while 
partisanship is somewhere in between (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller & Shanks 1996, 
192).  Gender is treated peripheral in this inquiry with other identities like whiteness 
despite its influence in variables like partisanship. One will account for the multifaceted 
influence of gender as it intersects these other identities (Bos & Schneider 2019; 
Kaufmann 2002).  Taken linearly, gender follows authoritarianism and partisanship 
respectively in the production of political preferences. As a result, gender may accentuate 
















Figure 1: Visualization of Casual Pathway Model of Preference Formation 
 
 
One can uncover the details of this relation by examining categories of gender for 
each sex to isolate its baseline effect on men and women. To this end, the inference 
pattern of social role theory provides a roadmap for expounding partisan gender gaps. 
Gender gaps emerge in politics because individuals are socialized to view certain 
activities as masculine or feminine. The perspective contextualizes gender gaps as 
reflections and representations of the categorical prototype for men and women as a 
group (Winter 2016). Therefore, one places emphasis on understanding the 
phenomenology of each category and its relation to other categories. The existence of 
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gender gaps is the norm rather than the exception due to the unequal position of men and 
women in society. 
One analyzes the macroscopic forces of gender identity to understand how it 
influences individual political behavior for men and women. Gender reflects the 
opportunities and constraints imposed on individuals by wider social forces. Resource 
disparities, discriminatory experiences, power inequities, and reactions to public policy 
make gender salient, and explain why gender gaps emerge (Howell & Day 2000; Lizotte 
2017; Sapiro 2003; Mettler 2010).  Through the logic of intersectionality, one can further 
specify relevant categorical prototype to analyze by adding identities (Bos & Schneider 
2019, 173). Partisanship is a key variable in this regard with its influence on gender 
norms along with whiteness. This focus creates four types of white voters with different 
politics to examine: Republican men, Republican women, Democratic men, and 
Democratic women. Together, one can identify individual gender differences between 
categories to form a compact narrative to use in hypothesizing relations to 
authoritarianism.  
Gender gaps are well documented in particular instances in the literature. Political 
scientists began studying these gaps at the behest of the feminist movement (Conover 
1988; Gurin 1985). Consequently, gender studies are traditionally synonymous with 
women’s’ studies, and the gaps are framed in the experiences of women in their own 
terms (Wolbrecht et al. 2008). The most consequential divide between men and women 
to interpret herein regards party affiliation as individuals turn toward public policy to 
alter or preserve their conditions. Women tended to favor Republicans until the 1964 
presidential election, but gradually found a home in the Democratic Party afterward 
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(Cassese & Barnes 2017). Women are now consistently more Democratic than men in 
voting and party identification (Kaufmann 2006, 448). Female politics evolved on a 
variety of issues as they changed their partisanship and new roles in society became 
available. The magnitude of movement in the direction of the partisanship of women has 
generated interest into such underlying causes. 
Research investigations have pinpointed two areas of political difference between 
men and women as key catalysts behind the origins of the gender gap in partisan 
identification. These areas of difference are categorized broadly within the boundaries of 
social welfare economics and cultural issues to the extent to which they are separable. 
Researchers have traditionally concluded that men and women emphasize issues of social 
welfare and culture differently, especially in the construction of their ideological self-
identification (Jelen et al. 1994; Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999; Kaufmann 2002, 285). 
However, recent scholarship has questioned the assumption that specific issues contribute 
to any difference in ideological reasoning or revealed identification (Condon & 
Wichowsky 2017, 15; Norrander & Wilcox 2008). Gender consciousness plays a role, but 
gender consciousness only matters with regard to political preferences if gender matters 
in the first place (Gurin 1985; Cook & Wilcox 1991). The existing gaps on issue 
positions and ideological tendencies remain for reasons relating to social roles. 
Social markers are attached to categories of identity whereby one can understand 
gender identities through the lens of group belonging. A sociological analysis pinpoints 
how these categories are salient with regard to personal identity. An analysis of the 
narrative and myths of each group prototype reflect what it means to be a member of a 
particular sex. These stories reflect the aspirational values, opportunities, and constraints 
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a member of each sex is likely to face. They allow one to contextualize modern gender 
gaps in areas of social welfare and culture politics. Admittedly, interpretations of the 
categories of gender identity are just that – interpretations. The task is qualitative; 
however, it is still productive. The study of the individual relations to institutions informs 
one of the ways in which others perceive their interests (Béland 2009). As a result, one 
can springboard into a more detailed understanding of gender differences and evaluations 
in modern politics. The dichotomy between men and women offers a contrast between 
narratives. Broadly, one can understand the mythology of each sex through the narratives 
of decline or of rising (Stone 2012, 160). For men, the narrative is one of decline. For 
women, the narrative is one of rising. The narratives reflect the changing social reality in 
the lives of most citizens. 
One evaluates masculinity through a narrative of decline. According to 
Baumeister, men experience a greater spread of successful and unsuccessful life 
outcomes, on average, than women (2010). While the apogee of society is inhabited 
mostly by men, so, too, is the nadir. Overall, the median man has seen a decline in 
fortunes in the context of growing inequality. The economic story of the last 50 years is 
one of increasing hardship and scarcity (Kimmel 2012). Men believe a changing 
economy has left them behind (Cramer 2016). The transition from an economy of 
organized labor and manufacturing to an economy of service-oriented jobs and 
automation has hit men without the college education especially hard (Hacker & Pierson 
2010). All the while, men have coped with the loss of traditional economic power along 
with the loss of unilateral political power in home and society (Carlson 2015). Women 
have entered the public sphere, and have renegotiated relations in the domestic domain. 
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This evolution of roles has rendered the conventional model of manhood incompatible 
with most modern socio-economic lifestyles.  
Furthermore, men feel adrift in a culture that they no longer unquestionably 
dominate. Conventional masculinity no longer garners the same prestige. A lot of ink has 
been spilled to bemoaning the loss of positive images of men in American culture. One 
adduces the growth of the masculine self-help industry as evidence that men lack visible 
public role models (Kimmel 2012). Popular culture appears devoid of men as paragons of 
virtue. The Ward Cleaver type was replaced by Archie Bunker type: faulty men without 
the admirability of a stoic comportment. These men like Homer Simpson and Peter 
Griffin are depicted as lovable oafs, but still lacking. The change may reflect the way that 
the average man actually is, but the commonplace is not an ideal for manhood. Ideals are 
aspirational, and women now hold the values worth idealizing (Eagly & Mladinic 1994). 
Women are portrayed as more praiseworthy, and implicitly superior for their congenial 
nature (Baumeister 2010, 25). Feminine traits are now considered essential for corporate 
and professional environments. White-collar men have adopted these feminine values, 
but the majority of men in the working-class adhere to conventional masculine values and 
norms (Nichols 2020). 
While it is impossible to gauge in actuality the accuracy of this narrative, it 
appears real in the mind of observers and commentators. It is given credence by the fact 
that Trump harnessed this dour self-perception among men to bolster his longshot 
campaign (Williams 2016). Men are searching for a positive self-image and esteem in a 
society where conventional masculinity is considered outmoded (Baumeister 2010; 
McKay & McKay 2009; Twigger 2002). The dual trends of economic and social 
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dislocation amplify the distress. Many men cannot attain the ideal of breadwinner or 
provider. The average, contemporary man still desires esteem. In such a situation, one 
expects an individual to redefine their gender identity to make it attainable. The evidence 
suggests that men are turning toward new cultural badges to signal manliness to replace 
past models. For instance, the rise in gun culture is attributed to men finding a new sense 
of self as protector as the provider ideal is increasingly out of reach (Carlson 2015). 
Consequently, the transition from economic-based notions of manhood to identity-based 
notions of manhood makes political masculinities more symbolic in nature. Collective 
grievances are the predecessor to political action in social identity theory, and relevant 
herein.  
The new masculinities built on notions of identity face novel challenges. No one 
could contest men as breadwinners as it was an economic fact to most families. However, 
one can contest identity-based forms of masculinity as misguided, unnecessary, or 
pernicious. Men face a dilemma as they endorse these new masculinities. Male advocates 
claim that this transition to attainable identities is to build positive self-esteem. Feminists 
dispute the innocence of the new male movement (Kimmel 1995). They see it as a 
repackaging of past sexist and anti-egalitarian tropes. This contestation over manliness, 
especially by women, leads to resentment no matter how well-intentioned (Barnett & 
Rivers 2019). In this way, the push for equity and accommodation even resembles 
oppression from the perspective of men (Blow 2018). Policy efforts to improve the status 
of women appear injurious the status of men (Bullock & Reppond 2017; Garcia et al. 
2005). Under contest, one expects men to double-down on their masculinities. 
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Not all men have responded negatively to the decline of traditional masculinity. 
However, the effects of masculinity in transition can intensify the salience of the 
traditional male identity among men. Men persistently perceive change as a threat to 
one’s livelihood, status, economic power, and privilege (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010). 
The presence of women asserting the right to define masculinity likely makes the issue 
relevant to otherwise apathetic men. Men, unlike women, seem hardwired to avoid 
connection to traits of the other sex (Berent et al. 2016; Brizendine 2010, 19). A loss of a 
sense of superiority should prompt men to seek redress politically, and hold political 
views unique from women. Narratives of decline push adherents to retrench, and confront 
the causes of their losses (Stone 2012). This visualization likely leads men overall 
holding the same preferences favored by authoritarian types to seek preservation through 
political ends. The fact that masculinity resembles authoritarian behavior likely magnifies 
the relation. 
On the other hand, the narrative is one of rising for women. The last 50 years has 
seen a surge in the status of the average woman, overall. Waves of feminism have 
propelled generations of activists to challenge the patriarchal practices of society. This 
activism has removed countless legal and cultural barriers from sidelining women in 
society. The economic situation has improved dramatically for female workers and 
consumers (Silverstein & Sayre 2009). For example, women now outpace men in 
attainment of higher education. Education is often a shorthand metric for future income. 
More women are enrolling and graduating from college proportional to men. It is 
estimated that women will be the majority of the educated workforce sometime in the 
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2020s (Matias 2019). Therefore, the near future may see women displace men as drivers 
of the economy and earners of the national income.  
Female integration into the broader public domain through expanded 
opportunities has remade social relations. Respectable culture has equally evolved to 
support the rise of women. The perception of women contrasts with men in this regard. 
Women are portrayed as exemplary, and having the values for which one should aspire. It 
is not that only women hold women in high regard. Both men and women regard women 
as positively. The imbalance of positive affect between the sexes may represent a 
collective overcorrection to compensate for the history of female oppression. Indeed, 
commentators adduce that women benefit from a broader culture that promotes this self-
regard (Baumeister 2010, 81). Feminine qualities are desired and praised. For instance, a 
Gallup study of 27 million employees in 195 countries found that women are preferred 
leaders to men (2015, 26). The reason for this conclusion is that employees favor 
superiors with people-oriented qualities, which are considered feminine. Women take a 
keener interest in relationships, and are more engaged with their subordinates. These 
people-oriented qualities are considered oppositional to agentic qualities, which are 
associated with men and masculinity. 
The gains for women in society, however, also reveals the limitations of progress. 
Women still face examples of gender barriers and discrimination (Lizotte 2017, 54). 
Paradoxically, women lack overall confidence in comparison to men, on average, despite 
significant gains (Kay & Shipman 2014). Additionally, they feel underserved and 
unaccommodated as workers and consumers (Siverstein & Sayre 2009). It is still 
expected that women manage a work-home balance while leading in the domestic sphere. 
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Women find that parenting has become more demanding (Miller 2018). Childcare costs 
have grown in real terms. These costs are complicated by the loss of real income due to 
inflation and anemic wage growth of the last decade. The growth in economic inequality 
over the last four decades particularly hurts women, who still earn less on average than 
men. As a result, women possess a sense of solidarity as women since they are still 
uniquely affected by social inequalities (Burns et al. 2011; Howell & Day 2000). This 
situation should dispose women to oppose conventional social arrangements while 
supporting redistributive policies. As a result, the effect of gender on women should 
counter the influence of authoritarianism depending on one’s disposition. The values of 
conciliation and cooperation associated with femininity should reinforce this oppositional 
nature.  
These narratives highlight gender gaps with regard to social welfare and culture. 
Past research corroborates this perspective.  Women favor greater social services and 
redistributive programs. Overall, women possess fewer economic resources than men 
(Bullock & Reppond 2017). Fewer resources leave women vulnerable to economic 
hardships, but it also has a chilling effect on female political mobilization. Historically, 
women have had a lower level of interest, engagement and knowledge of politics (Burns 
et al. 2011; O’Conner & Yanus 2009). Fewer resources and years spent outside the labor 
market in motherhood help explain higher levels of support for maintaining redistribution 
programs among women in areas of healthcare, housing, education, child-care, and 
welfare (Huddy et al. 2008, Lizotte 2017). In contrast, redistributive programs elicit 
opposition from men as they are viewed as an injury to economic and group interest 
(Bullock & Reppond 2017; Garcia et al. 2005). Reminders of past injustices to promote 
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female advancement prime men’s sense of gendered self-interest, and attenuate support 
for equity policies as men feel women currently enjoy gender equity (Hideg & Wilson 
2020). 
 Differences in economic views result from material self-interest, but also from a 
learned personality gap due to social expectations placed on each sex. Gender informs 
proper behavior and etiquette. Conventional culture instructs women to be empathetic 
toward others while teaching men to be distant. Indeed, social norms have a pronounced 
effect on gender differences in expressed personality traits, which manifest in partisan 
distinctions (Gerber et al. 2011; Vianello et al. 2014). The greater endorsement of 
egalitarian beliefs may also contribute to observed differences (Howell & Day 2000). 
Eagly and Wood demonstrate that women are viewed as more communal in their 
qualities: warm and nurturing. Men were viewed as having more agentic qualities such as 
assertiveness and aggression (2012). Men view themselves as dissimilar from others; 
whereas women find similarities (Ott-Holland et al. 2014). These internalized beliefs 
matter when a person scales appropriate actions from the personal level to the societal 
level. 
 In addition to economic policy questions, women find themselves more liberal on 
cultural issues, too. While cultural issues are distinct from economic issues, similar 
motivations appear to push women to liberal positions. Women tend to favor 
compassionate positions on social issues (Eagly et al. 2004). They disfavor governmental 
use of force (Shapiro & Mahajan 1986). Their reluctance to support the use of force 
translates into opposition to initiate armed conflict (Huddy et al. 2005; Huddy et al. 
2009). Women favor diplomacy instead (Nincic & Nincic 2002). In domestic contexts, 
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women are less likely to support the police use of force (Halim & Stiles 2001). 
Additionally, they are less likely than men to support capital punishment and harsh 
punishments on criminals with a few exceptions for rapist or child abusers (Stack 2000; 
Hurwitz & Smithey 1998). Wolpert and Gimpel find that women express consistently 
more favorable support for gun control overall (1998). Conversely, men disfavor gun 
control as it is viewed as an affront to their conception of manliness (Carlson 2015; 
Lizotte 2019). 
Moreover, women are more hospitable than men in regard to disadvantaged 
groups. This fact likely represents solidarity from one historically disadvantaged group to 
another. Thus, they express higher levels of support for gay rights overall (Herek 2002). 
Additionally, this support extends to civil rights. However, women do express higher 
levels of religiosity and religious fundamentalism than men in Western nations (Kelley & 
DeGraaf 1997; Walter & Davie 1998). The literature does not produce satisfying 
explanations for why this gap exists. One hypothesis is that women have historically been 
disadvantaged relative to men. The vulnerable in society embrace religion in order to 
assuage the downtrodden nature of their condition (Water & Davie 1998). Another 
possibility is that the values of compassion and charity in Western religion, i.e. 
Christianity, are attractive to women because they have become conventionally feminine 
values. 
Additionally, women express higher levels of support for adhering to 
conventional moral values in another unexpected twist. This position translates into 
stronger support for school prayer along with bans on pornography and drugs than men. 
This culturally conservative exception to female preferences likely exists as these issues 
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involve the family (Eagly et al. 2004). Therefore, the conventionally female role of 
caretaker in the family acclimates women to conservative social practices, in this regard. 
This point about familial expectations for women explains their deviance in supporting 
harsher punishments for rapists and child abusers. Abortion differences are inconsistent 
or nonexistent, though (Lizotte 2017). While women tend to be more liberal than their 
male counterparts the pattern is not concrete. 
 The discussion to here has focused on contextualizing the categories of men and 
women writ large. One constructed the narrative by examining the socio-economic forces 
of gender by itself. However, the singular category of gender omits other important 
identities that modify perspectives and preferences. The most important and 
consequential of which is partisan identity (Sanbonmatsu 2008; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 
2009). Party affiliation radically affects one’s conception of the public good and personal 
self-interest. Moreover, party affiliations influence gendered views as each party has its 
own gendered image (Winter 2016). One must analyze how partisanship bisects gender in 
two ways. The first is to continue with the qualitative discussion of gender in the 
Democratic and Republican Parties. Secondly, one must turn to the literature on gender 
gaps to examine inter- and intraparty differences in political preferences. 
 The inclusion of cross-cutting partisan categories is necessary to refine one’s 
understanding of modern gender gaps (Lizotte 2017b; Ondercin 2017). The discussion of 
the environmental forces acting on men and women was intended to merely establish a 
baseline understanding of the modal man and woman. The categorical narratives feel 
blockish and overly general at times because the narratives cast a wide net. One needs a 
perspective to expound the categories of men and women who deviate from the group 
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prototype. A partisan lens achieves this end, albeit indirectly, as a highly relevant social 
identity. Political parties have gendered connotations that allow one a window through 
which to study gender gaps in light of men and women who affiliate with a political party 
of the opposite connotation of their sex. 
 Partisanship is a powerful influence with regard to gender identity. Republicans 
frame themselves as manly, and Democrats frame themselves as feminine (Holman et al. 
2016, 136-137). However, men do not exclusively inhabit the Republican Party and 
women do not exclusive comprise the Democratic Party. Gender ratios are imbalanced in 
party affiliation. The parties are not exclusively sorted with regard to sex (Sanbonmatsu 
2002). Yet, each party has polarized over gender identity respectively through cultural 
war politics (Ondercin 2017, 751-753). Partisan polarization and issue ownership over 
matters of feminism precipitated this gap (Winter 2010, 591). Sharp ideological conflict 
reinforces the gender images of each party. Consequently, women and men may 
internalize partisan gender patterns in varying degrees depending on the party to which 
they attach (Shapiro 2003, 651). 
Prevailing partisan forces guide individuals to align their social identities in 
accordance with the prototype of their party. Egan has demonstrated that individuals will 
align their non-partisan social identities, including gender identity, to the salient 
prototype represented in a political party (2019). One expects partisanship to influence 
gender norms as it is more explicitly a core identity in causal pathway models of 
preference formation (King & Matland 2003; Sanbonmatsu & Dolan 2009, 486). 
Partisanship and gender identity align for Democratic women and Republican men. 
However, this tremendous pressure to conform is complicated by the fact that men and 
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women are not exclusively sorted along party lines, though. Therefore, countless voters 
are cross-pressured due to partisan identities and gender, which will condition their 
preferences (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Some men are Democrats. Some women are 
Republican. These individuals have dissonant social identities as Republicans project 
masculinity while Democrats project femininity. They are members of a party that 
represent the gendered qualities attributed to the other sex. These voters potentially 
complicate the relation between gender and authoritarianism. In this way, the lens of 
partisanship identifies men and women whose gender preferences may deviate from the 
broad narrative. One must observe their categorical interests, too (Bos & Schneider 2017; 
Winter 2010, 588).  
 A prototypical Democratic man and Republican woman comes into view by 
parsing the concepts. Democrats and Republicans stand for different principles, so one 
must identify the relevance of partisanship. In terms of ideology, Democrats are liberal, 
and Republicans are conservative. However, one needs a substantive understanding of 
liberal and conservative beyond the symbolic meaning (Ellis & Stimson 2012). In this 
regard, one marshals psychological theories. This perspective supplants the spatial 
analysis of individual interest with a social identity analysis. This lens offers a more 
tangible understanding of the electorate by replacing abstract ideology with politicized 
group interests as the focus of observation instead (Achens & Bartels 2016, 309-310).  
The culture of the Democratic and Republican Parties differs due to the extensive 
nature of social sorting and elite ideological polarization. Each party has developed its 
own prevailing conception of the public good in the party’s culture. The dueling visions 
for America constitute the identity politics that animate the “culture wars.” Partisans 
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inhabit two separate ideological universes. Unlike 50 years ago when the political elite 
shared one prevailing white culture, contemporary Republicans and Democrats diverge. 
The bifurcation of American politics is the story of two parties disentangling themselves 
from any type of overlap (Noel 2013). The social protest movements propelled this 
realignment (Baylor 2018). These movements challenged more than white men in 
government. It challenged how the prevailing culture of white masculinity defined 
patriotism and political acceptability (Kaufmann 2019, 296; Martinez-HoSang 2008, 
288). In turn, the white male as the default national identity eroded (Theiss-Morse 2009). 
The defense of and opposition to this benchmark of conventional America led to the 
current political culture in each party (Abramowitz & Saunder 2006; Zingher 2014). 
The defining feature of American politics in the last 30 years is elite polarization. 
This sorting has affected the composition and culture of each party. One can describe 
Republicans as the party of the whole while Democrats are the party of the other 
(Grossman & Hopkins 2015). The collapse of the shared white-ruling elite in each party 
has inspired citizens to sort along racial lines (Mason & Wronski 2015, 260; Tesler & 
Sears 2010). The tight re-alignment of social identities for Republicans is important. It 
affects the party’s culture and conception of the public good. Grossman and Hopkins 
argue that Republicans are akin to a social movement based on notions of convention and 
limited government (2015, 120). The high degree of congruence between member 
identities, i.e. Whites and Evangelicals, means that Republicans play identity politics 
with greater zeal and intensity than Democrats (Mason & Wronski 2018, 258).  
The Republican cultural vision for America is referred to as “patriotic 
correctness” (Wilson 2008). Abstract limited government ideology is itself a type of dog 
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whistle for ending welfare programs to minorities and women in substantive terms 
(Gilens 1999, 31). The member identities long for the days when America was “great” in 
the desire for white ethno-traditionalism to be the default national identity again 
(Kaufmann 2019, 8). In line with this desire, conservative men and women adhere to the 
strictures of conventional binary gender identities (Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020). This 
adherence to traditional gender norms generates for masculine public policy. The 
overrepresentation of men in the Party reinforces the promotion of conventional 
masculinity. This quality means that the Republican Party shares the traits associated 
with manliness (Winter 2010).  
The reality of elite polarization makes the Democratic Party the antithesis of the 
Republican Party. This perception has grounding in the composition and culture of the 
Democratic Party. Democrats have developed in opposition to the social composition of 
the Republican Party. They represent the myriad of social groups and movements 
opposed to the “whole” (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Mason & Wronski 2018). This 
composition includes anything that does not fit under the broad category of a white man. 
The diversity of groups includes ones based on material interest like labor unions. It also 
includes ones based on post-material, identitarian lines such as the LGBT, feminist, and 
civil rights movements. The resulting culture vision of non-conventional diversity is 
political correctness. The culture is enforced to protect the wellbeing of the traditionally 
disenfranchised populations who have attached to the Democratic Party.  
Democrats face a unique challenge due to their rainbow composition. Diversity 
produces distrust (Putnam 2007). It triggers a more cultural form of threat rooted in social 
identity and core values (Lavine & Velez 2017, 527; Newman 2013; Sides & Citrin 
DiMariano 87 
 
2007). Individuals are overly suspicious of the people who do not resemble them, and are 
comfortable with the people who do resemble them. It is no surprise then that political 
correctness polices are instituted to suppress inflammatory behavior with multiple 
identities present. Liberal ideology has changed to incorporate minority groups, and 
preserve interests of the wider Democratic coalition (Baylor 2018; Schickler 2016). One 
purpose of ideology is to bind individuals with divergent preferences into an organization 
through time (Aldrich 2011; Bawn et al. 2012; Noel 2013). The effect of ideological 
change on the Party’s culture is to extend the protections of political correctness to new 
groups.  
Democrats require a strong prevailing culture of toleration to bind its fractious, 
diverse elements into a party. The Left has to muster for collective action and to 
overcome the status-quo bias. The Right does not face those inherent institutional biases 
in the same way (Gourevitch 1986, 163). Democrats adopt values of conciliation, 
compromise, tolerance, and cooperation to cope with these centrifugal forces. These 
values are associated with conventional femininity. These values are routinely challenged 
by networks of activists pushing politics toward being a no-compromise, zero-sum game 
(Maskett 2016). These qualities of competition reflect a bias toward masculine qualities. 
Therefore, Democrats must additionally face masculine biases inherent to political 
competition. A 15-percentage point gap separates women from men on the stances that 
politicians have congeniality, civility and compassion in office (Gramlich 2018). One 
expects Democrats to double-down on civility to preserve its coalition, which will have 
extra appeal to the women who engage in its politics. The reality of political forces 
disposes Democrats to be default party for conventionally femininity. 
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If men and Republicans are from Mars while women and Democrats are from 
Venus, what should one make of Republican women and Democratic men? These two 
groups face cross-pressuring forces on their identity. Gender identity in these two cases 
nuances political identity. However, partisan identification is superior over an 
individual’s other social identities (Egan 2019). Partisanship has rank over environmental 
identities in casual pathway models, too. Therefore, gender identity should bend in the 
direction of the party’s gendered images associated with its sex (Lizotte 2019; Prusaczyk 
& Hodson 2020). These two incongruent categories are often overlooked as a matter of 
analysis. As a result, one is left to speculate about the gendered politics of a large 
percentage of men and women. In this case, however, the prototype for each party with 
regard to gender revolves around each party’s respective treatment of feminism (Winter 
2010). Men in the Democratic Party should hue toward feminine values in political 
approaches while women in the Republican Party should hue toward masculine values.  
The growing importance of gender analysis to political science has recently 
prompted researchers to study these incongruent categories. The election of Donald 
Trump with support from a majority of white women has served as the catalyst for closer 
academic scrutiny. The methodology of intersectionality has also opened the conceptual 
space to analyze intra-sex differences as well as intersex differences (Barnes & Cassese 
2017; Bos & Schneider 2019, 173). Republican women distance themselves from the 
feminist label (Schaffner et al. 2018). Interestingly, they have co-opted feminist rhetoric 
and concepts for non-feminist goals (Deckman 2016). Republican women use the 
language of feminism to serve the interests of patriarchic gender roles and norms. In this 
way, they avoid the egalitarian nature of feminism. They endorse benevolent sexism, and 
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support male patterns of group dominance (Radke et al. 2018). They adhere more 
strongly to gender binaries than conservative men, and the instruction of conventional 
roles (Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020). 
On the other hand, Democratic men have embraced feminism. These men are 
notably less studied than the other three categories. The academic focus rests on 
understanding why men cling to conventional notions of masculinity, and do not often 
distinguish between party affiliations among men. According to Shapiro, Democratic 
men have adopted the egalitarian beliefs of feminism (2003). They do not endorse the 
limited notion of manhood bequeathed to them by their forefathers. They fit the idea of 
the “new man” who liberates himself from restrictive gender norms (Kimmel 2012). It is 
perhaps for this reason that Democratic men do not use the rhetoric of masculinity to 
support egalitarianism. Culturally, the combination of masculine means toward the ends 
of feminism is an unwelcome contradiction. Democratic men’s proximity to progress, 
though, makes them comfortable with the new roles for women and men in society. They 
adopt a cosmopolitan approach to politics rather than an insular, nationalistic one. This 
quality especially reflects affluent Democratic men where income helps to promote 
egalitarianism (Ciuk et al. 2018; Nichols 2020).  
Feminist men may not caricature all Democratic men, however. The view of 
progressive men in the Democratic Party may overstate the case that men hew closely to 
ideals of feminine values. The relevance of party composition on social polarization 
between Republicans and Democrats is that white men in the Democratic Party may face 
stronger cross-pressures on their identity than white women in the Republican camp. 
Several Democratic men are members of the working class, and identify economically 
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with the Democratic agenda (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009; Bartels 2008). In this regard, the 
role of class potentially complicates the degree to which men attach to the Democratic 
Party. Their gender identities may soften their support for Democratic cultural politics 
(Nichols 2020). Men are known to resist association with feminine traits and objects 
(Brizendine 2010, 19). Yet, high income men in the professional classes may be more 
likely to practice post-material politics (Ciuk et al. 2018). Class cross-pressures may be 
unique to this category in the degree to which members are conflicted between identities, 
but ultimately it may be irrelevant since partisanship is the prime influencer on political 
behavior.  
 These two groups are unique in that they face cross-pressures on their identities of 
self. They remain in a situation of incongruent identities when they can sort to align their 
partisanship with their sex. However, partisanship is an enduring identity that remains 
mostly unchanged over one’s life (Green et al. 2002). Partisan cross-pressures 
undoubtedly impact the relation between gender and authoritarian preferences among 
individuals along the authoritarian spectrum. The gender of masculinity and Republicans 
resemble authoritarian attributes. The support for hierarchies, force, and hostility to out-
groups reinforces this overlap. On the other end, femininity and Democrats resemble the 
non-authoritarian type. They support tolerance and egalitarianism for diverse ways of 
life. This respect for diversity is anathema to an authoritarian.  
The relation between authoritarianism and gender in men and women may differ 
in strength depending on the party in question. Given the strength of partisanship over 
constituent social identities, it is quite possible that Republican women resemble 
Republican men in exhibiting stronger preferences for authoritarian politics since the 
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Republican Party is a more cohesive movement than the Democratic Party (Lizotte 
2019).  Likewise, Democratic men are less likely to endorse authoritarian preferences 
than Republican men, but they are still more likely to support such outcomes than 
Democratic women. While authoritarianism promotes strong partisan identities, it is a 
conjecture how it will influence preferences in the Democratic Party where the partisan 
identity and prevailing gender norms are antithetical to authoritarian preferences. 
The modern partisan gender gap is significant and enduring as men and women 
continue to diverge socially and politically. The politicization of gender under the Trump 
presidency makes it unlikely that the polarization of gender identity will subside any time 
soon (Fox & Lawless 2018). However, the emphasis on the modern gender gap is only 
the first part of a complete analysis. Gender is understood as a group construct that 
changes over time (Sanbonmatsu 2010). One has posited a connection between 
authoritarianism and gender, yet support for the thesis has yet to be fully substantiated. 
Social preferences supported by authoritarians have gendered tones insofar as 
aggressiveness and intolerance are related to maleness and conciliation and diversity to 
femaleness. One has linked the effects of authoritarianism to gender through partisanship, 
and justified the relation through the casual pathway model. However, one must include 
the element of historical development to fully comprehend the politically relevant nature 
and bases of contemporary gender (Burns 2008, 50; Ritter 2008, 20). This task requires 
exploring the origins of affective partisanship and the rise of social identity politics. This 
historical dimension is crucial to cement the larger claim between gender gaps in 
partisanship and authoritarianism as the norm due to political polarization. 
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Chapter 4: Gender and Authoritarian Cleavages in Context of Elite Polarization 
An historical analysis of institutions illuminates in greater detail the connections 
between authoritarianism and gender for men and women as political institutions promote 
polarization on these issues. To this end, it will further elaborate how authoritarianism 
and a social identity like gender became robustly intertwined within partisan identity. 
This entanglement means that gender should condition preferences formed by 
authoritarianism beyond issues of culture due to elite polarization. Race is central to 
forging this link. The political struggle over racial issues transformed party politics into 
its modern tribal form by fostering party polarization. In turn, elite polarization fomented 
affective mass partisanship.  
Affective partisanship amplifies the effects of the gender and authoritarian 
cleavages in politics. This form of partisanship functions as political conflict between 
social identity. It is itself influenced by authoritarianism as an underlying psychological 
mechanism (Luttig 2017). Because tribal partisanship is gendered, gender roles are 
intimately intertwined with political issues through ideology given elite divergence. The 
political self-interest of each sex contributed elite polarization as much as it was 
influenced by it. In this way, gender paved the way for authoritarian understructure of 
affective partisanship. Activists in the New Deal state linked issues of race, economic, 
and culture into one dimension, and parties gradually absorbed their position (Noel 
2013). Voters have sorted in reaction to this form of elite ideological polarization 
(Levendusky 2009). Therefore, the authoritarian substructure of modern partisanship due 




Race is the catalyst for the political development of the relation between 
authoritarianism and gender in contemporary politics. Authoritarian studies are studies of 
whiteness insofar as the methodology only obtains for whites (Pérez & Hetherington 
2014). White interests are gendered. These factors illustrate the need to discuss white 
identity politics. Studies on these matters dovetail with contemporary conversations about 
the explicit role of race in public policy. Racial bias is on trial in American society 
(Silverstein 2020). The current moment raises important questions about the centrality of 
race in the story of American political development. Herein, one relies on racial identity 
to fully understand the linkages between authoritarianism and gender identity through the 
consequences of elite ideological polarization. The process of polarization reflects 
institutional changes in the function and organization of parties in relation to the federal 
policy state. Racialized notions of gender propelled these changes. The role of these 
notions in the promulgation of authoritarianism in partisan politics underscores the claim 
that authoritarianism structures gender gaps as the norm.   
The literature on polarization through the lens of political development provides 
the necessary backdrop to substantiate the central thesis. The exploration of polarization 
in this context is crucial to understand the rise of politicized social identities. White men 
and women reacted to matters of race relations differently. The male repulsion from New 
Deal racial liberalism catalyzed polarization. This thesis is a synthesis of other historical 
accounts. Certain studies focus on the institutional roots of polarization, but not to the 
degree herein. Currently, a couple studies focus on authoritarian and polarization 
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Luttig 2017). Or, they focus on gender and polarization 
(Gillions et al. 2018). Moreover, the question of race is secondary and implicit in those 
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analyses. No study synthesizes gender and authoritarianism together in their account for 
white Americans in depth.  
This account would not be complete without race. Whiteness plays a role in the 
contest of economic welfare and cultural policy throughout the development of the New 
Deal state (Gilens 1999; Katznelson 2005; Kinder & Winter 2001, 440; King & Smith, 
2005, 83). It shaped the preferences of white men and women as the operation of the 
federal government became increasingly central to daily life and national politics. The 
largesse of the federal government became increasingly essential to control through the 
office of president, especially as politics splintered into explicit clashes based on partisan 
social identities. The promotion of elite ideological polarization due to issues of race 
combined economic and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict. It allowed 
authoritarianism to structure conflict by collapsing issue cleavages into a singular “us vs. 
them” continuum for partisan struggle (Hetherington & Weiler 2009; Huddy et al. 2015; 
Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Therefore, racial identity contributes to a deeper theoretical 
connection between authoritarianism and gender in partisanship among white Americans. 
The debut of ideological polarization contributed to the unique relation of each 
sex toward authoritarianism. Trends in the expansion of federal policy state rendered 
traditionally constituted parties obsolete. Elites reconstituted parties as ideological 
vehicles to respond to the growth of the policy state. Ideological divergence over the ends 
of policy led to partisan polarization, and the salience of partisan social identities 
(Webster & Abramowitz 2017, 641-642). Questions of economics and culture drive the 
preferences of men and women apart, but also separate authoritarians and non-
authoritarians alike. The reconfiguration of parties pushed these groups to diverge 
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politically at different rates with different intensities. The developments ultimately align 
the interests of men and authoritarian politics with the Republican brand across issue 
domains. It links women and non-authoritarian politics to Democrats. The salience of 
partisan identities in both parties makes strong authoritarians into partisan warriors 
(Luttig 2017, 867). Committed partisans internalize elite ideology with greater precision, 
and contribute to polarization in the electorate in turn (Druckman et al. 2013; Federico & 
Hunt 2013, 105; Levedusky 2013, 10). 
The novelty of this argument bridges outstanding gaps in the isolated literatures. 
It responds to calls to encapsulate gender in a holistic understanding of politics (Burns 
2008). Moreover, it provides the theoretical lens to better understand the nature of 
authoritarianism in modern partisanship. For instance, the intertwined nature of race and 
gender in light of partisanship offers a basis for explaining economic preferences among 
authoritarians. Heretofore, scholars have been unable to fully link authoritarianism to 
ideologies due to its weak relation to economic preferences (Cizmar et al. 2014, Johnston 
2018, 237). Economic beliefs are of primary concern in political conflict (Goren & Chen 
2016, 712). The foundation of the argument that authoritarianism is central to modern 
partisanship by scholars like Luttig is diminished if it cannot explain economic positions 
(2017).  
The emphasis on identity as a fundamental feature of partisanship encourages one 
to consider economic ideology in terms of group competition (Iyengar & Krupenkin 
2018, 207). Affect is a key component of political competition because partisanship is an 
expressive social identity (Huddy et al. 2015). Affect toward the target group of public 
policy is sufficient to enhance or mitigate support for the policy (Condon & Wichowsky 
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2017; Jacoby 2000). Additionally, gender roles influence the formation of social welfare 
preferences differently for men and women. This theoretical shift enables one to link 
authoritarianism to economic ideology by way of sex, which derivatively advances the 
literature on partisan polarization.  As a result, one should have the capacity to further 
understand several independent literatures through a combined analysis.  
These breakthroughs are possible through the emphasis on race as it is central to 
the incorporation of authoritarians in the party system. This premise follows King and 
Smith’s claim that one cannot explore American political development without observing 
struggles between orders of white supremacy and racial egalitarianism (2005, 89). To this 
end, this inquiry examines the conflict over race in policymaking for men and women in 
the development of elite polarization and mass partisanship. The methodological focus 
continues with the inference pattern of social identity theory to examine the convergence 
and divergence in the collective grievances of politicized social groups. The inclusion of 
a political development perspective guides the narrative. 
The employment of a section dedicated to political development allows one to 
contextualize political behavior as a reflection of the interests of a category of identity 
through time. The focus of an institutionalist perspective in political development is a 
pragmatic choice to accomplish such an end. These identities are reflections of 
psychosocial dynamics of a certain situation or context (Burns 2005, 141; Huddy et al. 
2008, 32; Deaux & LaFrance 1998). The temporal dimension provides the ideational 
background to situate what it means to be a white man or woman across particular 
moments (Ritter 2008, 13). Secular changes in institutional contexts define observed eras 
of self-perception and political preferences (Sanbonmatsu 2010, 427). American political 
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development seeks to demarcate periods of change and continuity. These institutions 
stage the terrain for politics. The longue durée presents a firmer foundation on which to 
justify an expansive relation between gender and authoritarianism. The insight of 
American political development is suited to advance this inquiry in line with practice in 
gender research. 
 The addition of a historical element requires guidelines for clarity in purpose and 
method. In a seminal text on the methodology of political development analysis, Orren 
and Skowronek cast their research program as a search for “durable [shifts] in governing 
authority” (2004, 123). They argue that one must place institutions in the center of 
analysis as independent variables in order to contextualize the political realities of an 
observed era. The focus on how patterns of governing authority do change transcends 
quantitative approaches through the use of qualitative tools. This approach differs from 
standard causal inference with its wider focus on overarching theory and structural 
causality (Galvin 2019). The approach is subsequently non-teleological by nature. 
Consequently, the methodology to arrive at conclusions varies as approaches in the field 
remains diverse. 
 The open-ended framework of political development compliments inquiries into 
social identity. This aspect makes the approach all the more useful to studying a multi-
faceted phenomenon like polarization. The study of durable shifts in governing authority 
advances a perspective focused on social identity as the interests associated with one’s 
category of identity change. Political development examines the role of “temporal 
processes and events [in influencing] the origin and transformation of institutions that 
govern political and economic relations… [and the] identity of actors over time” 
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(Fioretos et al. 2016, 3-4). Collective identities change organically in response to 
environmental factors. Shifts in authority precipitate and react to changes in how groups 
perceive themselves and their needs from governing institutions. Institutions are 
structured patterns of behavior to constrain human interaction (North 1990, 1; Orren & 
Skoronek 2004, 82-85). Individuals develop interests in conjunction with their relation to 
pertinent institutions. Thus, the historical study of institutions benefits this larger study of 
social identity. 
 Social identities are an important matter of inquiry. Institutions are not neutral 
variables. They shape opportunities and constraints available to actors in the policy 
process. Thus, they can either be obstacles or advantages in the gendering of politics. 
Hacker and Pierson refer to the population of institutions in the policy process as the 
policy terrain (2014). The interaction of institutions and actors operating in the policy 
terrain shape the ideational process of the framing of politics. This process refashions 
what policies are possible, desirable, or even imagined (Béland 2010; Lukes & Hayward 
2008). Institutions favor certain interests over others as mobilizations of bias 
(Schattschneider 1960). They are biased toward self-preservation while seeking to 
maintain their chartered purpose (Baumgartner & Jones 2009). Citizens heuristically 
form their understanding of policies relative to their values vis-à-vis the symbolic and 
programmatic output of institutions in this dynamic process (Goren 2013).  
Reciprocally, policymakers construct policies to reflect prevailing notions 
associated with salient identities. Systems of institutional orders enforce racial and gender 
identities, in this way (King & Smith 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2010; Skocpol 1992). 
Policymakers craft policies to engender notions of what it means to be a white man or 
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woman. For instance, institutions managing access to credit existed to primarily serve 
men before the late 1970s. The limited access of credit for women continued despite 
economic and social changes because credit institutions supported a male-breadwinner 
ideal for society (Prasad 2012). The institutional bias toward the status-quo means that 
the lag of past ideas impacts current politics (Gourevitch 1986; Hacker & Pierson 2014). 
Institutions do not gradually change to reflect a plurality of opinion, but tend to change 
sharply in a single instance as a new position gains prominence (Baumgartner et al. 
2009). Pivotal events are points of observation, therefore. In the case of credit, Congress 
moved to remove paternalistic restrictions as the pressure increased to reflect the reality 
of female financial independence from men. 
The case of credit policy is emblematic of the larger partisan contest over social 
welfare policy in the United States. The clash of gendered notions of race in the battle 
over the state has arguable contributed the most to inflaming political polarization as the 
former white male standard became merely an option. The rise of an alternative to 
“traditional America” induced polarization within the two-party system. Polarization is 
the most prominent feature of modern American politics (Fiorina et al. 2005). One cannot 
develop the narrative without accounting for polarization in partisan social identities. 
Polarization has been a multifaceted process with roots in the high-stakes, racialized 
game for hegemony over the progressive policy state. It has unfolded variably over time. 
As such, one must frame the conflict over federal policy within the context of 
fundamental changes to various institutions in the government such as the presidency and 
the structure of political parties. 
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The story of polarization is not flat, linear, or continuous. One must advance 
beyond simple accounts of causal inference toward an analysis of political development 
(Pierson 2005, 9). By and large, the current literature offers limited examples of a long 
view in the discussion of polarization. The early period in the literature on polarization 
squabbled over its existence, causes, and extent as a mass phenomenon (Abramowitz & 
Webster 2006; Fiorina et al. 2005; McCarty et al. 2009). Polarization was a relatively 
recent development in its modern iteration by the 2000s. The 1980s bore witness to the 
visible breakdown of the New Deal consensus, and the hegemony of the Democratic 
Party. The seeds of this demise were sown decades before, however (Ellis & Stimson 
2012). Partisanship adopted an ideological stance among elites, and political struggles 
took on an acrimonious tone after the election of Reagan (Lee 2016). The presence of the 
first president hostile to New Deal progressivism in the federal government since its 
incorporation modified notions of political acceptability and interest. 
Scholars reacted to these unexpected developments in polarization. In a bit of 
irony, researchers had concluded only a few decades earlier that political parties were 
moribund (Highton & Kam 2011, 203). Technocratic capabilities were supposed to 
supplant parties in progressive theory. However, partisanship was thriving by the new 
millennium in a form recognizable by contemporary standards. It took decades for 
collective understanding to recognize changes in political behavior were more than 
momentary deviations from the norm, though. Parties had reversed their fortunes as 
vestibular organs in the early 1970s to gain new relevance in the organization of political 
conflict in a relatively short period of time (Abramowitz & Saunders 1998). The 
renaissance of parties occurred concomitantly with the resurgence of the Republican 
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Party. Republicans were increasingly challenging Democrats, and emerging victorious 
electorally. The 1994 Republican Revolution would have been improbable only 15 years 
prior. The paradigm of competition for parties substantively differed from partisan 
conflict of the previous generation.  
The essential change in partisan conflict resulted from the development of 
organized ideology. Politics shifted from topsoil issues to bedrock concerns about the 
foundations of American life. Coherent belief structures differentiated modern 
polarization from the 1950s or even the highly polarized post-Reconstruction party era. In 
the 1890s, the country had experienced intense polarization (Stonecash & Brewer 2009, 
48). However, the parties were not polarized over ideological agendas. A multitude of 
unconstrained economic issues formed the main schisms. Questions of race plagued the 
country at this time, but economic positions never constrained racial positions. This 
pattern held into the 1960s (Noel 2013, 148). The lack of organized ideology or any 
substantial political conflict characterized the immediate period after World War II. The 
undifferentiated parties of the era led the American Political Science Association to call 
for more polarization. The organization feared that voters would not be able to exercise 
political control without clear policy signals from either party (Milkis 1992; 180).  
Political parties have indeed polarized in the interim, but for reasons unrelated to 
the prodding of academics. The elites in each party began to internalize ideological 
constraints as early as the 1970s (Mann & Ornstein 2013; Theriault 2008). Elite position-
taking has moved away from local coalitions, and toward the national party’s ideological 
stance for candidates in U.S. House races in an ongoing trend since, at least, the start of 
the New Deal (Ansolabehere et al. 2001). These candidates often professed more extreme 
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policies than voters held as prototypical partisan (Bafumi & Herron 2010). The 
emergence of polarized elites was not limited to the House of Representatives (Hall 
2015). Turnover in the Senate introduced polarized factions from the House (Rohde & 
Theriault 2011). The existence of bipartisan issues between leaders in each party largely 
evaporated by the 1990s (Noel 2013). The parties became homogenous, ideological 
entities in spatial terms by that point (McCarty et al. 2006). Social polarization has 
increased since then, as a result (Mason & Wronski 2018, 261). As expected, the success 
of adopting ideology was different for Democrats as it was for Republicans. 
Compositional factors allow the parties to polarize at different rates as they disentangled 
themselves of overlapping consensus (Grossman & Hopkins 2015). 
The documentation of what happened in American politics leads one to question 
how polarization manifested. The term polarization implies that something caused the 
parties to diverge in the first place. The answer is two-fold: the growth in federal 
policymaking power and the policy ends to which those powers were used. Parties have 
since changed in terms of function and purpose. This truism is especially valid in the case 
of the Republican Party as it has morphed into a parliamentarian-type, absolutist party in 
its structure and mission (Grossman & Hopkins 2015, 120; Mann & Ornstein 2013). The 
growth of the policy state has catalyzed these developments. The centralization of policy 
prerogative in the federal government has raised the stakes to control the levers of power 
due to the potential to suffer lasting policy defeats (Hacker & Pierson 2015). Relevant to 
this inquiry, the new center of gravity in politics gained gendered overtones as the federal 
government advanced civil rights. White men shifted their partisanship in reaction to 
racial liberalism to align with their material self-interest and gendered beliefs about 
DiMariano 103 
 
individualism and hard-work (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Authoritarians reacted 
against the ability of a progressive federal government to remake social relations 
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Their refuge in the Republican Party forged the early 
bonds between gender and authoritarian politics. 
Therefore, polarization and its political consequences is rooted in the modern 
federal policy state. Unfortunately, the modern federal policy state does not have a start 
date. Scholars address this dilemma by demarcating eras and typifying periods of 
common politics. In this situation, the election of President Roosevelt in 1932 marked 
both a watershed moment in the alignment of parties and the growth of the federal policy 
apparatus. The story of modern ideological polarization starts at the precipice of the New 
Deal. The Great Depression wrought unimaginable upheaval throughout society, 
especially among political coalitions. It ended a generation of Republican hegemony led 
by a haphazard coalition of workers and business leaders (Gourevitch 1986, 148). 
Roosevelt’s 1932 election victory resulted from a diverse coalition reacting to the 
immediate threat of total economic collapse. The coalition contained strange bedfellows 
as Roosevelt united immigrants, urban northerners, union laborers, Jews, southern 
segregationists, and farmers (Stonecash & Brewer 2009). The pressing emergency of the 
Depression precipitated, and maintained, this coalition. 
The Roosevelt administration initiated an unprecedented explosion in federal 
policymaking. The New Deal era marks the incorporation of progressivism into 
federalism. Progressivism emerged as a solution to the human misery of the industrial 
revolution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is described as a creative 
synthesis of Hamiltonian means of state action to Jeffersonian ends of individual liberty 
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(Noel 2013, 2-5). In practice, progressives like President Roosevelt harnessed power of 
the federal government to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. The New Deal’s 
progressive doctrine gained constitutional legitimacy when the Supreme Court 
strategically abandoned its pro-business libertarianism in 1937. This reversal ended 
challenges to the delegation of plenary power to the federal government to regulate 
commerce (Miroff et al. 2015, 42-43). Ackerman argues that the incorporation of New 
Deal ideology into constitutional jurisprudence marks the birth of the progressive 
constitutional regime (2019). The Court’s reversal marked the beginning of a 
constitutional era that still reigns today. 
The dawn of the New Deal to the modern day bounds the 90-year period of 
common politics for this inquiry. Operational questions about the scope of the federal 
government in the lives of Americans define the central political schism throughout 
(Goren & Chen 2016, 704). This era itself divides into roughly 30-year periods for the 
purposes of studying polarization. Pivotal events denote the dawn of new eras: 
Roosevelt’s 1932 election, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Republican Revolution in 
1994. These periods are unique with regard to the role of race in structuring conflict 
against the backdrop of changing political institutions. It is important to bound eras with 
regard to race since a raft of scholars consider race to be the most consequential issue to 
divide politics in this era (Abramowitz & Webster 2018, 123; Carmines & Stimson 
1989).  
Questions of race gained traction in national politics after 1932 for the first time 
since Reconstruction. The conflict over race defined American institutional development 
more broadly once racial and economic liberalism combined into one ideological 
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dimension in the context of Great Society programs after 1965 (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, 
323). Men disassociate with the Democratic Party, and increasingly develop into agents 
of conservatism afterward (Gillions et al. 2018). Party positions diverged as elites sorted 
into ideologically homogenous pairings. The parties to emerge from the ideological 
reorganization of conflict take diametric positions across issue dimensions in the third 
observed era. Elite polarization then leads to sorting in the mass electorate (Levendusky 
2009, 110). Women begin to polarize over party affiliation later around the 1992 election 
when they began to depart the Republican Party (Kaufmann 2002, 285). 
One must therefore observe moments of transformation in racial politics as 
moments in the development of polarization. In the initial stages of the New Deal, leaders 
kept race off the agenda to ensure the survival of progressivism in federal politics. 
Roosevelt’s economic liberalism would remain supported and popular so long as the 
promise of the New Deal applied to helping the common (read: white) man (Ellis & 
Stimson 2012, 73; Gilens 1999). The inclusion of southern segregationists in the 
Democratic majority ensured that the New Deal would not be as expansive as Roosevelt 
had envisioned. This group regularly joined Republicans to restrict the scope of labor 
rights and aid to African-Americans (Katznelson 2005). They supported the New Deal 
only when it brought material benefits to their political clientele. Southern Democrats 
feared the ability of the New Deal policy regime to end the caste system of White 
supremacy built on compliant black and white labor (Schickler 2016). 
The realities of the bargain between white progressives and segregationists 
characterize the first observed period of the New Deal era. The combination of these 
factions in one political coalition appears strange in modern times. However, 
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arrangements of convenience were the norm prior to ideological organization of parties. 
Parties maintained cohesion through “a decentralized spoils system rather than a fully 
developed and coherent policy agenda” (Robertson 2018, 52). Parties were parochial, 
locally-oriented coalitions. The power of the federal government was strategically 
contained as states maintained a prominent position of prerogative in federalism (Miroff 
et al. 2015, 40). The legitimation of federal plenary power supplanted states as the prime 
movers of political action, however. The new tools of the federal policy state gradually 
replaced the spoil system in their ability to forge political coalitions. The arena of politics 
transitioned to national leaders and national issues where the old ways of the political 
process would be de-emphasized in lieu of technocratic government. Political activity 
flowed from Washington D.C. as opposed to toward it (Milkis 1999, 9). 
Political leaders reacted to this new calculus. Candidates for the U.S. House from 
both parties were ideologically unresponsive to local districts prior to the New Deal. In 
substantive terms, one would expect this lack of responsiveness as parties organized 
groups independent of ideology. This organizing principle changed in 1934 when 
Republicans began responding to ideological pressures as the New Deal cleavage opened 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). They took on a liberal or conservative position 
depending on their district. This demonstrates the instant preeminence of the New Deal 
economics in national politics. Economic issues consolidated into one primary dimension 
of conflict rather than staying unconstrained (Noel 2013, 81). This new cleavage reflected 
how much the federal government should regulate the economy on the whole (Goren 
2013). However, the impact only affected ideological formation in the Republican Party 
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initially. Democrats remained unresponsive on the whole in the short term to ideological 
pressures to constrain beliefs. 
This resistance to ideological polarization in the face of institutional change could 
not endure. The preeminence of national politics encouraged ideological conflict over the 
course of the first observed era. The Democratic Party eventually organized around 
ideology, which fueled the growing trend toward polarization in ideological terms. The 
increased salience of race in relation to the New Deal state induced sorting. This point is 
reflected in the fact that Democratic nominees were responsive to their districts by the 
late 1960s “when movements in national politics began to re-allocate racial politics to the 
primary ideological axis [of economics] that organized partisan differences” 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). The contemporary dimension of ideological politics is 
gradually absorbed by the party system during the period such that Democrats become 
liberals and Republicans become conservative. This ideological dimension eventually 
expands to ensnare more issues in line with liberal or conservative economic beliefs 
(Noel 2013, 80). 
The policy success of the original New Deal coalition led to its political 
disintegration. Fault lines in the pact surfaced early and often. The coalition lost cohesion 
as the anguish of the Depression and World War II faded. Progressivism had entrenched 
in federal policymaking, and no longer required a broad coalition to defend it. Activists in 
each party lobbied to constrain party coalitions in line with ideological conceptions. 
Conservatism and liberalism outside political parties had developed by the 1950s to 
resemble their modern iterations (Noel 2013, 79). This means that elites connected 
economic, racial, and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict.  
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The inclusion of racial politics into party ideology reflected the increasing 
national push for civil rights. Local Democrats, labor unions and civil rights groups 
mobilized a grassroots effort to push the Party to embrace their ideological commitments 
to champion civil rights (Baylor 2018). Meanwhile, Republican party building initiatives 
under Eisenhower began courting racial conservatives in the South into a coalition for 
limited government (Schickler 2016). National Democratic leaders resisted the call from 
liberal Democrats during this time to organize ideologically as they rightfully feared it 
would shatter the New Deal coalition (Rosenfeld 2017). This resistance included staking 
clear positions on race. However, the influx of racial liberals into the Democratic Party 
and the decline of the segregationist-wing made the problem of keeping race off the 
agenda moot (Schickler 2016).  
The end of the first observed period coincides with the changing center of gravity 
in the original New Deal coalition. In the first period, one finds change and continuity in 
the collective opinion of politicized groups. Public opinion, especially in the North, 
warmed to racial liberalization while it remained unpopular in the South. As the emphasis 
of politics broadened to include race, voters chose leaders with more concerns in mind 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001, 150). Groups in each party mobilized from the grassroots to 
reform the party coalitions ideologically (Baylor 2018). To this end, liberals and 
conservatives used the issue of race wherever possible to dissever economic liberals from 
racial conservatives in the Democratic Party, and vice-versa in the Republican Party 
(Schickler 2016, 273-275). The sack of racially liberal Republicans in the North in the 
1958 elections signaled the beginning of partisan sorting on race (Hetherington & Weiler 
2009, 67). Race and economics continued to exist as two separate cleavages despite 
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increasing Democratic ownership over both issues. Parties reluctantly continued as 
coalitions of interests despite incentives to reorganize as ideological vehicles. As a result, 
one also observes southern Democrats with liberal racial views replaced with southern 
Democrats with conservative racial views and liberal economic views during this period 
(Ansolabehere et al. 2001). 
The gradual realignment of parties on race triggered ideological organization of 
the mass electorate. Partisans warmed to their respective party’s stance on race as the 
racial cleavage slowly merged with the New Deal cleavage in light of the civil rights 
movement (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 8). The Johnson administration finalized the merger 
of these two dimensions in the public consciousness through the president’s support for 
civil rights and expanded welfare programs. His 1964 presidential victory equipped him 
with friendly supermajorities in Congress. By now, liberal ideologues were in control of 
the Democratic Party (Schickler 2016). His Great Society initiative extended the New 
Deal beyond industrial factory workers to more groups like the poor and African-
Americans. Additionally, Johnson responded to calls for national civil rights guarantees 
to end the Jim Crow regime in the South (Milkis 2016). He advanced this end with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This support of racial policy permanently linked liberal 
ideology with civil rights, and connected African-Americans and the Democratic Party in 
political matters (Baylor 2018). Questions of economics and race in ideology remain 
linked to this day, as a result. 
President Johnson’s achievements mark the transition to the second observed era 
of New Deal politics. His administration was a critical moment in the story of 
polarization as his legacy of civil rights forever changed the institutions of the presidency 
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and partisan coalitions. For one, his presidency signals the death knell for the shared 
white elite in both political parties (Mason & Wronski 2018, 260). Moreover, he is the 
last Democratic president to win a majority of white male voters. The majority of this 
voting bloc has not identified with the Democratic Party since (Kaufmann 2002, 286). 
The first gender gap also emerges in the tumult presaging the 1964 election as Goldwater 
campaigns as the first ideological conservative in the New Deal era. Racial resentment 
among white men contribute to the formation of this gap (Gillions et al. 2018).  
The expansion of the New Deal welfare state coincided against a backdrop of 
social tumult. The unrest of the 1960s explains several of the reasons for the long-term 
shift in party demographics and preferences (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 76-85). It is by the 
point of the Civil Rights Act that national politics began activating authoritarian voters 
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 68-76). One must suspect that the rapid assault on 
conventional social relations during the protest movements of the 1960s primed 
authoritarian concerns. This position is only speculation absent reliable public survey 
data (Cizmar et Al 2014). The civil rights movement provoked the development of a 
concurrent “law and order” backlash movement as civil rights was equated with black 
lawlessness (Murakawa 2008, 252). It is difficult to believe that authoritarians did not 
flock to the banner of order in an atmosphere of unrest. Liberalism itself was sullied by 
its association with the discord. 
The enlargement of the policy state heightened anxieties for authoritarians. The 
developments of the Johnson administration and their effects on ideological polarization 
would not have been possible without the growth of the policy state. The development of 
the New Deal policy state gave new impetus and meaning to political participation. The 
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apparatus of the national government had become something essentially different by the 
1960s. Schattschneider captures the contemporary sentiment succinctly: 
While we were looking the other way, the government of the United States 
became a global operation a decade or two ago. The budget is about 250 
times as large as it was [in 1890]. If you multiply the diameter of a 
baseball by 250 very suddenly, you have an explosion. Is it possible to 
understand American politics without considering the regime a going 
concern? [Emphasis added.] … The changes in the regime are so great 
that one might well ask whether or not our theoretical equipment is 
adequate for the comprehension of what has happened. (1960, 115-116). 
 
Schattschneider’s analysis about the growing thicket of policy on institutions was 
prescient. He proposed that policy creates politics, and applied this understanding to the 
New Deal state. This concept was novel for the time. It emphasizes how changing 
institutional configurations alters political realities. In this case, even observers of the 
time recognized that politics had become conceptually discontinuous against the 
backdrop of the policy state. The goal of parties became to capture control of the 
apparatus of state for durable policy victories beyond short-term spoils (Hacker & 
Pierson 2014).  
The Johnson administration is an inflection point in institutional development as 
he realizes the power of the policy state to bring the New Deal to its highwater mark. He 
wields the resources of the Great Society program to remake American social relations. 
Changes in the presidency mirrored transformations in the party system during the 
period. The growth in executive administration made the presidency a more 
consequential office to hold. The increased prominence of the presidency accelerated 
trends in party polarization. For one, it reinforced the movement toward federal-centric 
politics. Political parties had a new impetus for competition, and now an office to 
necessarily capture (Hacker & Pierson 2014, 650). National administration of policy had 
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supplanted the original purpose of parties to dole out patronage (Milkis 2016, 294). The 
loss of this traditional tool to maintain party unity ultimately led to the collapse of 
traditionally constituted parties by the 1970s. Party leaders needed a new way to sustain a 
long coalition with the implosion of the original New Deal coalition. Ideology and the 
new battle over the proper use of the policy state emerged to replace the old bonds of 
collective action (Noel 2013, 119). Both parties succumbed to ideological takeovers as 
noted with activists increasingly handling the drafting of platforms (Rosenfeld 2017; 
Schickler 2016).  
Consequently, the burgeoning policy state changed the role of the presidency in 
the New Deal state. The economic calamity of the 1930s and warfare of the 1940s gave 
the president a new set of powers to claim as inherent (Kornhauser 2015, Tichenor 2013: 
779-782). The arsenal of policy tools at his disposal gave the president independent 
leverage in politics (Milkis 2016, 302). The administrative president combined with the 
progressive ideal of a popular president. This president would represent the whole nation, 
and articulate public opinion (Tulis 2017). This type of president would appeal to popular 
opinion over the heads of lawmakers to take an active lead in national politics. The new 
policy state increasingly gave the president a prerogative and capability to assert himself 
in national politics. Consequently, it was shaped by successive presidents’ expeditions 
into evermore polarized politics in a self-reinforcing circle. 
These trends accelerate under President Johnson. The Great Society programs and 
the Civil Rights Act reflect the new power of the presidency as a prominent figure in 
politics. This executive power assumed a racial, and subsequently gendered, dimension. 
Social welfare issues sparked the first sustained gender gap among white Americans 
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(Gillions et al. 2018, 9). The racialization of social welfare programs is the result of 
Johnson’s choice to adjoin social movements with modern executive policymaking 
(Milkis 2016). The presidency could proffer support for the same ideals as prominent 
social movements as a hub of growing administrative and political commitments (Miroff 
1981, 14). The president could fashion political alliances himself in this regard by relying 
on the gravity of his office (Milkis & Jacobs 2017). The independent base of power of 
presidents to speak directly to groups and social movements weakened the power of party 
leaders to maintain coalitions. Johnson combined the administrative state, political 
parties, and the presidency in a way that linked all three institutions in the public mind 
with notions of race (Milkis 2016).   
Johnson’s commitment to the civil rights movement had political ramifications for 
his office and the reconstruction of political conflict. The public polarized to the merger 
of partisanship and the presidency at the helm of a policy state. Ordinary citizens no 
longer viewed the president as a statesman at the helm of the ship of state. Johnson had 
politicized the office with his support for the civil rights movement (Azari 2014, 13). The 
presidency took on the critical perception of a partisan office. Meanwhile, Great Society 
programs expanded presidential political power, and the president’s centrality in 
policymaking at the expense of the other branches. These new programs gave the 
president a newly unimaginable position to affect daily life (Milkis 2016, 302). In 
conjunction, these trends made the stakes of holding the office of president evermore 
consequential. 
The politicization of the presidency abetted the transformation of the party system 
along ideological, polarized lines. President Johnson’s support for the economic and 
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racial liberalism is the moment when the two are permanently fused one dimension of 
ideology in mass politics. The Democratic Party assumed the full mantle of liberalism, 
and liberalism assumed its contemporary negative connotation at this moment. 
Liberalism no longer implied support for the “common man.” Instead, it would denote 
government largesse for the undeserving poor and minorities at the expense of the 
common (white) man (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 76). Johnson’s controversial support for 
civil rights involved assuming the costs of a close alliance with minority interests without 
the substantial benefits of electoral gains (Milkis 2016). The public linked Democrats 
with uncontrolled federal spending and the disorder of protest movements as liberalism 
quickly fell out of grace (Ura & Ellis 2012, 283).  
The Johnson administration permanently altered the nature of American politics. 
Johnson’s support for civil rights solidified the conversion of parties into ideological 
vehicles by irrevocably shattering the New Deal coalition. Ideological elites had spent 
decades after World War II attempting to remake the parties into ideological units 
(Rosenfeld 2017). Race was the issue to break apart the big-tent party coalitions, and 
reorganize them along ideological lines. The growth of the federal government to affect 
race relations concerned many Americans. The backlash against the growth of the state 
constitutes the raison d’être for the modern conservative movement today (Hacker & 
Pierson 2014, 653-654). Men fueled this movement (Gillions et al. 2018; Kaufmann 
2002, 288). Modern conservatism finds its roots in the ideological mobilization of 
Republicans in their opposition to state activism. The issue of race catalyzed the 
transformation of Republicans into an ideological vehicle for white male antipathies 
(Schickler 2016, 276). 
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In this way, the issue of race propelled the reorganization of party coalitions into 
something closer to their current composition (Carmines & Stimson 1989). Perceptions of 
race shifted large swaths of public opinion as adduced by the immediate change in 
fortune for the term “liberal” in the context of the Great Society. These changes in 
politicized grievances are key observations in the focus of political development. The 
most immediate consequence of contentious election of 1964 is the swing in support for 
Goldwater among white men (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). It is important to remember 
that men and women sorted at different rates over different issues at different times 
(Barnes & Cassese 2017; Huddy et al. 2008; Kaufmann 2002; Ondercin 2017). This point 
matters when interpreting the 1964 election. In many ways, it foreshadows future 
presidential elections in third observed era of New Deal politics between ideological 
conservatives and progressives.  
It is important to note that men did not diverge from women in 1964 explicitly 
over matters of gender. The polarization over gender identity and the feminist revolution 
has yet to occur. Gender roles in a patriarchal context still largely define masculinity and 
femininity for men and women in both parties. Instead, one observes men breaking for 
Goldwater’s platform of racial and economic conservatism (Gillions et al. 2018). Their 
political movement reflects the strength of the value of individualism; in this case with 
regard to gendered notions as white Americans (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 7-8; Goren 
2001). This point accentuates Kaufmann’s observation on the link between taxes and 
male political preferences (2002, 296). White men opposed the expansion of social 
welfare programs at their perceived cost. They favored welfare retrenchment once given 
a clear choice on the matter between ideologies.  
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The developments of the 1960s set the stage for sorting in the second observed era 
of the New Deal. In spite of the social upheaval of late 1960s and early 1970s, Americans 
remained attached to their parties – initially. One expects that contentiously polarizing 
issues would cue realignments in the electorate. Partisanship continues influencing issue 
orientation until the early 1980s (Highton & Kam 2011, 212). Elite polarization reaches 
its lowest point in the early 1970s, in fact (Abramowitz & Saunders 2006, 177; Fiorina et 
al. 2005). One must question why polarizing issues like civil rights did not have greater 
influence on partisanship at this moment. For one, party leaders had strong attachments to 
their party. Southern Democrats were still Democrats (Carmines & Stimson 1989; Noel 
2013, 156).  
The most prominent reason for the lack of immediate polarization, however, 
appears to be the lack of an organized ideological movement at the helm of the 
Republican Party to offer a viable alternative choice (Hacker & Pierson 2014, 653). 
However, changes were visible under the surface. Mass partisan affiliation sinks to its 
lowest level following the 1960s despite the continued influence of partisanship over 
voter preference. This decline reflected a cadre of disenchanted voters (Bafumi & 
Shapiro 2009, 2). These voters would have been unrestrained by partisan overtures. Their 
departure would have allowed ideological factions in parties to remake coalitions (Noel 
2013). However, the reorganization along ideological lines was far from complete among 
masses and elites. 
In general, voters had imperfect choices to register their preferences at this time. 
Party elites remained imperfectly sorted. Moreover, the Republican Party largely 
acquiesced to Democratic hegemony following the staggering defeat of Goldwater. Party 
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leaders pushed back against conservative ideologues, and did not press advantage to 
escape their minority position (Lee 2016; Rosenfeld 2017). They accepted the New Deal 
consensus as a fait accompli. Therefore, they had no viable route to majority as they did 
not embrace the conservative ideological movement or present an essential alternative to 
the Democrats on economics. Instead, enterprising party leaders saw a way out of the 
political wilderness through cultural issues (Heatherington & Weiler 2009, 68; 
Levendusky 2009, 23). 
The seeds of Republican Renaissance begin with Nixon’s southern strategy. 
Nixon sought to peel the white working class from Democrats through coded racial 
appeals. The white working class remained loyal to New Deal economics, but grew 
increasingly wary of its association to cultural and racial liberalism. Urban unrest 
contributed to a growing fear of government-sponsored lawlessness. The Great Society’s 
War on Poverty had hastened public concern with welfare reform, and the public largely 
perceived poverty and welfare in racial terms (Gilens 1999, 122). Nixon recognized that 
the scale of reform nauseated white voters. The merger of the New Deal economic 
liberalism with racial policy presented an opportunity. Nixon highlighted issues to 
accentuate the cultural trepidations of white Americans. The new cultural cleavage 
bisected public opinion as anticipated. The issues targeted southern Democrats, who 
reflected a more racially conservative demeanor than their northern counterparts 
(Levendusky 2009, 79; Noel 2013, 131). The new cultural dimension capitalized on the 
declining popularity of the liberal brand. A conservative identity became increasingly 
respectable for white voters, which made appeals to cultural conservatism resonate more 
intensely among voters who still supported New Deal economics. Cultural issues, unlike 
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programmatic economic ones, are easy to comprehend to ordinary voters, and 
additionally appealing to authoritarians. 
The emphasis on cultural issues opened a new front in politics. Of particular 
relevance, the feminist movement contributed to the definition of cultural politics in the 
second observed era (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Feminist men and women 
increasingly challenged the traditional gender roles. The movement focused its energies 
on political demands. Feminists fought for abortion legalization, economic independence, 
and equality between the sexes. The early feminist movement backed the Equal Rights 
Amendment to guarantee such rights politically. The 1970s began with broad-based 
support for liberalizing gender roles, but ended with gender as a divisive cultural issue 
(Mansbridge 1985). Each party supported the ERA until the Republican platform shifted 
decisively toward conservatism in 1980 under Reagan’s supervision (Jordon et al. 2014). 
However, Reagan campaigned to appeal to women even if he opposed feminism (Davis 
1999). His positioning minimized the gender gap in party affiliation despite the 
emergence of gender gaps, overall. 
The gap in party affiliation takes a while to mature as prevailing partisan moods 
influenced perspectives in both parties in the same direction (Ura & Ellis 2012, 280). The 
decline in broad support for the projects of liberalism writ large registers in both parties. 
It also is a harbinger for a newly ascendant conservative movement. The tenor of politics 
had evolved during the 1970s due to social unrest and economic malaise (Ellis & Stimson 
2012, 88-89). Liberalism was at its lowest point in popularity in 1980 since 1952 (Hacker 
& Pierson 2005, 38). The decade witnessed a growing ecosystem of conservative activists 
and thinktanks to support an ideological movement. The liberal cultural victories in areas 
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like abortion and school prayer had appalled religious citizens, and provided ample 
opportunity to secure another disenchanted voting bloc. House constituencies warmed to 
ideologically conservative Republicans (Theriault & Rohde 2013, 1023). Reagan 
capitalized on cultural backlash and the floundering support for liberalism to secure the 
Republican nomination. In taking a page from Johnson, he forged an alliance with 
evangelical Christians (Milkus 2016). His victory established that Republicans could win 
general elections without sacrificing ideological purity (Jordon et al. 2014, 179).  
The link between conservatives and evangelicals proved fortuitous for Republican 
fortunes. Democrats recognized they did not appeal to most white voters on racial or 
cultural issues. They ceded cultural issues to Republican conservative imagery to focus 
on economic issues, which appealed beyond their base (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 177). As a 
result, the Republican Party established itself as a base for culturally disaffected whites 
(Cizmar et al. 2014; Hillygus & Shields 2008; Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 139). The 
inclusion of evangelicals is important as religious fundamentalists favor authoritarian 
preferences. These preferences include favoring patriarchal gender relations. These 
whites also disfavored the softening of Democrats on issues of force and security 
(Levendusky 2009). Reagan’s emphasis on engagement with communism appealed to 
disaffected men and authoritarians. The combination of cultural backlash, racial 
resentment, welfare retrenchment, and jingoism established conservatism as the home for 
masculinity and authoritarianism. The migration of emotive issue of culture to the 
forefront of conflict structured politics to activate such voters. 
Thus, Reagan formalized the substance of modern partisan ideology. 
Additionally, his presidency witnessed the acceleration toward the contemporary order of 
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elite ideological polarization. Reagan is the archetype of the modern iteration of partisan 
president (Skinner 2008). Reagan is notable because he served as the chief campaigner 
for Republicans in 1980; whereas, he would not have entered the picture until after the 
party convention just a decade earlier (Jordon et al. 2014; Karol 2016, 476). Thereby, he 
condensed the role of party leader and president into one person. One can attribute to 
Reagan the perfection of presidency-centered politics (Milkis & Jacobs 2017). Politically, 
Reagan was the first president to attempt to offer a viable alternative to New Deal 
progressivism for the American public. He created a mandate to retrench the New Deal 
state (Azari 2014). He used his office to sustain his conservative coalition by issuing 
executive orders to craft and to appeal to his base. In doing so, he solidified the 
presidency into its modern form for partisan warfare. Skowronek marks Reagan’s 
presidency as the fulfillment of previously identified shifts in governing authority. He 
notes that by Reagan’s tenure:  
The political foundations of presidential action [had] become increasingly 
independent over time, the incumbent drawing upon resources for action 
that [were] ever more directly tied to the executive branch itself… [and] 
the polity directly engaged in a president’s leadership project [had] 
expanded over time both geographically and demographically (1997, 55). 
 
It is no surprise that birth of presidency-centered partisanship after the 1980 
campaign coincides with the first significant developments in affective partisanship 
(Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018, 202). Ideological divergence in presidents causes partisans 
to view the other party’s leaders with suspicion. Presidents have been the main source of 
polarization ever since Reagan (Wood & Jordan 2018). The formalization of presidents 
as party leaders has made the two synonymous in the context of an expansive federal 
policy state. The president is the most visible and consequential figure in American 
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politics due to the gravity of the office (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 4). The vestige of so 
much influence in one office simplifies political conflict into a battle for president, which 
intensifies electoral competition. They articulate ideological goals when they articulate 
policy goals because the two parties now operate in two different thought-ecosystems 
with two distinct bases.  
When presidents propose a legislative program, they are doing more than 
suggesting a set of policy proposals for Congress to consider. They are 
also serving as the most visible public face of their political party. 
Members of Congress consequently react to a president both in capacity as 
chief legislator and party leader. In viewing a president as party leader, 
members of the opposing party have incentives to resist his proposals, 
separate from their agreement or disagreement with his actual policies. 
Members of the president’s party have electoral motive to support their 
party leader (Lee 2008, 924). 
 
Presidents are as polarizing today because Reagan accelerated the absorption of 
ideology into the party system. Reagan offered more than conservative policies in a 
liberal regime. He offered a fundamentally different type of political regime in place of 
the New Deal state. As a result, the Republican Party served as a credible alternative to 
southern Democrats. These Democrats essentially operated as a third party throughout the 
New Deal (Carmines & Stimson 1989). The elites of southern Democrats resisted sorting 
into the Republican camp, but had no reason to stay loyal to Democrats after liberals in 
Congress reorganized committees to strip southern Democrats of seniority. The southern 
Democratic wing essentially collapsed during the 1970s after losing the benefits of party 
loyalty (Noel 2013, 124). Reagan’s political maneuvering absorbed these Democrats into 
the Republican coalition based on ideological concerns first. The ideological organization 
of long coalitions supplanted the partisan long coalition of Roosevelt’s New Deal during 
Reagan’s presidency (Poole & Rosenthal 1997, 52). This transitional era ended with the 
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1994 Republican takeover of Congress as the few remaining southern Democrats 
converted to the ascendant Republican Party. This period corresponds to the emigration 
of women from the Republican Party as both sexes finally polarize with regard to party 
affiliation (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Thus, the constitution of modern parties was 
finally in place. Afterward, the process of polarization would intensify.   
The alignment of elites along both ideological and partisan lines represents one 
aspect of polarization. The other component is the mass electorate. Elite polarization is 
instrumental toward the development of partisanship in the electorate. Elite partisans sent 
clear signals to citizens once they had disentangled themselves of overlapping ideological 
ties. These signals prime voters’ partisan affiliations (Dilliplane 2014, 86). The most 
common method of sorting involves partisans aligning their ideology to match their 
partisanship (Levendusky 2009, 108). However, partisans with strong issue positions also 
used the clear signals from elites to align their partisanship to better match their ideology 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Carsey & Layman 2006; Highton & Kam 2011). The 
alignment of partisanship and ideology induces identity politics. The reduction of cross-
cutting social identities, especially in the Republican Party, has dramatically increased 
affective partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster 2017, 626; Cassese 2020; Mason 2015). 
The process of sorting fueled the dynamics of competition over matters of social identity 
in the contemporary era of the New Deal. 
The emergence of ideological elites amplified sorting based on gender and 
authoritarian concerns as they promoted politics of cultural disagreement. Each variable 
factors into the development of partisan polarization. The cultural cleavage links gender 
and authoritarian preferences with the racialized economic cleavage due to elite 
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ideological polarization. This cultural cleavage has tracked closely with the economic 
cleavage for elites since 1986 (Ellis & Stimson 2012, 122). It has brought previously 
unaligned or un-politicized social identities into the partisan divide. For instance, Reagan 
enlisted antifeminist groups and evangelicals into his camp as the feminist movement 
settled in the Democratic Party (Spruill 2008). Ellis and Stimson argue that “cultural” 
concerns have always been associated with conservative ideological self-identification 
over the last 50 years (2012, 49). However, the advent of ideologically coherent elites 
guarantees the participation of conservative-minded social identities. Ideological elites 
organize the demands of their constituent groups into a coherent belief system (Bawn et 
al. 2012; Noel 2013, 160). Unaffiliated groups with politicalized social identities outside 
an ideological coalition have to align themselves as ideologies constrain issues. This 
process creates a self-perpetuating circle as the ideological organization of parties offer 
groups paltry incentives to change sides. The combination of economic and cultural 
ideology exacerbates polarization. 
The evidence for the connection between cultural issues and polarization is 
widespread in the literature. Leege and colleagues find that the politics of cultural 
differences are increasingly characteristic of modern elections as wedge issues (2009; see 
also Hillygus & Shields 2008). Previously, scholars assumed that issues evolved, and 
supplanted old party coalitions as new issues emerged (Carmines & Stimson 1989). 
However, the organization of parties around elite ideology has proved remarkably 
resilient. The inverse appears to be characteristic of modern politics: parties make issues 
and not vice-versa. One witnesses conflict expansion rather than displacement. The 
potency of the near alignment of cultural and economic issues bifurcates issues to fit 
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within the structure of existing conflict. Partisanship is combining with more issues as a 
result (Abramowitz & Saunders 2006; Bafumi & Shapiro 2009; Baldassarri & Gelman 
2008; Brewer 2005; DiMaggio et al. 1996). The ideological constraint of elites has 
incorporated more cultural and moral issues into partisan dispute (Adams 1997; Carmines 
& Woods 2002; Carsey & Layman 2002). The expansion of conflict creates the 
appearance of a culture war by portraying only two ideological visions for America. 
Under the circumstances, one expects the dynamics of political conflict to activate 
authoritarian voters based on a simplified “us vs. them” mode of politics.  
Into this mix, elites have polarized over issues of gender. It is telling that the first 
sustained gender gaps on issues open in 1980 (Kaufmann 2002). The prime movers in the 
gender gap are men at first. The liberalization of social welfare policy since 1952 made 
men more conservative on the whole (Kaufmann & Petrocik 1999). Men view social 
welfare policies as injurious to them as men. As a result, men supported conservative 
candidates like Goldwater in 1964 and Reagan in 1980, who promised to retrench the 
welfare state. The connection of civil rights to New Deal economics meant that racialized 
opposition to the welfare state carried a gender dimension. Gillions and colleagues find 
that ideological polarization was instrumental for polarization on gender issues. The 
sexes did not polarize until the parties were sufficiently differentiated on issues of social 
welfare (Gillions et al. 2018, 5; Ondercin 2017, 751). At first, men shuffled toward the 
Republican Party. Afterward, women sorted toward the Democratic Party. 
Men opened the gender gap in partisanship; however, women have also polarized 
with the ascendency of feminism in society. Women became more liberal as women 
entered new roles in society (Inglehart & Norris 2000; Howell & Day 2000). The contests 
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over abortion rights and the ERA highlighted the choice between traditionalism and 
egalitarian reform (Wolbrecht 2000). The liberalization of women and their roles in 
society provoked a reaction in men, and exacerbated the gender gap (Wolak 2015). These 
conflicts reinforc the gender gap. At first, campaign appeals about traditional women’s 
issues did not seem to increase the partisan gender gap (Hutchings et al. 2004). The 
female propensity to favor the Democratic Party appeared more deeply connected to 
questions of economic independence (Gillions et al. 2018; Kaufmann 2002). Women 
relied on the policy state to sustain their economic independence (Barnes & Cassese 
2017; Huddy et al. 2008). As the parties sorted ideologically, though, social issues then 
became more important to women (Kaufmann 2002, 302). Elites invested economic 
issues with gender connotations. Therefore, female political identities are tied into 
questions of social position, and put into opposition to the interests of men.  
The development of a progressive policy state to remake social relations 
precipitates the emergence of politicized gender identities. Questions of social 
egalitarianism now take precedence in voting behavior for both men and women in 
relation to redistributive politics (Kaufmann 2002, 301-302). Elites have responded to 
these gender gaps by framing themselves in gendered ways. Republicans describe 
themselves in masculine terms, in part, to underscore their oppositions to dependency on 
social welfare to retain male voters. Democrats avail themselves in compassionate and 
interpersonal terms to highlight their support of social protections to retain female voters 
(Winter 2010, 590). These stances reinforce gender stereotypes in each party’s ideology 
(Holman et al. 2016).  
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In conjunction, the collapse of symbolic and programmatic issues into one 
dimension of ideology primes authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler 2009). Polarized 
issues are easy to decipher based on heuristics relating to self-identity. The developments 
behind ideological politics have therefore increased the prominence of authoritarianism in 
structuring voting behavior. One suspects that the social upheaval related to the rights 
movements and their backlashes raised issues of order and security. Questions of 
egalitarianism and remaking social relations would be anathema to authoritarians. 
Unfortunately, the lack of representative public survey data from this era inhibits firm 
conclusions. Continuous national surveys of authoritarian voters only commence in 2000. 
However, Cizmar and colleagues conclude that authoritarianism “has been associated 
unfailingly with opposition to government efforts on behalf of blacks and other racial 
minorities” for the representative surveys done in 1952, 1972, and 1992. Additionally, it 
is significantly associated with conservative attitudes on abortion and women’s rights in 
1972 and 1992. Lastly, it has been predictive of presidential votes from 1972 to present 
day for the years with available data (2014, 74-75).  
These data in light of the sketch of political development offer circumstantial 
evidence that sorting along authoritarian lines is intertwined with the gendering of 
ideological conflict. One finds stronger evidence for this theoretical interaction in third 
observed era of the New Deal regime from 1994 to present. This final period coincides 
with the robust development of affective partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster 2017; 
Iyengar & Westwood 2015; Mason 2018). In this era, the institutional development of the 
policy state has matured, and the main components of ideological politics are already in 
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place (Noel 2013, 165). Political conflict has a robust symbolic meaning in the paradigm 
of liberal and conservative (Ellis & Stimson 2012).  
More inclusively, the symbolic dimension of ideology touches personal matters 
like “race, gender, safety, and security” together with economic matters (Hetherington & 
Weiler 2009, 67). The breakdown of the political and social consensus after World War II 
has bifurcated into two ideological visions for organizing American society in each party. 
The outlet for the expression of politicized identities resides almost entirely in one’s 
choice of president now. The centrality of the selection of leader further simplifies 
authoritarian decision-making by reducing political conflict into a singular struggle over 
who to elect to the White House. Thus, ideological organization and political 
development reinforces the authoritarian structure to modern politics. 
Momentous events in the form of terrorist attacks and the election of first black 
president dispel any lingering doubts about the connections of gender to authoritarianism. 
The weight of the 9/11 attacks in the collective conscious could only compare to Pearl 
Harbor. However, terrorist attacks are not the same as a nation declaring war on the 
United States. Americans did not know who the enemy was or where they were 
operating. The specter of fear and threat impelled authoritarians and non-authoritarians 
alike to support extraordinary means to secure safety and protection. In troubled times, 
individuals rely on “instinct over cognition” (Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 110). One 
observes the potency of public insecurity as Republicans defied a law of political gravity 
to gain seats in Congress in the 2002 midterm elections. Prior to that election, the 
president’s party had lost ground in every election since World War II during midterms. 
One must observe this event as a catalyst for a deeper relation between Republicans, 
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authoritarians, and men. Republicans painted themselves as tough to broadcast their 
leadership bona fides to distressed voters (Holman et al. 2016; Winters 2010). 
Moreover, the election of President Obama intensified affective partisanship. 
Obama articulated public outrage with the growing boondoggles in the Middle East and 
the collapse of the financial industry. The calamity of the Great Recession gave Obama 
supermajority status in Congress in 2008 only for the Democratic advantage to evaporate 
by 2010. Spectators have written at length to account for the sudden reversal of fortune 
when a modern New Deal hegemony was predicted for Democrats. These scholars 
identified aggressive big-business lobbying to identify Democrats and big government as 
the source of the economic misery (Hacker & Pierson 2016). Folk theories state that 
uneducated rubes who watched Fox News bought the line from Republican elites, and 
voted against their self-interest (Mann & Ornstein 2013; Williams 2016). 
These folk interpretations identify features of polarized politics, but miss the 
essential point. The rubes only appear irrational when one observes them through the 
narrow lens of material self-interest (Cramer 2016; Deckman 2016). Politics is about 
collective grievances associated with social identities and the programmatic policies that 
follow therewith. Transactional policies acquire currency through the social identities that 
they benefit or harm. Identity politics harmed Obama’s electoral fortunes after his 
election in a way that Roosevelt never encountered. Obama’s presidency witnesses the 
culmination of the effects of the transformation of the federal policy state in conjunction 
with the authoritarian structuring of politics. His race solidified this development. 
The essential point about partisanship under Obama is that his race mattered 
(Williamson et al. 2011, 34). In this way, race continues to factor into the ideological 
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relation between gender and authoritarianism. Several political commentators recognized 
that Obama’s mixed-race heritage affected his perception among voters. Race had 
become an albatross for Democrats by Reagan’s presidency. They had long since ducked 
their obvious alliance with African-Americans under Clinton (Hetherington & Weiler 
2009, 139). However, Democrats could not change subjects to mask Obama’s skin tone. 
Obama ostensibly racialized politics despite his own steadfast neutrality on the topic 
(Tesler 2016). Racial resentment soon colored the bailouts for banks as voters blamed 
government policy toward minorities for the sub-prime lending meltdown. Whites 
continued to hold anger against African-Americans for violating the ethics of hard-work 
and individualism. The view that African-Americans claimed victim-status to receive 
government assistance for their own self-inflicting injuries shaped perceptions of policies 
during Obama’s presidency (Banks 2014, 26). White men and women became more 
racially conservative (Tesler 2016). Hostile sexism and the denial of racism eventually 
factored into support for Trump behind Republican partisanship, especially for men 
(Schaeffer et al. 2016, 23). 
The contentious modern era of elite polarization has fomented affective 
partisanship in the electorate. The phenomena manifests much like a constrained belief 
system (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018, 270). Affective partisanship propels the strong bias 
toward the in-group into derogation toward the partisan out-group. The programmatic 
aspects of elite ideological visions matter to the extent that it promotes or diminishes the 
status of the party brand (Huddy et al. 2015, 12). Individuals reject policies that clash 
with their partisan conceptions of self even if they are inclined to otherwise support the 
policy (Mason 2018). Compromise tarnishes the party brand because it makes the party 
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appear inferior. Mass partisanship translates the positions of elite ideology into the “us 
vs. them” logic of competition. The dynamics of gender and authoritarianism obtain in 
this context. Difficult policies become comprehendible through the heuristic of the party 
brand and the reduction of nuance into one dimension of “for” or “against.” 
The encompassing aspect of affective polarization thus makes issues of gender 
and authoritarianism consequential to political struggle. Often, issues of gender and 
authoritarian politics intersect explicitly at the same time. This is the case with gay 
marriage or gun control (Lizotte 2019; Prusaczyk & Honson 2020). Partisan elites gender 
secular issues explicitly to marshal their base. Polarization accentuates the extent to 
which voters absorb these gendered cues. However, political issues implicitly carry 
gender connotations through association with the party’s ideology. These ideologies 
combine economic and cultural issues into one dimension of conflict (Noel 2013). They 
reflect each party’s composition and stance on feminism. The linkage allows the 
authoritarian basis to cultural issues to extend to politics in general (Johnston 2018). 
Political arrangements attract men and authoritarians to the Republican camp, and attract 
women and non-authoritarians toward the Democratic camp. This deep connection is 
possible due to the evolution of political institutions through the catalyst of racial issues 
to produce ideological polarization. As a result, authoritarianism and gender should 




Chapter 5: Hypotheses 
The elaboration of authoritarianism and gender in the context of political 
development elucidates multiple points of connection between the two concepts. One 
expects a relation between gender and authoritarianism as a norm on political matters. 
The nature of elite ideological polarization and its contribution to affective mass 
partisanship has produced two relevant political considerations. First, the promulgation of 
partisanship as a social identity has allowed authoritarianism to structure political conflict 
(Hetherington & Weiler 2009, 118; Johnston 2018). Politics is now a contest between 
social identities. The intensity of electoral competition activates authoritarian concerns as 
partisans perceive attacks on party interests as attacks on personal identity. Thereby, the 
bases of identity in political competition create a foundation for authoritarianism in 
mediating issues preferences (Luttig 2017).  
Second, elite polarization and the imbalance of sex ratios in each party have 
gendered the image and policies of Democrats and Republicans. Republicans frame 
themselves as masculine, and Democrats frame themselves as feminine (Winter 2016). 
Voters perceive gender connotations in party cues on issue positions (Sanbonmatsu & 
Dolan 2009, 490). The connective tissue of ideology distributes these gendered 
perceptions across issue domains. These perceptions interact with the preexisting notions 
of gender in an individual. As a result, authoritarianism and gender should respectively 
structure and influence a voter’s political preferences as two concepts connected in the 
milieu of modern partisanship. 
One must pivot to formally expound the theoretical relation between gender and 
authoritarianism in concrete terms. The literature review prepared the groundwork for 
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this endeavor. As an organizing belief, gender influences political preferences through 
cultural socialization. These gender beliefs shade issue and party evaluations (Holman et 
al. 2016; Winter 2016). One’s validation and affirmation of gender norms relies in part on 
one’s authoritarian predisposition. Authoritarians require security and order borne from 
cognitive difficulties with nuanced situations (Stenner 2005). These difficulties 
predispose authoritarians to embrace group conventions as time-honored ways to 
organize one’s life. The heterosexual gender binary is one of these conventions 
(Prusaczyk & Hodson 2020). As a result, authoritarianism impacts one’s gender identity. 
Due to inequitable social roles, the endorsement of gender roles across the authoritarian 
spectrum will differ for men and women. The ability of authoritarianism to influence 
one’s appraisal of gender roles and the ability of gender to subsequently influence 
authoritarian preferences creates a multifaceted relation (Lizotte 2019). 
Historically, the relation between the sexes has benefited men over women. The 
movement toward greater egalitarianism in society has presented new opportunities and 
constraints for each sex. These secular changes in society affect how men and women 
appraise political preferences in light of authoritarianism. The two variables are not equal 
in their effect on issue stances. Authoritarianism is the dominant variable to affect 
political preferences. Its central role reflects the fact that psychological mechanisms exert 
the greatest influence on decision making outcomes (Cizmar et al. 2014, 77; Miller & 
Shanks 1996, 192). For its part, gender is a mediating variable in this relationship. It is an 
outlying variable that is not central to decision making outcomes, but still exerts a 
significant effect on political preferences. This basis allows one to frame the interaction 
between gender and authoritarian dispositions. 
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One expects gender to exert a greater effect in the absence of a strong 
authoritarian disposition. The distance of gender from the core of decision making in the 
logic of causal pathway model limits its ability to influence outcomes in the presence of 
stronger influencers. Its effect is conditional on the magnitude of one’s authoritarianism 
predisposition. A weak predisposition toward authoritarianism will allow more latitude 
for gender to determine preferences. The preceding literature review highlighted an array 
of issues where men and women differ due to gender socialization. One saw that men are 
more culturally and economically conservative than women (Eagly et al. 2004).  The 
conventional male preference for social arrangements is more closely aligned to the 
authoritarian’s preference. Men are more likely to prefer aggressive and punitive policies, 
and feel less sympathy toward out-groups than women. Consequently, one expects 
gender socialization to push men toward authoritarian preferences as the effect of 
authoritarianism is diminished.  This process creates a gender gap in preferences along 
the spectrum of authoritarian dispositions. The exact ability of gender to mediate 
preferences will depend on how much influence of authoritarianism is present. 
The dynamic of this relation has the potential to manifest differently depending on 
the issue. In most cases, gender will modulate the effect of authoritarianism in an 
interactive fashion. On certain issues, gender will mediate and moderate authoritarian 
dispositions. For instance, Lizotte finds that gender is a moderating mediator of 
authoritarian dispositions on the issue of gun control. This issue is unique as gender roles 
define what security and order mean for men and women in different ways. Authoritarian 
men oppose gun control as it is injurious to their identity as a protector. Guns offer 
protection for men, who experience violence from strangers at greater rates than women. 
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Authoritarian women support gun control to protect them and relatives from violence. 
Gun control offers protection for women, who experience intimate violence at higher 
rates than men (2019, 391). In this scenario, the gender roles for each sex diverge in the 
character of defining protection for one’s self. The moderating-mediator relation should 
manifest when gender moderates an outcome in conjunction with the mediating effect of 
gender interacting with authoritarianism (2019, 395). It is assumed this same moderating 
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These models capture the two predicted relationships between gender and 
authoritarianism. In the interactive model, gender differences appear among non-
authoritarian populations, but disappear in authoritarian populations. In the moderated-
mediational model, gender differences may appear in non-authoritarian populations, but 
increase in intensity among authoritarian populations. The implication of gender with 
regard to the issue in question will determine which outcome to expect. The 
preponderance of hypotheses in this inquiry predict convergence in the interaction of 
gender and authoritarianism with regard to outcomes. Only one issue will require greater 
exploration through the divergence model to establish the relation. 
These hypotheses broadly cluster around three topics of interest. Further, they are 
arrayed in line with the logic of Altemeyer’s typology of authoritarian characteristics 
(1981). The first topic represents issues relating to preferences for social arrangements. 
This section tests if preferences are gendered among traditional issues of concern for 
researchers of authoritarianism. The second topic concerns intergroup relations with 
regard to group identity in the form of affective partisanship. This category examines the 
interaction of gender and authoritarianism in relation to relevant aspects of partisanship 
and social identity. The final topic investigates the relation in the domain of economic 
ideology. The purpose of this category is to cast gender as the missing variable to explain 







Table 5: Typology of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Category of Dependent Variable Expected Relation 
1-2 Cultural Preferences Mediation (Convergence) 
3-6 Affective Partisanship Mediation (Convergence) 
7-8 Economic Preferences Moderated-Mediation 
(Divergence) 
Hypotheses of Social Arrangements: Cultural Preferences 
The first topic of hypotheses concerns itself with one’s orientation toward the 
structure of society in regard to two dimensions of authoritarianism. These two 
dimensions are social convention and leadership style (Altemeyer 1981). The assumption 
for this block of hypotheses is that gender waxes and wanes in its effect on an 
individual’s preference formation depending on one’s predisposition. Non-authoritarians 
should be disposed to form their opinions absent the need for closure that predominates 
an authoritarian’s decision making. In this realm, an individual should have greater 
latitude to select preferences that do not directly force the individual to conform to group 
authority. Non-authoritarians should be disposed toward greater diversity (Hetherington 
& Weiler 2009, 42).  
In addition to diversity, gender will also have influence over how non-
authoritarian individuals color their preferences in the absence of authoritarian constraint. 
Here, the effect of gender is different for men and women. Since gender socialization 
disposes men toward behavior related to authoritarianism, non-authoritarian men should 
harbor a higher level of support for authoritarian preferences than non-authoritarian 
women. One should expect authoritarian dispositions to increasingly override other 
decision-making cues like gender as one slides across the authoritarian spectrum. 
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Therefore, authoritarian men and women should express roughly the same preferences as 
the impulses of authoritarianism precede other influences like gender. Gender should not 
cause men and women to construe authoritarian means differently in any of the 
hypotheses in this topic. Therefore, the convergence model should explain the relation 
between gender and authoritarianism for hypotheses in this category, on the whole. Two 
hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this first topic: 
Hypothesis 1: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
predispositions will be more likely to express support for homogenous cultural 
preferences than those with lower authoritarian predispositions. 
 
 Postulate 1A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will express 
higher levels of support for homogenous cultural preferences than non-authoritarian 
women. 
 
 Postulate 1B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will express the 
same levels of support for homogenous cultural preferences as authoritarian women. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
predispositions will be more likely to express support for sexist social arrangements than 
those with lower authoritarian predispositions. 
 
 Postulate 2A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will express 
higher levels of support for sexist social arrangements than non-authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 2B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will express the 
same levels of support for sexist social arrangements as authoritarian women. 
 
Hypotheses of Intergroup Relations: Affective Partisanship 
The second topic of hypotheses concerns itself with the domain of partisanship. 
The nexus of social identity provides the connective tissue for gender and 
authoritarianism through party affiliation. Therefore, this topic explores the gendering of 
preferences in regard to the third dimension of authoritarianism: out-group derogation 
(Altemeyer 1981). These hypotheses will concern themselves with explicit political 
positions as opposed to idealized preferences for the structure of society. The trappings of 
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these positions reflect politics as group competition. Affect is a key component in 
partisan decision-making because partisanship is an expressive social identity (Huddy et 
al. 2015). Party affiliation informs individuals of politicized group grievances to identify 
as their own grievances (Huddy 2018, 6). It informs them with whom to associate and 
disassociate. Partisans will extend positive affect to others who they acknowledge to be in 
the coalition. For instance, a prototypical Republican will feel amiable toward 
businessmen while a prototypical Democrat will feel amiable toward labor unions. 
The hypotheses in this category deal with the affect associated with partisan 
identity. The bulkhead of these hypotheses is that gender mediates affect for opposing 
partisans. Women are conventionally socialized to express conciliation and congeniality 
toward others. By contrast, men are socialized to unempathetically engage in disputes. 
Broadly, gender socializes men to find difference whereas it socializes women find 
similarity (Eagly et al. 2004). Social role theory holds that the values ascribed to each sex 
translate into political preferences (Lizotte 2017). Indeed, the political preferences of 
women are more compassionate toward social minorities than men, on average 
(Kaufmann 2002). In the absence of authoritarian constraint, one expects women to 
harbor lower levels of negative affect toward out-groups than men. However, women and 
men should hold equally negative views toward out-groups as authoritarian dispositions 
increases. Authoritarians perceive competition as a zero-sum game, and experience 
heightened threat in the presence of consequential stakes. The mediational effect of 
gender will disappear in the presence of authoritarian dispositions. In this manner, the 
convergence model of the relation between gender and authoritarianism will obtain. Four 
hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this second topic: 
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Hypothesis 3: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
dispositions will be more likely to be strong partisans than those with lower non-
authoritarian dispositions. 
 
 Postulate 3A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
more likely to be strong partisans than non-authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 3B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely 
to be strong partisans as authoritarian women. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
dispositions will be more likely to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential 
candidates than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions. 
 
 Postulate 4A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
more likely to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential candidates than 
non-authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 4B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely 
to manifest an affect gap in the evaluation of presidential candidates as authoritarian 
women. 
 
Hypothesis 5: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
dispositions will be more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized 
social identities than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions. 
 
 Postulate 5A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized social identities 
than non-authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 5B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely 
to be polarized in their affective evaluations of politicized social identities as 
authoritarian women. 
 
Hypothesis 6: In a comparison of individuals, those with stronger authoritarian 
dispositions will be more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political 
parties than those with lower non-authoritarian dispositions. 
 
 Postulate 6A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
more likely to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political parties than non-
authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 6B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be as likely 
to be polarized in their affective evaluations of political parties as authoritarian women. 
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Hypotheses of Intergroup Relations: Economic Preferences 
The dynamics of competition present a second relevant dimension of partisanship 
to investigate in light of the hypothesized relation between gender and authoritarianism. 
This dimension of partisan derogation involves the conversion of affect into concrete 
policy positions. It is the thrust of the third topic of economic hypotheses. The inference 
pattern for the social aspect of partisanship is that partisans compete to protect the status 
of their party (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018; Iyengar & Westwood 2015; 704). The linchpin 
assumption is that competition induces partisans to rely on their negative affect for other 
out-groups to form their policy preferences. They oppose the policies that the other side 
supports. Intense elite ideological polarization clarifies this connection between affect 
and policy, and reinforces it in the mass electorate (Johnston 2018).  
The conversion of affect into policy positions connects the interaction of 
authoritarianism and gender to economic ideology. For decades, researchers have failed 
to link authoritarianism with support for specific economic ideologies (Stenner 2005). Its 
effects are contained to social and cultural issues. As with the case with gender and 
authoritarianism, this disconnect between economic policy and authoritarianism is under-
theorized. One must reconsider the relation in terms of social identity. Economic 
ideology is largely bifurcated into liberalism and conservatism with regard to the New 
Deal cleavage. Voters decide whether they would like more government activism in 
economic affairs or less. Traditional research into the link between voters and their 
ideological bearings rests on respondent self-identification (Abramowitz & Saunders 
2006). One should be skeptical of revealed ideological labels because voters often do not 
understand what “liberal” and “conservative” mean in political contexts (Ellis & Stimson 
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2012, 16). These terms are idealized generalizations. Consequently, shared understanding 
between partisans on their meaning is weak. 
Traditionally, scholars have overcome this limitation by probing respondents’ 
feelings toward government itself. In this way, one can get a sense of operation ideology. 
Voters can use this heuristic to inform policy positions regardless of sophistication 
(Goren & Chen 2016). Scholars argue that beliefs about operational ideology form the 
fountainhead of political behavior in American politics (Abramowitz & Saunders 2017; 
Goren & Chen 2016). The concept is accessible to enough Americans to navigate 
political issues, and may even serve as the means by which voters inform their partisan 
identity. Abramowitz and Webster claim that ideological polarization, the sharp and 
irreconcilable difference over policy, drives affective partisanship. They substantiate their 
proposition by testing if one’s social welfare ideology affects one’s affect toward 
presidential candidates (2017, 638). Their conclusion would undercut the assumptions of 
the social identity theory of politics if one stopped on this point, but their results beg the 
question. Does social welfare ideology drive affect, or vice-versa? 
One must consider the social dimension of ideological conflict. Affect toward the 
target group of public policy is sufficient to enhance or mitigate support for the policy 
(Condon & Wichowsky 2017; Jacoby 2000). Questions over the scope of government 
matter to individuals in the first place because welfare policies imply a transfer of 
resources from one group to a beneficiary group. Redistributive politics have an implicit 
racial component for white Americans (Ellis & Stimson 2012; Gilens 1999; Tesler 2016). 
This racial dimension is also gendered (Schaffner et al. 2018). To white men, 
redistributive politics is a net loss. The government taxes them, and they perceive no 
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benefit in return. For white women, redistributive politics offers some insurance against 
male economic dependence and the vicissitudes of the market (Bullock & Reppond 2017; 
Lizotte 2017). The government taxes them, but they receive access to social welfare 
programs in return. Therefore, men and women construe economic security differently 
due to gender roles. 
The divergence of male and female interest for redistributive policies affects the 
role of authoritarianism in relation to economic ideology. Past attempts have failed to 
safely link authoritarianism and economic ideology because these attempts relied on the 
labels of revealed ideology instead of concrete positions in the realm of group 
competition.  One finds that these attempts have also failed to distinguish between the 
interests of men and women (see Abramowitz & Saunders 2006). Men perceive 
economic security by retrenching redistributive policies. Women receive economic 
security by entrenching redistributive policies. The divergent interests of men and women 
mean that gender plays a moderated mediational role with regard to authoritarianism as 
expected in the divergence model (Lizotte 2019).  
Gender will moderate authoritarianism in this situation. Men and women will 
diverge in terms of economic ideology toward conservatism and liberalism as they 
become more authoritarian in their disposition. Concurrently, gender will serve to 
mediate the relation between authoritarianism and economic ideology. In a similar 
assessment made in the second category of hypotheses, non-authoritarians differ from 
authoritarians in their perception of competition as a zero-sum game. The authoritarian 
motivation to derogate out-groups will not be powerful for non-authoritarians. It is 
predicted therefore that non-authoritarian men will be slightly more conservative than 
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non-authoritarian women while authoritarian men will be much more conservative than 
authoritarian women. Non-authoritarian men will be less conservative than authoritarian 
men overall, and non-authoritarian women will be less liberal than authoritarian women. 
The chasm of the gender gap in economic preferences will expand as one’s authoritarian 
disposition increases. Men will further support conservatism in the sense that they favor 
less redistribution while women will increasingly support liberalism in that they favor 
expanding redistribution. Two hypotheses are constructed to test the assumptions of this 
third topic: 
Hypothesis 7: In a comparison of individuals, men will be overall more likely to oppose 
government regulation of businesses than women. 
 
 Postulate 7A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
slightly more likely to oppose government regulation of businesses than non-
authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 7B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be more 
likely to oppose government regulation of businesses as authoritarian women. 
 
Hypothesis 8: In a comparison of individuals, men will be overall more likely to oppose 
the taxation of millionaires than women. 
 
 Postulate 8A: In a comparison of individuals, non-authoritarian men will be 
slightly more likely to oppose the taxation of millionaires than non-authoritarian women. 
 
 Postulate 8B: In a comparison of individuals, authoritarian men will be more 
likely to oppose the taxation of millionaires as authoritarian women 
Caveats and Considerations 
The hypotheses of the second and third topics, which probe intergroup relations 
broadly, are potentially complicated with regard to party affiliation. This variable 
possesses the ability to bisect the influence of gender and authoritarianism. Party 
affiliation carries gender connotations itself (Winter 2010). Party affiliation is also a 
visible and consequential identity (Huddy et. Al. 2015; Iyengar & Westwood 2015). In 
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this regard, its influence bends the interests of constituent social identities toward the 
prototype of the party (Egan 2019). This influence cross-pressures men and women who 
belong to political parties with different gender connotations to the one associated with 
their sex. This cross-pressure impacts Republican women and Democratic men. Party 
affiliation will potentially muddle the relation between gender and authoritarianism. It is 
possible that it intensifies support for authoritarian outcomes for Republican women 
across the spectrum while conversely weakening the support for the same outcomes 
among Democratic men. This attenuating effect could distort the predicted relation 
between gender to authoritarianism. One must be aware of this potential, and take care to 
isolate the influence of partisanship to the extent possible. 
The takeaway for these hypotheses is that in most situations the full effect of the 
authoritarian disposition should have the influence on female preference formation. 
Gender will have the greatest influence on preferences absent the influence of the 
psychological mechanism of authoritarianism. In the American context, that provides 
white females more latitude in preference formation as gender socialization moves men 
toward authoritarian social arrangements absent authoritarian dispositions. In the majority 
of all hypotheses, the effect of authoritarian dispositions will move men and women 
toward preferences for authoritarian social arrangements. This relation deteriorates in 
light of economic issues as different ends are needed for authoritarian means. In the 
example above, liberalism defines protection for women and conservatism defines 
protection for men. It is not uniform like it was in the other hypotheses where greater 
conformity to groupness was the end to authoritarian means for both men and women.  
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Chapter 5: Data & Methods 
 The broad hypothesized interrelation between gender and authoritarianism in the 
partisanship of white Americans means allows one latitude in the selection of a dataset. 
This inquiry relies on the 2016 American National Election Survey (2017). The ANES is 
a quadrennial national survey with a reach of over 4,000 respondents. The survey 
includes a pre-election and post-election interview to enable analysts to study the 
electorate during presidential elections. Large public surveys provide a strong capacity 
for testing theories about political behavior (Brady 2000, 48). It includes the CRV scale, 
so it is possible to operationalize authoritarianism. However, the methodology of the 
ANES potentially biases results. Surveys conducted around elections register public 
sentiment at a moment when political identities are salient (Conover & Miller 2015). The 
timing exaggerates the extremity of voter responses (Gerber et al. 2010, 742). Despite 
these concerns, the ANES investigates a variety of topics from social issues to economic 
choices. The reach of the ANES offers insight into multiple political issues. 
Independent Variables 
 This inquiry relies on the CRV scale to operationalize authoritarianism (Stenner 
2005; Hetherington & Weiler 2009). The four constituent variables to construct the scale 
are all located within the 2016 ANES. These four variables reflect a respondent’s child-
rearing preference to an item in a pair of choices. The four questions include: 
1. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Obedience or self-reliance?’; 
 
2. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Being considerate or well 
behaved?’; 
 





4. ‘Which one is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for 
elders?’ 
 
The resulting scale has good internal reliability (α=.65). The CRV scale will be the main 
independent variable of concern. The other independent variable is sex. The ANES asks 
respondents what their sex is, and the resulting variable registers if they are a male or 
female respondent. A male respondent is registered as a 1, and a female respondent is 
registered as 2. The interaction variable is created by multiplying the CRV scale with the 
sex variable. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Authoritarianism (CRV Scale) 3,612 2.35 1.11 1 4 
Sex 4,218 .53 .49 0 1 
Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 1 & 2 
 The first topic of hypotheses treads two dimensions of the authoritarian attitudes: 
social convention and leadership. The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is a broad 
measure of cultural preferences across these two dimensions. The ANES provides a 
multitude of questions, which probe respondents for their orientation toward idealized 
social arrangements. Six questions were selected to craft a scale to measure one’s 
preference for both strong leadership and traditional social conventions. The questions 
selected include: 
1. ‘Our country would be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining 
everything’; 
 
2. ‘Minorities should adapt to the customs and traditions of the United States’; 
 




4. ‘What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil 
and take us back to our true path’; 
 
5. ‘The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society’; and, 
 
6. ‘This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on 
traditional family ties.’ 
 
Each statement reflects a tradeoff between a society of diversity and a society of 
conformity. The questions were chosen for internal consistency, and the scale has high 
internal reliability (α=.83) to justify the selection. The responses to the constituent scales 
range from one to five whereby higher responses corresponds with a higher level of 
support for authoritarian social arrangements. The conglomerated scale for authoritarian 
cultural preferences also ranges from one to five, and has a relatively even spread of 
responses among answers. The spread of responses is represented in Figure 4.  






 A second scale compliments the first scale by probing attitudes toward social 
conventions with the explicit focus on gender roles for Hypothesis 2. These questions 
capture the level of sexism in respondents, and it is often referred to modern sexism scale 
(Cassese & Barnes 2017, 680). The scale comprises of responses to two statements about 
the place of women in society: 
1. ‘When women demand equality these days, how often are they actually seeking 
special favors?’; and, 
 
2. ‘When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more 
problems than they solve?’ 
 
These questions focus on the role of women in challenging conventional social practices 
in private and in public. The modern sexism scale has relatively high internal reliability 
(α=.75). It ranges from one to five with one representing low symbolic sexism and five 
representing high symbolic sexism. The spread of responses is relatively skewed toward 
the absence of sexism. One can reasonably accept this skew as a reflection of egalitarian 
cultural values in the United States. Either respondents truly exhibit low levels of 
symbolic sexism, or bias toward social acceptability with their responses.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of Responses for the Modern Sexism Scale in Hypothesis 2
 
 
Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 3 through 6 
 The following sections of hypotheses examine the relation between gender and 
authoritarianism in regards to intergroup relations. The analysis of this relation divides 
into two parts. The first part is the second topic of hypotheses, which measures out-group 
derogation in terms of affective partisanship. The ANES offers multiple routes to 
operationalize partisan affect. The first measure examines the strength of partisanship in 
respondents for Hypothesis 3. Partisanship is a central social identity in lives of most 
Americans. Political parties are entitative groups. Therefore, the affiliation of a 
respondent with a party should be influenced by his/her authoritarian disposition. Strong 
authoritarians are more likely to be strong partisans (Luttig 2017).  
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The ANES asks respondents to register the intensity of their allegiance to a 
political party. This question is a seven-point scale ranging from strong Democrat on one 
end to strong Republican on the other end. The mid-point consists of independent voters. 
This variable is recoded so that Democrats and Republicans are lumped together based on 
the intensity of their partisanship. The new interval scale consists of four responses. A 
high response (4) signifies strong partisanship while a low response (1) signifies partisan 
disaffiliation or independence. The distribution of responses is skewed in a reflection of 
the current state of partisanship in contemporary politics. Roughly half of respondents 
consider the strength of their affiliation to a party to be weak or moderate, yet nearly half 
identify as strong partisans. Independents in this situation represent the smallest group, 








The next measure for Hypothesis 4 consists of a feeling thermometer for each the 
presidential nominees in the 2016 election. Candidates for president are the most visible 
representative of each party who compete in the most visible and consequential race to 
voters (Bafumi & Shapiro 2009, 4). They represent their constituent groups and their 
issues (Bawn et al. 2012). The embodiment of a party’s platform in a candidate generates 
polarized emotions in the electorate (Iyengar & Krupenkin 2018). Respondents register 
their thermostatic feelings on a scale of 0 to 100 with regard to Trump and Clinton. A 
rating of 0 signifies negative affect while a rating of 100 signifies positive affect.  
The absolute value of a respondent’s view toward Trump minus Clinton will 
represent the chasm in affection between candidates among respondents. A wide gap 
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between feelings for Trump and Clinton will signify a high degree of in-group appraisal 
and out-group derogation. Lower numbers represent a smaller gap in responses in the 
evaluation of Trump and Clinton among respondents. The distribution of evaluations in 
Figure 7 do not produce a discernable pattern. The responses register across the scale. It 
is not uncommon for an unequal distribution in a thermostatic scale as respondents round 
their considerations toward benchmark interval numbers (Zaller 1992, 295).  




 This logic continues in the next hypothesis. The measure for Hypothesis 5 
examines affect toward social groups as a compliment to the measure of affect for 
candidates and party polarization. The affect for candidates is worth examining, but 
candidates possess peculiar characteristics, such as sex, that could foil them as a true 
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measure of partisan affect. In the pattern of social identity, one will examine a 
respondent’s affect for the politicized social groups of each party.  
A scale of feeling thermometers of groups in each party form the basis for the 
social polarization dependent variable. For Democrats, a conglomerated feeling 
thermometer is crafted from thermometer scales for labor unions, feminists, liberals, the 
LGBT community, transgenders, and Black Lives Matter activists (α=.85). For 
Republicans, a conglomerated feeling thermometer is crafted from thermometer scales 
for Christian fundamentalists, big business, conservatives, rich people, and the Tea Party 
(α=.79). A factor analysis revealed two distinct factors. The feeling thermometer for poor 
people was not included on the Democratic conglomerated feeling thermometer as it 
loaded on both factors. In similarity with the presidential evaluation thermometer, the 
absolute value of a respondent’s view toward Republican-aligned social groups minus 
Democratic-aligned social groups will represent the chasm in affection between partisan 
coalitions. A wide gap between feelings will signify a high degree of appraisal for one’s 
partisan coalition and derogation for the opposing party’s coalition. Figure 8 shows that 
the responses for social polarization are relatively unskewed. It is hard to discern the 
reason for the difference in distributions between Figure 7 and 8. It is likely that 
partisanship is actively skewing ratings of presidential nominees while it is exerting less 
influence in the evaluation of politicized social groups. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of Levels of Social Polarization for Hypothesis 5
 
 
Lastly, one examines party polarization outright for Hypothesis 6. The variable in 
question in this case follows in the same vein as the previous two. It is another way to 
interpret the relation between gender and authoritarianism with regard to partisan 
intergroup conflict. It is perhaps the most forthright by probing partisan meta-identities 
directly. The inclusion of the last hypothesis is important to study the emerging 
phenomenon of social polarization; however, many individuals have wide-ranging 
associations despite the alignment of social groups in national politics. The multiplicity 
of social attachments to different groups potentially dilutes the relationship between 
gender and authoritarianism.  
Partisan polarization should not suffer from these drawbacks (Egan 2019). One 
constructs the dependent variable for this test in the same fashion as for the variable 
measuring the gap in affect between presidential candidates and politicized social groups. 
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This hypothesis captures the intensity of affective partisanship among respondents toward 
both Democrats and Republicans. The ANES asks respondents to register their feelings 
toward the parties on a scale from 0 to 100. The absolute value of their affect for 
Democrats minus Republicans on a condensed scale of 0 to 10 forms the polarization 
scale. A wide gap signifies polarized feelings toward the parties. Authoritarianism will 
structure the gap since strong authoritarians are strong partisans and strong partisans will 
be most likely to polarize. The distribution of responses in Figure 9 is surprisingly 
unskewed given the tangible presence of partisanship, which promotes the idea that it is 
the peculiarity of presidential nominees in addition to partisanship that is actively 
skewing the distribution of those responses. 





Dependent Variables for Hypotheses 7 & 8 
 The second part of the analysis in regards to intergroup relations represents the 
third cluster of hypotheses for this inquiry. Hypotheses 7 and 8 are novel for the attempt 
to link authoritarianism to economic preferences through the effect of gender. The 
connection of authoritarianism to an economic ideology has proven elusive even in light 
of elite polarization and mass partisanship (Johnston 2018). The cause for this absence is 
likely methodological. The dependent variable for economic ideology is generally one’s 
self-identification as liberal or conservative. These identities have more than one 
dimension of meaning to voters (Ellis & Stimson 2012). Therefore, it is prudent to avoid 
economic ideological self-identification as the dependent variable. 
 The first step to construct dependent variables for this cluster of hypotheses is to 
functionally operationalize economic preferences. This requires that one define economic 
ideology. Goren and Chen conveniently define economic ideology functionally as one’s 
orientation toward the role of government in the economy (2016). An American who 
prefers less government regulation is more conservative in this sense as opposed to a 
liberal who prefers more government regulation. The benefit to this conceptualization is 
that most citizens use it as a heuristic for understanding partisan conflict (Goren 2013).  
The role of government in the economic reflects the central schism in political 
philosophy in the context of the New Deal state. The ANES asks respondents two 
questions in this context. The first one is an ordinal variable which asks respondents if 
more or less government activity is better. This question is quite general. However, the 
second one asks respondents specifically about their preference toward government 
regulation of business. This question captures the functional tradeoff between 
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government and economic supervision, and is more desirable for the model, as a result. 
The variable has five choices with lower values signifying more regulation, and higher 
values signifying less regulation. The responses are heavily skewed toward moderation of 
the two extremes, and could potentially distort results in experimentation. 




It is prudent to conduct an analogous test to substantiate the results of Hypothesis 
7 due to the novelty of the experiment. A second test will operationalize economic 
ideology through a dependent variable in a similar vein. The ANES provides a question 
probing a respondent’s preference for taxing millionaires. It will serve as the basis for 
Hypothesis 8. It is an interval variable consisting of three responses. These responses 
include favoring, opposing, and neither favoring or opposing the taxation of millionaires.  
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This question follows in the logic of the tradeoff between redistribution and social 
welfare in a similar way to regulating business. The taxation of millionaires could 
actually be a more salient question to respondents than the regulation of businesses in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. Millionaires function as the personification of one’s 
perspective of the market. They are either self-reliant success stories or the human face of 
unfair business practices. It is presumed that the same moderated-mediational relation 
will emerge as in Hypothesis 7. Similarly, the distribution of responses for Hypothesis 8 
is also skewed. Figure 11 demonstrates this bend. The responses for Hypothesis 8 follow 
a distinctly populist slant. The differences in skews reinforces the notion that the question 
for Hypothesis 8 registers social tensions between economic classes whereas the question 
in Hypothesis 7 is an impersonal, programmatic question.  





Table 7: List of Hypotheses and Associated Dependent Variables 
Hypothesis Dimension of Authoritarianism Dependent Variable 
1 Social Convention/Leadership Cultural Preference Scale 
2 Social Convention Modern Sexism Preference Scale 
3 Intergroup Relations Party Affiliation Strength 
4 Intergroup Relations Presidential Evaluation Thermometer 
5 Intergroup Relations Social Group Polarization Thermometer 
6 Intergroup Relations Partisan Polarization Thermometer 
7 Intergroup Relations Business Regulation Preference Scale 
8 Intergroup Relations Taxing Millionaires Preference Scale 
 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Cultural Preference Scale 3,645 3.50 .92 1 5 
Modern Sexism Scale 3,610 2.19 .91 1 5 
Party Affiliation 4,247 2.87 1.07 1 4 
Presidential Nominee Evaluations 4,208 5.24 2.78 1 10 
Social Polarization 3,639 5.49 2.87 1 10 
Partisan Polarization  3,298 5.18 2.79 1 10 
Business Regulation 3,627 3.01 .82 1 5 
Taxing Millionaires 3,635 2.49 .77 1 3 
 
Control Variables  
 The conceptualization of economic ideology in Hypothesis 7 and 8 is 
parsimonious; however, another caveat is that it is individualistic. It does not consider an 
individual in the context of group identity (Huddy 2018). The function of the government 
in the economy to authoritatively redistribute wealth is based on social considerations. 
This redistribution occurs in the context of social groups. One’s orientation to 
government social welfare policies reflects prejudices regarding who benefits and who 
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suffers. At a minimum, individuals do not want their own affiliates to bear costs with no 
benefits.  
One must isolate the effect of social considerations of affective partisanship to 
fully account for the interactive relation of gender and authoritarianism with regard to 
economics. A racial component influences the policy considerations of white Americans 
toward economic policy. A racial resentment variable will represent affect toward 
African-Americans and the welfare state by proxy (Gilens 1999). This variable is the 
most commonly accepted way to operationalize racial attitudes. It measures symbolic 
racism in lieu of the challenges of capturing outright racism in respondents (Kinder & 
Sanders 1996). In this way, it is an appropriate variable in the logic of social identity, and 
will serve as a control variable. This variable is another constructed scale from three 
constituent questions with high internal consistency (α=.79). These questions probe one’s 
racial sentiments in five step intervals. They ask whether a respondent agrees with the 
following prompts: 
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
 
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
 
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. 
 
Racial considerations play an enormous role in social welfare policies as they 
have merged with economic ideologies. Gender and authoritarianism interact with these 
considerations in the milieu of the social identity of white Americans. One’s level of 
resentment will mediate feelings toward economic regulation. In isolating racial 
resentment to the extent possible, one can determine the extent to which gender inflects 
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one’s economic ideological preferences while also measuring the interaction of gender 
and authoritarianism mediate the intensity of those preferences.  
A number of common demographic variables are also included in the models for 
controls. These variables cover age, religion, education, region, and household 
information. The age variable is an interval variable. Three dummy variables capture 
whether a respondent identifies as Mainline Protestant, Catholic, or Evangelical. The 
South is represented as a region with its own dummy variable as it is uniquely 
conservative among regions in the United States. Lastly, a dummy variable indicates 
whether the respondent has children in the household under 18. This variable corresponds 
to Lizotte’s model for authoritarianism as she proposes parenthood alters considerations 
for social arrangements for men and women (2019). The education variable measures 
one’s degree attainment from a high school diploma or less (1), to some college (2), to a 
bachelor’s degree (3) to a graduate degree (4). 
This model also measures egalitarianism in respondents in the mold of Lizotte’s 
model (2019). Egalitarianism is a core value that reflects in an individual’s political 
preferences (Ciuk et al. 2017). It reflects the sentiment that policy should produce 
equitable outcomes in society. The variable is an interval scale (α=.79) consisting of an 
individual’s agreement with general statements about personal dispositions. These 
include: 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has 
an equal opportunity to succeed; 
 
2. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people 
are; 
 
3. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life 




4. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many 
fewer problems. 
 
Lastly, a variable is included in certain models to capture a respondent’s 
partisanship. This control variable is necessary due to the compounding implications of 
partisanship in the nexus of social identity. Partisanship carries the trappings of gender, 
and certainly could muddle the relationship of authoritarianism and preferences in men 
and women in the hypotheses concerning cultural preferences and economics. This 
variable will not be included in the hypotheses explicitly touching partisan matters, and 
one could leave it out altogether. However, it is identified, especially in the casual 
pathway model, as an important influence on preference formation. Therefore, it will be 
included in the cultural preferences and economic hypotheses. The ordinal variable itself 
is a measure of party identification. It captures if a respondent self-identifies as a 
Democrat (-1), Independent (0), or Republican (1). 
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Table 9: List of Control Variables 
Name Description Type Values 
Age Age of Respondent Interval 18+ 
Catholicism Religious Identification Nominal 0/1 
Mainline Protestant Religious Identification Nominal 0/1 
Evangelical Religious Identification Nominal 0/1 
South Region of Residence Nominal 0/1 
Education Highest Degree Attained Interval 0 to 4 
Children Presence of Children under 18 in 
Household 
Nominal 0/1 
Egalitarianism Preference for Equal Social Outcomes Ordinal 0 to 4 
Racial Resentment Tolerance toward African-Americans Ordinal 0 to 4 
Party Identification Self-Identified Party Affiliation Nominal 0/3 
Methods 
 This inquiry relies exclusively on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for 
hypothesis testing. This method is used to test all the hypotheses since the dependent 
variables in question are interval in nature. Diagnostics are applied to each model for 
these hypotheses to ensure the models are properly specified. The first diagnostic test is a 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity occurs 
when error terms differ in their variance over a range of measured values (Williams 
2020). This prevents OLS regression from being the best linear unbiased estimator. The 
problem plagues each model except for the ones concerning Hypothesis 4 and 7. One 
corrects this problem by specifying robust standard errors where needed. Additionally, 
one tests for multicollinearity to ensure that independent variables are not correlated with 
one another. A variance inflation factor is calculated for each of the eight models. No 
model demonstrated multicollinearity. The results of these diagnostics are located in 
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Appendix A. Lastly, the models are weighted in accordance with the weighing variable 
provided by the ANES.  
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Test Result Summaries 
 Overall, the regression tests supported few of the hypotheses outright. One has 
cause to affirm only in certain scenarios that the relation between gender and 
authoritarianism on political behavior differs for men and women given one’s 
authoritarian predisposition. This relationship shines most prominently in traditional 
matters of authoritarian research related to cultural preferences. On the whole, however, 
the results blemish the idea that one should expect an interactive relationship as the norm 
on political matters. The strength of the effects of partisanship with regard to inter-group 
relations subsume the conditional effect of gender and authoritarianism. The interactive 
effect holds absent the priming of partisan identities, but not directly in cases of 
economic redistribution. Authoritarianism causes men and women to increasingly support 
preferences for authoritarian social arrangements, yet the rate of change is not the same 
for women as men. The reason for this interactive effect is that men, as a result of gender 
socialization, support more authoritarian preferences overall than women. The 
preferences converge as authoritarianism overwhelms the effect of gender on preference 
formation. Therefore, it is with qualification that one posits that gender interacts with 
authoritarianism. 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
 The first hypothesis showcases this observed interactive relation between gender 
and authoritarianism. The dependent variable for this test measured the cultural 
preferences of respondents on a scale toward social relations and convention on issues 
such as minority integration and strong leaders. The scale registered responses of 1 to 5 
with higher responses signifying higher authoritarian preferences. The authoritarian 
DiMariano 166 
 
disposition, the sex variable, and the interaction term between those two variables all 
produced statistically significant coefficients. The expected preference was 3.2 for a non-
authoritarian male respondent—a score that leans toward authoritarian cultural 
arrangements. The value for an authoritarian male respondent is nearly one point higher 
(4.12) than his non-authoritarian counterpart. This jump represents a substantive 
difference on par with the effect of party affiliation.  
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Level of Education -0.136*** 
 (0.0153) 
Egalitarian Values -0.148*** 
 (0.0160) 
Party Affiliation 0.314*** 
 (0.0186) 
Children under 18 0.0473 
 (0.0352) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The expected preference and rate of change is not the same for women, however. 
The expected base preference drops to 3.08 for the population of non-authoritarian 
females. This gap represents the full effect of gender on the preferences of non-
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authoritarian respondents. Gender is not as central to preference formation as 
authoritarianism in the logic of causal pathway models. Therefore, the effect of gender is 
greatest in the absence of authoritarianism. Again, the difference is significant, yet one 
would expect gender to produce a more substantive effect. However, the rate of change 
also matters. The rate of change is greater for women than men such that authoritarian 
women actually hold more authoritarian preferences than authoritarian men (4.28 to 
4.12).  
 
The logic of the hypothesis expected convergence of preferences among 
authoritarian men and women. However, the gap between the preferences of authoritarian 
men and women is marginally greater than the gap between non-authoritarian men and 
women. It is possible that gender produces an unexpected effect among authoritarians, 
too. This outcome appears to be the only unanticipated result of this test. The variable for 
children in the household is insignificant. This outcome corresponds to the results of 
Lizotte, who also found that the variable was insignificant (2019). The concern for the 








































Figure 12: Cultural Preferences by Gender and 





relations. This is intuitive given that authoritarianism imparts the concern for the 
upbringing of children, in the first place. The substantive effects of the control variables 
contextualize the effect of authoritarianism. The age and education of the respondent 
move the needle by less than half a unit of the full spread of their effects. Age increases 
one’s support for authoritarian cultural preferences while education decreases it. The 
most culturally conservative sect, Evangelical Christianity, likewise only moves the 
needle by less than a quarter of a unit. In this regard, the effect of gender appears more 
prominent. 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between gender and authoritarianism continues with regard to 
modern sexist attitudes. One anticipated that this dependent variable would make gender 
even more salient in the decision-making process between men and women across the 
authoritarian scale. The results support this prediction. Unlike the previous model, 
though, the interaction term is not significant in this situation for Hypothesis 2 (p=.109). 
However, it is close enough to significance to justify treating it as such. A non-
authoritarian man holds sexist beliefs, overall. The constant for the model is 2.95 on a 
scale of 5. The base position starts from above average sexist perspective. The effect of 
authoritarianism increases already present sexist attitudes in men. Authoritarian men 
register around 3.30 units on the scale. One expected authoritarianism to produce such an 
effect. Authoritarians sharply respond to challenges to the conventional order. The 
presence of a prevailing national culture in favor the advancement of women beyond 
their current roles in society is believed to produce a backlash effect or resentment among 
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men. The push for egalitarianism collides with an authoritarian’s desire for hierarchical 
structures in group relations. The results reflect these sentiments. 












Level of Education -0.126*** 
 (0.0188) 
Egalitarian Values -0.230*** 
 (0.0199) 
Party Affiliation 0.110*** 
 (0.0232) 
Children under 18 0.0163 
 (0.0466) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Unsurprisingly, gender registers a pronounced effect in the results. Women are 
less likely to view other women as unreasonably complaining about sexism or demanding 
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better treatment. These attitudes culminate with women registering around a 2.75 on the 
modern sexist scale. This outcome is still somewhat sexist. It is possible that this score 
represents a backlash effect among women against the goals of feminism, or is evidence 
of latent support for benevolent sexism. Authoritarianism increases support for sexist 
attitudes among women. Women become more sexist for every unit increase in 
authoritarianism than men. Ultimately, the preferences of authoritarian women converge 
with the preferences of authoritarian men to the point that they are indistinguishable. An 
authoritarian woman scores 3.236 on the scale compared to the 3.232 points of an 
authoritarian man. 
  
Results for Hypothesis 3 
 The first two hypotheses demonstrated an interactive relation between gender and 
authoritarianism with regard to cultural preferences and social relations. The remaining 
hypotheses concern themselves with inter-group relations. It is in these hypotheses that 
the original assumptions need further specification. The first of these hypotheses focuses 
































Figure 13: Modern Sexism by Gender and Authoritarian 




respondent is attached to a partisan identity. Authoritarianism should structure support for 
partisanship as an expressive identity. Gender should modulate the intensity of 
partisanship. The results in Table 12 do not support these hypotheses at all. Neither the 
authoritarian disposition, the sex variable or the interaction term are significant. This 
unexpected hiccup forces one to contemplate the rationale for the insignificance. The 
presence of partisanship is likely distorting the results. The literature review identified the 
two parties as potentially complicating factor due to differences in nature and 
composition. Republicans have more authoritarians, and avail themselves in masculinity. 
Democrats have fewer authoritarians, and avail themselves in feminine themes. The 
















Level of Education 0.0809*** 
 (0.0247) 
Egalitarian Values 0.0258 
 (0.0223) 
Children under 18 0.0308 
 (0.0557) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 One reproduced the hypothesis test in Table 13, but separated respondents by 
party affiliation. The results are intriguing. Authoritarianism, sex and the interaction term 
are again insignificant for Democrats. Partisanship does not vary by these variables. 
However, this is not the case for Republicans. The variables for authoritarianism and sex 
are significant among authoritarians, and the interaction term is only just insignificant 
(p=.106). If one counts the interaction term as significant due to its proximity to the 
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threshold of significance, then gender and authoritarianism interact as expected for 
Republicans only. The constant term signifies that the average Republican is already 
quite partisan (2.76 out of 4). Authoritarianism has a prominent effect on Republican 
partisanship. Its full effect raises the partisanship of a male respondent by half a point. 
This effect is twice as much as the full effect of age. Interestingly, women are more 
partisan than men overall if one does not assume the interaction term is significant. One 
did not expect this result, nor would one expect the results if the interaction term is 
counted. In that case, non-authoritarian women are more partisan than non-authoritarian 
men, but converge at 3.5 on the partisan scale as expected. This hypothesis requires 







































Figure 14: Partisan Strength by Gender and Authoritarian 
Disposition among White Republicans in Hypothesis 3
Republican Men Republican Women
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Table 13: Strength of Party Affiliation among White Americans by Party 
Affiliation 






   
Authoritarian Disposition Scale 0.129*** 0.00689 
 (0.0305) (0.0353) 
Female 0.256** 0.0735 
 (0.116) (0.101) 
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction -0.0691 -0.00356 
 (0.0428) (0.0446) 
Age 0.0359*** 0.0962*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0123) 
Level of Education -0.00469 -0.0424* 
 (0.0233) (0.0238) 
Egalitarian Values -0.0780*** 0.0745*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0234) 
Children under 18 0.000502 0.0638 
 (0.0522) (0.0517) 
Mainline Protestant 0.107 -0.150** 
 (0.0671) (0.0681) 
Evangelical 0.136** -0.244*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0846) 
Catholic -0.0145 0.00595 
 (0.0594) (0.0595) 
Southerner -0.00797 0.0483 
 (0.0475) (0.0531) 
Constant 2.746*** 2.644*** 
 (0.128) (0.130) 
   
Observations 1,312 1,142 
R-squared 0.047 0.067 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results for Hypothesis 4 
 The next hypothesis continues in the same vein. One observes the effect of gender 
and authoritarianism on the affection of a respondent toward the 2016 presidential 
candidates. This hypothesis tests the concept of polarization through the office of 
president. Presidential candidates are the personification of each party, and thus bound to 
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produce intense feelings. The public views presidential candidates as avatars of the social 
movements of the opposing political party as a consequence of the evolution of the party 
system and the office of presidency throughout the course of the New Deal. Gender 
issues and authoritarianism were key elements in the production and maintenance of the 
current divide between parties. The results should reflect their prominent role in the 
development of modern partisanship. 
 The test demonstrates that a gap in affection exists between presidential 
candidates. One expects this outcome. The coefficient of the constant term is 3.21 for 
non-authoritarian men. This value is lower than one might anticipate in light of the heated 
nature of contemporary politics. The effect of authoritarianism is significant and 
substantive. Its full effect raises the predicted response to 4.33 for authoritarian men. 
Authoritarianism is the most powerful variable in changing preferences in the model. One 
expects a large effect as authoritarianism promotes in-group affection and out-group 
derogation. It even trumps partisanship in this scenario. Counterintuitively, the change in 
party affiliation from Democrat to Republican lowers the gap in affect between 
candidates. This result indicates that Republicans felt warm toward their candidate less 






























































Figure 15: Presidential Candidate Affect Gap by Gender 

















Level of Education 0.0416 
 (0.0640) 
Egalitarian Values 0.140** 
 (0.0634) 
Party Affiliation -0.166** 
 (0.0798) 
Children under 18 0.117 
 (0.147) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The model continues to defy anticipated results with the results for women. The 
model demonstrates that women had an outsized gap in affect between the candidates. 
This outcome is reasonable. The 2016 election pitted the first female candidate in history 
against a man who bragged about sexually assaulting women. The intriguing component 
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to the results is the coefficient of the interaction term. Its value is -.01 when combined 
with the coefficient of the authoritarianism scale coefficient to produce the rate of change 
for women. The gap in affect toward candidates remained consistent and constant for 
women across the authoritarian spectrum. This result does not imply that women always 
appraised one candidate over the other, but could mean that women had strong attitudes 
toward each candidate no matter who they were. Women contrast in this model by 
deviating from the anticipated effect of authoritarianism whereas men followed the 
predicted pattern. Non-authoritarian men were less polarized on the candidates than non-
authoritarian women (3.12 units to 3.87), but authoritarian men were more polarized than 
authoritarian women (4.33 units to 3.83). 
Results for Hypothesis 5 
 The results of this hypothesis potentially captured too many of the peculiarities of 
the 2016 presidential candidates to faithfully capture the relation between gender and 
authoritarianism. Gender salience likely exercised an outsized role in the assessment of 
candidates. In all probability, Democratic women likely supported the first woman for 
president with intense zeal while loathing the other candidate with a record of sexual 
assault accusations. Female Republicans made a conscious decision to support Trump, 
which likely intensified this deliberate support as a result. The fact that women are more 
partisan than men in the Republican Party offers support to this interpretation. The results 
are most likely borne from the unique matchup of the election cycle, though. The next 
two hypotheses provide analogous checks to compare results. The first test examines 
social polarization. The variable in question registers the gap in affection between 
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politicized social group of differing partisan affiliations. The outcome of this test in Table 
15 renders equally unanticipated results. 












Level of Education 0.337*** 
 (0.062) 
Egalitarian Values 0.364*** 
 (0.062) 
Party Affiliation -0.0804 
 (0.0730) 
Children under 18 -0.139 
 (0.146) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The fascinating aspect about the social polarization test is that the main effects are 
not significant. The social polarization gap between non-authoritarians and authoritarians 
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is not significantly different. The spread of outcomes is not significantly organized by sex 
either. However, the interaction term is significant. A female respondent who becomes 
authoritarian notices a significant and substantive decline in social polarization. The 
effect does not extend to men. In real terms, authoritarian women actually experience a 
smaller gap in affect between politicized social groups than non-authoritarian women. 
The outcome is counterintuitive. One expects authoritarianism to promote gaps in 
affection among politicized groups. However, the condition of being female moderates 
the magnitude of the affect gap. In this case, gender either defines how authoritarian 
females respond to out-group social groups, or authoritarianism warms or cools women 
to a broader array of social groups. The fact that party affiliation is not significant is 
telling. However, it is possible that the culture of each party affects the results when 
holding party affiliation constant. 
 Table 16 reports the results of regression testing by party affiliation. The results 
are strikingly different from the combined regression test results in Table 15. The 
interaction term is no longer significant in either case for Democrats or Republicans. The 
main effect for gender is also insignificant for respondents of both parties. However, 
authoritarianism is significant and substantive among Republicans and Democrats. One 
expected gender in both parties to attenuate social polarization for women. Instead, party 




























































Figure 16: Social Polarization by Party Affiliation and 





Table 16: Social Polarization among White Americans by Party Affiliation 
 Republican Democrats 
VARIABLES Coefficients  Coefficients 
   
Authoritarian Disposition Scale 0.385*** -0.554*** 
 (0.0977) (0.106) 
Female -.318 0.231 
 (0.371) (0.305) 
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction 0.0212 -0.1041 
 (0.137) (0.135) 
Age 0.217*** -0.0377 
 (0.0397) (0.0372) 
Level of Education 0.0555 -0.262*** 
 (0.0746) (0.0720) 
Egalitarian Values -0.484*** 0.965*** 
 (0.0744) (0.0707) 
Children under 18 -0.067 -0.332** 
 (0.167) (0.156) 
Mainline Protestant -0.299 -.038 
 (0.2155) (0.2060) 
Evangelical 0.928*** -1.217*** 
 (0.199) (0.255) 
Catholic -0.325* -0.576*** 
 (0.190) (0.1799) 
Southerner 0.335** -0.003 
 (0.1522) (0.160) 
Constant 4.318*** 4.385*** 
 (0.410) (0.3933) 
   
Observations 1,308 1,139 
R-squared 0.038 0.085 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The party to which one belongs matters with regard to the effect of 
authoritarianism on the affect gap. A trend in the results is developing that reflects the 
nature of the Republican Party as an ideological movement. The psychological pressure 
to enforce uniformity in the Republican Party is higher due to its cohesion (Mason & 
Wronski 2018). The full effect of authoritarianism in the Republican Party increases the 
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affect gap by 1.5 units on a scale of 10. In substantive terms, an authoritarian Republican 
ranks Democratic social groups a full 5.85 points below Republican social groups. Only 
age possess a greater effect on increasing the affect gap while egalitarian values reduce 
the gap with equal vigor. It is unsurprising that authoritarianism would have such an 
effect among Republicans. The Republican Party is currently the de facto home of 
authoritarian-minded voters. The cohesion of Republicans likely amplifies the effect of 
authoritarianism on in-group affection and out-group derogation. 
 Democrats experience a much different effect from authoritarianism, however. In 
this case, authoritarianism decreases social polarization by a hefty amount. The full effect 
of authoritarianism lowers social polarization from 4.4 units to 2.2 points. A few potential 
causes are behind the inverted effect. Authoritarianism is either reducing in-group 
affection or out-group derogation or potentially some combination of both. Democrats 
count few authoritarians among their ranks, so authoritarianism may reduce in-group 
affection while promoting out-group affection for those who remain. The other 
significant values can help interpret the results of authoritarianism. Egalitarian values, in 
this case, substantively raises social polarization. It has the largest predicted effect of any 
variable in either test. The full effect raises social polarization from 4.4 units to 8.3 units. 
The opposing effects of egalitarianism and authoritarianism indicate that authoritarianism 
is likely reducing out-group derogation among Democrats as white authoritarians likely 
feel warm to social groups aligned with the Republican Party. Egalitarianism is likely 
raising in-group affection among Democrats as the party that represents the marginalized 
in society. Democrats are social levelers while Republicans represent hierarchy. This 
difference would explain the influence and direction of each effect. 
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Results for Hypothesis 6 
Lastly, one examines the proposed interactive relation with regard to mass 
polarization. The dependent variable in question is the most abstract and direct measure 
of the distance one feels between prototypical Republicans and Democrats. Partisanship 
constitutes a meta-identity of polarized social identities (Mason 2018). It is a salient 
identity with numerous occasions to express it in public (Huddy et al. 2015). One 
expected the interactive effect of gender on authoritarianism to shine in this hypothesis 
where it did not in other tests examining the nature of partisanship. However, the results 
in Table 17 are as dismal as in the previous hypothesis tests. Partisan polarization does 
not vary by authoritarianism or gender. 
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Level of Education 0.217*** 
 (0.0704) 
Egalitarian Values 0.268*** 
 (0.0659) 
Children under 18 0.230 
 (0.157) 













Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Consequently, one assumes that the results are conditional on party affiliation as 
they were in prior tests. Therefore, one conducted the test again by controlling for party 
affiliation. The results are similarly as unexpected as before. Party affiliation matters with 
regard to the effect of gender and authoritarianism as seen in Table 18. These results defy 
the assumption that authoritarianism results in groupism despite the substance of the 
entitative group identity in question. If this assumption is correct, then the concept needs 
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to be further specified. The movement of the effect of authoritarianism on polarization is 
different depending on party affiliation. Among Republicans, authoritarianism causes a 
surge in polarization. Strong Republican authoritarians experience an affect gap of over 
five units. The full effect is to raise polarization by 1.15 units from a constant of 4.36 
units to 5.51 units. This movement is shy of the full effect of age (1.37 units), but 
influences polarization more so than egalitarianism and Evangelism. This effect holds for 
men and women. Authoritarianism exerts equal influence on the sexes in the Republican 
camp. One expected some effect for sex or the interaction term, though.  
DiMariano 188 
 
Table 18: Party Polarization among White Americans by Party Affiliation 






   
Authoritarian Disposition Scale 0.285*** -0.422*** 
 (0.108) (0.144) 
Female 0.172 -0.789** 
 (0.409) (0.399) 
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction -0.0435 0.273 
 (0.154) (0.186) 
Age 0.196*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0519) 
Level of Education -0.135 0.111 
 (0.0851) (0.102) 
Egalitarian Values -0.221*** 0.595*** 
 (0.0830) (0.107) 
Children under 18 0.301 0.0928 
 (0.188) (0.219) 
Mainline Protestant 0.131 -0.297 
 (0.248) (0.266) 
Evangelical 0.607*** -0.660* 
 (0.230) (0.364) 
Catholic 0.0633 -0.179 
 (0.212) (0.254) 
Southerner 0.219 0.199 
 (0.174) (0.230) 
Constant 4.362*** 4.268*** 
 (0.454) (0.596) 
   
Observations 1,001 897 
R-squared 0.061 0.110 
Standard errors in parentheses for Republicans 
Robust errors in parenthesis for Democrats 





The effect is reversed for Democrats. Authoritarianism has a substantial 
attenuating effect on polarization along with sex. The full effect of authoritarianism is 
1.68 units. Strong Democratic authoritarian men experience minimal polarization (2.58 
units) whereas non-authoritarian Democratic men experience a gap of 4.27 units. The sex 
variable is significant and substantive. It also decreases polarization. One expected such 
an influence; however, it is against the trend in the other hypotheses examining 
























































Figure 17: Partisan Polarization by Republican Party Affiliation 





















































Figure 18: Partisan Polarization by Gender and Authoritarian 
Disposition among White Democrats in Hypothesis 6
Democratic Men Democratic Women
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3.48 units; whereas, an authoritarian Democratic female experiences a gap of 1.79 units. 
Both men and women in the Democratic Party experience less polarization as a result of 
authoritarianism, so gender is likely not the reason for the unexpected results. The fact 
that Evangelism produces an attenuating effect on polarization among Democrats 
suggests that authoritarianism is raising positive regard toward Republicans. This result 
contravenes the notion of authoritarians becoming strong partisans regardless of the 
partisan social identity involved (Luttig 2017). The Democrat’s brand of diversity and 
tolerance appears anathema to authoritarians who remain in the Party, and thus inoculates 
them from becoming Democratic partisan warriors. 
Results for Hypothesis 7 
 Testing to this point has mostly frustrated the proposed belief that 
authoritarianism and gender interact to influence partisanship. The relationship of the 
interaction between gender and authoritarianism has not always manifested as 
anticipated. One has discovered instead that party affiliation further conditions the 
hypotheses. The test of the interactive relation on inter-group relations has produced 
these shaky results. On initial glance, the proposed relationship does not exist with regard 
to the economic ideology test results in Table 19 either. The variables for the main effects 
and the interaction term are both statistically insignificant. However, the control of racial 
resentment is statistically significant. It produces a substantive effect on the desire to 
deregulate businesses, which compliments the idea that racial and economic attitudes are 
intertwined. Its full effect raises the predicted response from 3.03 to 3.39 for a 
respondent. In this regard, it exudes roughly the same influence as the full effect of the 
variable for partisanship. One expected these variables to be significant due to the 
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influence of elite ideology in each party. The absence of any significance is surprising for 
gender and authoritarianism. 












Level of Education 0.0212 
 (0.0152) 
Egalitarian Values -0.0859*** 
 (0.0152) 
Party Affiliation 0.165*** 
 0.0183 
Children under 18 -0.068** 
 (0.0334) 















Standard errors in parentheses 




 The lack of a manifested relationship forces one to reconsider the assumption of 
this hypothesis, too. It is possible that the operational variable for economic ideology is 
not reliable for the purposes of this hypothesis. However, if one assumes that it really is, 
then the substantive effect of party affiliation may be responsible for the lack of an 
observed relation yet again. It appears that the effect of authoritarianism is conditional on 
party affiliation, in fact. One did not anticipate the significance of authoritarianism 
among respondents of one party, however. Table 20 documents the results of the previous 





























































Figure 19: Economic Ideology by Authoritarian Disposition 


















































Figure 20: Economic Ideology by Authoritarian Disposition 
among White Democrats in Hypothesis 8
Democratic Men Democratic Women
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Table 20:  Business Regulation among White Americans by Party Affiliation 
 Republican Democrats 
VARIABLES Coefficients  Coefficients 
   
Authoritarian Disposition Scale 0.00900 -0.0763** 
 (0.0284) (0.0352) 
Female 0.0974 0.0824 
 (0.107) (0.0998) 
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction -0.0548 0.0461 
 (0.0394) (0.0441) 
Age 0.0180 -0.0524*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0122) 
Level of Education 0.0527** -0.0136 
 (0.0215) (0.0242) 
Egalitarian Values -0.0641*** -0.112*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0260) 
Children under 18 -0.00596 -0.162*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0511) 
Mainline Protestant -0.0500 0.103 
 (0.0619) (0.0673) 
Evangelical -0.0792 0.230*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0835) 
Catholic -0.0745 -0.0251 
 (0.0546) (0.0587) 
Southerner 0.00623 -0.110** 
 (0.0439) (0.0526) 
Racial Resentment 0.110*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0273) 
Constant 2.858*** 3.188*** 
 (0.152) (0.164) 
   
Observations 1,308 1,139 
R-squared 0.038 0.085 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Authoritarianism and gender continue to be insignificant among Republicans. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that the non-regulation of business is the raison d’être of 
the Republican Party. Therefore, partisan beliefs do not vary amongst authoritarian 
dispositions. However, authoritarianism is significant among Democrats. Yet gender is 
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not a significant variable among Democrats with regard to the desire to regulate business, 
nor is the interaction term. One concludes that authoritarianism for Democrats supports 
the regulation of business regardless of sex. The effect is substantive, and logically fits 
with the party’s history and ideological platform. Racial resentment is significant for both 
parties with about the same substantive effect for Democratic and Republican partisans. It 
produces the opposite effect on white Democrats in line with expectations. 
Results for Hypothesis 8 
 One tests the hypothesis about economic ideology a second time by using support 
for taxing millionaires as the dependent variable. This second variable used to 
operationalize economic beliefs concurrently fails to produce support for the interactive 
relationship between gender and authoritarianism. All three of the main variables are 
insignificant. The situation bears resemblance to the previous test. Party affiliation, racial 
resentment, and egalitarian values are the statistically significant variables to influence 
one’s belief about taxing millionaires. The constant term of 2.47 units out of a maximum 
of 3 reflects the skewed nature of the responses toward the popularity of taxing 
millionaires. Egalitarian values further increases that support by nearly .4 units, and is the 
most influential variable. It is more influential than party affiliation, the full effect of 
which is about .35 units. Racial resentment is the least influential, but its full effect still 
decreases support for taxing millionaires by about .25 units.  
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Level of Education -0.0202 
 (0.0170) 
Egalitarian Values 0.0982*** 
 (0.0174) 
Party Affiliation -0.170*** 
 (0.0214) 
Children under 18 0.0479 
 (0.0385) 















Robust errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The outcomes for party affiliation and racial resentment are not surprising 
considering the fact that racial and economic preferences are aligned in elite ideology and 
mass partisanship. However, it is surprising that gender is not significant despite the 
significance of racial resentment given the bisecting influence of gender in the 
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construction of preferences for white Americans. The lack of significance for the main 
independent variables directs one to control for party affiliation while conducting the 
hypothesis tests as previously done for Hypothesis 7. The results are detailed in Table 22. 
Table 22: Support for Taxing Millionaires among White Americans 
 Republican Democrats 
VARIABLES Coefficients  Coefficients 
   
Authoritarian Disposition Scale -0.00866 -0.0826** 
 (0.0311) (0.0340) 
Female 0.0196 -0.138* 
 (0.117) (0.0758) 
Female*Authoritarianism Interaction 0.0185 0.0537 
 (0.0431) (0.0420) 
Age 0.00664 0.0183* 
 (0.0125) (0.0109) 
Level of Education -0.0634*** 0.0383* 
 (0.0236) (0.0218) 
Egalitarian Values 0.118*** 0.0630*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0242) 
Children under 18 0.104** -0.0328 
 (0.0526) (0.0496) 
Mainline Protestant 0.0308 0.0152 
 (0.0677) (0.0571) 
Evangelical -0.0614 0.0805 
 (0.0629) (0.0642) 
Catholic 0.117* -0.0892 
 (0.0599) (0.0593) 
Southerner 0.0354 -0.139*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0516) 
Racial Resentment -0.0750*** -0.0296 
 (0.0284) (0.0232) 
Constant 2.345*** 2.744*** 
 (0.166) (0.144) 
   
Observations 1,310 1,141 
R-squared 0.037 0.080 
Standard errors in parentheses for Republicans 
Robust errors in parentheses for Democrats 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The conclusions mirror results from Hypothesis 7 with regard to support for 
regulating business. It appears that party affiliation is a key condition for the 
manifestation of a relation between authoritarianism and sex and economic liberalism. 
The test by party affiliation demonstrates that the main three independent variables have 
no effect among Republicans. It is more credible now to posit that affiliation with the 
Republican Party mutes the influence of the independent variables on economic policy 
preferences. It is strongly suspected that economic ideology does not vary among 
Republicans, and the results do not vary by the independent variables as a result. Racial 
resentment is significant and substantive, though, among opposition to taxing millionaires 
for Republicans. The full effect of racial resentment decreases support for taxing 
millionaires by about .3 units. With the constant term reflecting some economic populism 
at 2.35, a racially resentful Republican would register at 2 units or the equivalent of 
neither supporting or opposing taxation. This position does not completely correspond to 
the vehement opposition of Republican elites to taxing millionaires, nor does it explain 
why gender is also insignificant if racial resentment is significant. 
 The opposite holds for affiliation with the Democratic Party on support for taxing 
millionaires. Authoritarianism and gender are significant as predicted only amongst 
Democrats; however, the interaction term is not. Authoritarianism lowers support for 
taxing millionaires. The full effect of which lowers support from the constant of 2.75 
units by .35 units to 2.4 units. This effect makes an authoritarian Democrat similar to a 
standard Republican. Curiously, gender is also significant, but it is not in line with 
expectations. The support for taxing millionaires is .14 units lower among the average 
female respondent than the average male respondent. The direction of movement for 
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women contradicts the thrust of the literature review. Gender, especially in the context of 
Democratic party affiliation, should move women toward a stronger desire to tax 
millionaires. It is hard to contrast this result since the results for Democratic women are 
the only instance gender being significant in the economic ideology hypotheses. 
 The results of Hypothesis 7 and 8 are disquieting. It is difficult to the reconcile the 
results of the economic ideology hypotheses with the deductions made in the literature 
review. It is not only the lack of an interactive relationship between authoritarianism and 
gender that makes one pause before drawing conclusions from these two tests. It is also 
the reverse effect manifesting for gender for Hypothesis 8. The strong influence of party 
affiliation and racial resentment represent the best avenue to explain the observations. 
Racial resentment and party affiliation appear to come before the effect of gender and 
authoritarianism. The influence of racial policies on the development of party coalitions 
would explain the strength of these two variables in the context of polarization although it 
would not explain the lack of significance for authoritarianism and especially gender. It is 
also possible that the dependent variables are not ideal for operationalizing the 
hypotheses. Both variables register sentiments about economic ideology, but both 
variables lack variance in responses. This is adduced from the relatively paltry R-square 
value in all the tests for Hypotheses 7 and 8. It is possible that the results would be 
different if one had access to a dependent variable with a better spread among responses. 
General Takeaways 
Overall, the regression tests present a range of results to inductively contrast with 
the hypotheses. The deduced position that gender and authoritarianism interact across 
political issues must be qualified and taken as suspect. The hypothesized relation 
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manifests as expected within the first set of hypotheses concerning cultural preferences 
and modern sexism. It is possible that these questions explicitly activate authoritarian 
concerns in a direct contest between “us vs. them”, and thus produced the expected 
substantive results. This point would explain why the sets for partisanship and economics 
did not meet expectations despite being based on the same logic of conflict. However, it 
does not explain why strong authoritarians were not strong partisans in the hypothesis 
regarding a direct test partisan affect. It is possible that these relations do exist, but the 
models were not operationalized properly for the experiments. One must contrast these 
results with expectations to appraise the theory of authoritarianism and gender used for 
the hypotheses. 
Table 23: Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Not Supported Partially Supported Supported 
Cultural Preferences  X  
Modern Sexism   X 
Party Identification  X   
Presidential Nominee Evaluations  X  
Social Polarization X   
Partisan Polarization X   
Economic Regulation X   





Discussion and Conclusion 
Critique of Core Concepts 
 The varied results from the regression tests have provided a range of findings to 
parse. It is necessary now to compare those results with the considerations made prior to 
testing. The preponderance of scrutiny must first fall on the conception of 
authoritarianism. One located the motivation for authoritarian predispositions as a need 
for cognitive reassurance in the form of epistemological closure. Authoritarianism is a 
psychological mechanism for dealing with uncertainty, and results in efforts to impose 
unanimity. Scholars commonly witness these resulting efforts for conformity as a defense 
mechanism (Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Stenner 2005). These ends are reached through 
group affiliation. The exploration of Frankfurt School philosophy helped frame the 
essence of authoritarianism. Scholars often remain agnostic to the theory behind 
authoritarianism, and consequently it is often reduced to its methodology. The 
philosophical exegesis allowed one to distinguish the concept from mere prejudice or 
aggression alone. However, this step alone was not sufficient to construct a model of 
authoritarianism. It only validated it as a concept worth exploring. 
 The philosophical element assumed an academic basis with the dynamic model of 
personality. In this way, one expounded a comprehensive view of the mechanisms and 
consequences of authoritarianism. Personality operates as an enduring, yet situational, 
feature of an individual. The concept of dynamism in personality allowed one to frame 
authoritarianism as a disposition. Individuals vary in their propensity to sacrifice personal 
autonomy to group authority to fulfill internal needs. This propensity interacts with one’s 
environment through threatening cues to situationally mediate one’s preferred level of 
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autonomy. This model of authoritarianism begged the question, though. What causes one 
to desire to conform in the first place? The answer is multifaceted, and runs the gambit 
from childhood upbringing to personal experiences. However, this inquiry focused on the 
need for closure as a prime-mover. 
 The need for closure served as the chief component for determining an 
individual’s predisposition for authoritarianism. Other underlying motivations such as the 
need for order or belonging were contextualized in the pattern of needing certainty. 
Human beings have awareness and meta-cognition. One consequence of this intelligence 
is the realization of metaphysical uncertainties. Individuals vary in their comfortability in 
a world of uncertainty. The uncomfortable lot seek cognitive refuge by way of 
identification with an entitative group. These groups provide a set of super-ordinate 
authorities to which one can adjust one’s life. Hence, one arrives at their preferred level 
of personal autonomy. 
 The formulation of authoritarianism by group identification defined the model for 
testing. It allowed one to deduce conclusions from its logic. The inference pattern of the 
model allowed one to situate authoritarianism as a mainspring of affective partisanship. 
Political scientists are increasingly understanding partisanship through the lens of social 
identity. Individual citizens behave politically in accordance with social allegiance. The 
human mind rationalizes more so than it reasons in political endeavors. Group affiliation 
informs individuals of their situation, and forms the bands of collective action. Partisan 
affiliation is a particularly strong and salient social identity as partisans are constantly 
primed in terms of identity as a member of a political party. This affinity produces 
amiable feelings toward fellow partisans and allied leaders. Partisans experience tense 
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competition over tangible benefits, and subsequently derogate members of the other party 
according to the degree to which one associates with one’s own party. The extent to 
which one identifies as a partisan should reflect one’s predisposition to authoritarianism. 
Political parties are entitative groups, and provide the essential epistemological 
certainties to uniquely attract authoritarians. 
 Therefore, one concluded that authoritarianism structures modern partisanship. 
Authoritarians would be partisan warriors. The distribution of authoritarians between and 
within the two major parties affects the dynamic of competition. Democrats are mainly 
comprised of non-authoritarians while the Republicans are mostly comprised of 
authoritarians. Parties absorbed the authoritarian cleavage over the course of the New 
Deal regime. The promulgation of the federal policy state has resulted in the increased 
prominence of the president in the political order. The centrality of the office of president 
made it as a clearinghouse for partisan initiatives. The vestiture of such authority in one 
office altered the calculus of competition. The change in political gravity accelerated with 
the finalization of the process of elite sorting into ideological homogenous political 
parties. The clear signals of each party’s idiosyncratic ideology have simplified the 
decision of party affiliation for individuals of varying authoritarian dispositions by 
turning politics into a singular struggle between one party and another over whose 
candidate will occupy the White House. 
 Gender factors into these developments. Men and women increasingly diverge in 
terms of party affiliation. This trend has developed concomitantly with the development 
of the federal policy state. The social roles of men and women influence their political 
self-interest as members of a sex with regard to economic and cultural preferences. The 
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alignment of social and economic policy in party ideologies has reduced cross-pressure 
on the choice of party affiliation for men and women. This imbalance has gendered the 
images of each party and party affiliation. Men prefer the Republican Party while women 
prefer the Democratic Party, overall. As a result, each party sends gendered cues to voters 
about their stances on conventional masculinity and femininity to maintain their bases. 
Republicans traffic in masculine tropes while Democrats traffic in feminine ones.  
Conventionally, society has attached attributes to each gender. Masculinity 
implies toughness, initiative and agency. Femininity implies compassion, congeniality, 
and consensus. Masculine traits reflect characteristics favored by authoritarians, and 
feminine traits reflect non-authoritarian characteristics, as a result. These traits engender 
individuals with certain patterns of living. They become political when one’s gendered 
perspectives are set to solving public problems. These perspectives inform the politics 
and presentation of each party’s platform. Consequently, gender influences political 
preferences in the electorate. The degree to which gender cues influence political 
decision-making are contingent on one’s disposition to authoritarianism. 
Overall, the results give little credence to the existence of a broad interactive 
relation between gender and authoritarianism in the partisanship of white Americans. 
This conclusion requires specific reservations and qualifications, however. The clearest 
example of the hypothesized interactive relation between gender and authoritarianism 
appeared in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in relation to the cultural preference scale and 
effectively in the modern sexism scale. These two scales offered respondents a choice 
between convention and change. The authoritarian disposition pushed respondents 
towards supporting conventional traditions. These outcomes make intuitive sense. 
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Authoritarians support conforming to the established ways of the community. It is not 
surprising that authoritarians support minority integration into the majority as opposed to 
respect for diversity. The toleration for diversity is not in the authoritarian’s repertoire of 
skills. The same pattern holds in the modern sexism scale. Conventionally, gender roles 
and social opportunities have favored men over women. Authoritarians should be 
attracted to the conventional arrangement between the sexes. One expected the 
authoritarians to prefer past arrangements, and scoff at attempts to equalize outcomes. 
 The proper assessment of authoritarianism for the two preference scales means 
that one correctly anticipated the conditional effect of gender on preference formation. 
Gender is an organizing pattern for one’s life. However, it is not a central variable in 
casual pathway models. It is eclipsed by the interests of salient identities like partisanship 
and psychological mechanisms like authoritarianism. The strength of the direct influence 
of gender, therefore, relies on the absence of influence of more pivotal variables - a point 
that is crucial to understand the lackluster results in the partisanship hypotheses. The 
authoritarian predisposition does not weigh on the political calculus of non-authoritarians 
as much as it influences the judgment of authoritarians. Not surprisingly, gender 
exercised a greater influence on the preference formation of non-authoritarians without 
the presence of either authoritarianism or partisan cues. Non-authoritarian men registered 
more authoritarian preferences than non-authoritarian women in both tests. This gap 
between the preferences of men and women closes as one increases in authoritarianism as 
expected. These two tests validate the logic of the two hypotheses without caveat. One 
would expect to find this relation on other social issues such as immigration, which was 
not included in the cultural preference scale. 
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Assessing Explanations for Unanticipated Results 
 The results of the first two hypotheses must square with the remaining results. 
The rest of the hypotheses require more qualification to explain as they did not follow 
expectations. The outright failure to manifest results as predicted with regard to affective 
partisanship and economic ideology implies an improperly specified model. In this 
situation, unforeseen conditions apply or a fault exists in the theorizing. One begins by 
examining Hypotheses 3 through 6. The hypotheses dealt with affective partisanship, and 
carry significant consequences for understanding the relation of authoritarianism and 
gender in party politics. Authoritarian disposition should structure affective partisanship. 
Overall, the results of the four tests dealing with partisanship did not support this 
conclusion. Authoritarianism did not structure the intimacy of one’s association with a 
partisan identity, nor did gender condition the effect of authoritarianism on support for 
partisan matters. The results only showed qualified significance when controlling for 
party affiliation. The two dueling sets of conclusions require attention to reconcile. One 
judges by the results that either the conceptualization of authoritarianism and gender was 
incorrect, or that one did not properly appraise the effect of partisanship. 
Misconstrued Variables: Authoritarianism and Gender 
One will contemplate the possibility of the two propositions. To the first point, 
authoritarianism and gender are not properly understood. The likelihood of this point 
rests on an improper reading of authoritarianism. One proposed that authoritarians would 
seek entitative group identities to satisfy a need for certainty. It is possible that an 
authoritarian predisposition does not produce a compulsion to conform to a social 
identity. The literature describes a raft of derivative consequences of an authoritarian 
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disposition. One prominent characteristic is to seek security (Stenner 2005; Hetherington 
& Weiler 2009). An authoritarian may accomplish that without sublimation to a group 
identity. In this way, Duckitt’s emphasis on group affiliation with regard to salient threats 
for authoritarianism is misplaced (1989, Feldman 2003). It also cast doubts on the tenet 
of uncertainty-identity theory that implies social individuals seek identities to cope with 
uncertainty (Hogg 2000). In this situation, authoritarians impose order onto social 
arrangements because it is the presence of strong authority itself that soothes them. 
Therefore, one attributed more explanatory potential to authoritarianism than justified. 
The interpretations of results would comply this reading. First, one found the 
existence of the proposed relationship between authoritarianism and gender with regard 
to Hypotheses 1 and 2. The scales did not activate a social identity. It probed the feelings 
of respondents toward social relations and arrangements. It measured how comfortably 
the respondent handled diversity. One counter-argument is that the significance of those 
tests, indeed, reflects support for enforcing a group identity. In this situation, that group 
identity is the national identity. However, a purely American national identity generally 
rests on one’s partisan leanings. Each party represents its own conception of civic identity 
and the public good. As a result, one again interprets the results as general need for 
protection from a visible source of authority against uncertainty. 
The results of Hypotheses 3 through 6 with regard to partisanship also comply 
with this reading. Partisanship is a powerful social identity. The two major partisan 
identities in the United States are diametrically opposed to one another. They each 
propose a vision of the public good, and the means to attain it. One would assume that the 
entitativity of each identity is all that an authoritarian would need to satisfy the need for 
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closure. However, one witnessed authoritarianism structure politics across parties more 
so than it ever structured politics within parties. For instance, authoritarianism increased 
the strength of Republican partisanship when sorting OLS regression by party affiliation 
in Hypothesis 3. It did not conversely matter with regard to Democratic partisanship. 
Likely, authoritarians do not regard Democrats as authoritative. Democrats are social 
levelers by nature, and present themselves as diverse. The essence of liberalism or the 
tropes of femininity demur authoritarians from structuring their lives around the 
Democratic label. The forces of illiberalism do not seem to marshal for the ends of 
liberalism. 
Moreover, one witnessed authoritarianism reducing social and political 
polarization among Democrats in Hypotheses 5 and 6. This result also contravenes the 
idea that any powerful, entitative identity is enough to attract authoritarians. The 
diminishment of polarization has a few possible interpretations due to the nature of the 
construction of the dependent variable for the partisan polarization in Hypothesis 6. One 
interpretation is that authoritarian Democrats feel warm toward their own party as well as 
to Republicans. However, the inference pattern of inter-group behavior in social identity 
theory does not afford much space for this view. One expects fierce competition of 
tangible benefits to reduce affect for one’s opponents. Contemporary partisanship is 
characterized by the fear and loathing of the other party. In the light of uncertainty-
identity theory, one expects a divergence between in-group and out-group affection. 
Group affiliation produces in-group favoritism if nothing else. This expectation 
concurrently dispels the interpretation that authoritarian Democrats feel cold toward their 
own partisan identity as well as to Republicans. 
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The understanding of partisanship as a social identity leaves one to conclude that 
authoritarianism produced out-group affection and in-group derogation for Hypothesis 6. 
These results contradict the accepted wisdom of the literature. It is more probable that 
authoritarianism produces a strong desire for order and structure, and that the Republican 
Party provides agreeable means to these ends. It is important to remember that the two 
parties are not mirror-images of one another. The Democrats are a flat organization while 
the Republican Party, by contrast, is more hierarchical in nature and uniform in purpose. 
By nature, the few authoritarian Democrats in the Party will find the Republican Party 
more reflective of their worldview. As a result, the predicted relation between gender and 
authoritarianism collapsed in the milieu of partisanship. 
It is also possible that one did properly understand the role of gender either. The 
results are not hospitable to this interpretation, though. Gender organizes one’s private 
life, and how one sees public questions. The relation between gender and 
authoritarianism appeared as expected in Hypothesis 1 and 2. Men had less tolerance for 
diversity than women. The traits associated with men diminish compassion, and engender 
support for hierarchical social relations. The problem for the gender variable is that it 
produced unexpected results in the affective partisanship hypotheses, and haphazard 
results for the economic ideology tests. Often, it was insignificant even when controlling 
for party affiliation. In a few other situations, it produced the opposite predicted effect 
such as in Hypothesis 3 or 8. It raised Republican partisan affiliation for women more 
than men, for instance. Additionally, it polarized female evaluations across the board in 
their appraisal of presidential candidates.  
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The failure of gender itself to exhibit its anticipated effects in the results has two 
possible explanations. The first response is that the interactive relation failed to manifest 
because one misconstrued the proper nature of the authoritarian dynamic. If one places 
more emphasis on the results of the partisan hypotheses, then one understands that 
authoritarianism is more about order and security through consonant group identities than 
through affiliation with dissonant entitative groups like the Democratic Party that values 
tolerance. In this way, authoritarianism does not carry the same inference pattern. The 
nature of authoritarianism in politics would be more to structure inter-group politics than 
intra-group politics. Gender organizes how one sees political questions, but its effects 
would be overshadowed by the weight of partisanship and authoritarianism depending on 
the party in question. One anticipates gender would have been more relevant if 
authoritarianism and partisanship had not already compressed intra-group political 
preferences.  
Misconstrued Variables: Partisanship 
The last point segues into the second explanation. This explanation concerns the 
understanding of the strength of partisanship and how it influenced outcomes. In the logic 
of the casual pathway model, one concludes that the failure of gender to manifest its 
effects as expected is that other variables eclipsed its influence. In this case, one did not 
properly anticipate the role of partisanship in preference formation. Partisanship carries 
gendered themes. The nature of these overtones depends on the party in question. 
Partisanship could have stayed the influence of the sex variable, and acted as the main 
variable for gender through its robust influence on decision-making. One knows that 
partisanship, as an over-arching identity, has the reach to alter deeply held beliefs and 
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constituent identities. In this way, it could have informed one’s individual notions of 
gender prior to hypothesis testing. Partisans would then display the unvaried gendered 
perspective of one’s party instead. This reasoning accounts for why the variable for sex 
rarely demonstrated significance in Hypotheses 3 through 6, but it does not account for 
the instances when it was significant.  
The influence of partisanship over individual decision-making potentially stayed 
the influence of an authoritarian disposition, too. One must cast partisanship as the 
misconstrued variable in Hypotheses 3 through 8 if one regards the results of Hypotheses 
1 and 2 as trustworthy. Partisanship is likely the reason why authoritarianism did not 
manifest as expect. It is possible that the influence of authoritarianism is captured in 
partisanship as party elites have sorted on issues of authoritarianism like they have on 
issues of gender. If so, one did not properly account for the conditional effect of 
partisanship in Hypotheses 3 through 8. This explanation seems like a plausible 
interpretation. Partisanship is the most important, consistent predictor of political 
preferences. The impact of partisanship on inter-group behavior may have stayed the 
impact of authoritarianism and gender. Thus, one did not observe any significance of the 
two variables let alone an interactive relation. After all, one did not witness the predicted 
interactive relation at all outside Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
The basis of this explanation rests on the idea that one downplayed the potency of 
partisanship. The exploration of the emergence of modern partisanship in the American 
political development section demonstrated how the party cleavage absorbed 
authoritarianism and gender into the ideology of each party. The chasm between policy 
positions of each party makes it difficult for partisan elites to compromise. Instead, each 
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party stakes oppositional policies. One assumed that authoritarianism and gender still had 
potential to influence decision-making within parties as well as between them despite the 
influence of partisanship. However, it is possible that strength of partisanship has already 
induced most members of the electorate to sort on matters of authoritarianism and gender 
despite their sex or authoritarian leaning. Sorting would explain why one observed 
authoritarianism and gender to be insignificant in most cases. It is most apt to explain the 
insignificance of gender. Despite differences between men and women, the gendered 
differences between the parties are more consequential to an individual’s preference 
formation. In this way, one expects men and women alike in a party to share the same 
gendered outlook with one another.  
The same logic applies to authoritarianism. The parties may differ in their 
compositions of authoritarians, but partisans in a highly contentious political environment 
follow the authoritarian preferences of elite cues in spite of their own authoritarian 
predispositions. The authoritarian cleavage matters between parties more so than within 
parties. Conversely, sorting has produced distance between parties. Authoritarianism 
might operate as articulated in the literature review, but the conditional effect of 
partisanship is now powerful enough among partisans to produce conformity in 
preferences across the spectrum of authoritarians in their ranks. In this way, the strength 
of party affiliation and its effects on inter-group relations do not vary much between the 
sexes or along the authoritarian spectrum.  
The only segment of voters who appear not to follow this line of reasoning are 
authoritarians in the Democratic Party. Here the mismatch between prevailing anti-
authoritarian values of Democratic partisanship and one’s authoritarian inclinations are 
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too powerful to reconcile as witnessed with regard to social polarization (Hypothesis 5), 
partisan polarization (Hypothesis 6), and support for taxing millionaires (Hypothesis 8). 
The authoritarian Democrat’s authoritarian predisposition overrides the influence coming 
from partisanship. One would expect this outcome within the casual pathway model. One 
must qualify the application of the causal pathway model when component variables all 
exert influence in the same direction. 
The casual pathway model as a predictor of individual decision-making needs 
additional stipulation in a situation where parties are highly sorted. This oversight led to 
the faulty assumptions underlying Hypotheses 3 through 8 despite an emphasis placed on 
the insight of social identity theory in the literature review. One should have foreseen 
social pressures exerting a greater effect on individual decision-making. The alignment of 
variables in a polarized environment allows partisanship to most heavily influence 
outcomes, and sabotage predicted relations. Partisans will follow elite stances as long as 
those stances do not wildly clash with their authoritarian dispositions as was the case with 
authoritarian Democrats. Party affiliation also explains why non-authoritarian Republican 
women were more partisan than men in Hypothesis 3. Gender matters in this explanation 
as female Republicans are supporting a party associated with masculinity and 
authoritarianism. The choice is conscientious given the option to sort, and they own it.  
This improperly theorized role of a contentious partisan environment also 
explains the haphazard results of the economic hypotheses. One remains uncertain of the 
actual relationship of gender and authoritarianism with regard to economic ideology due 
to inconsistent and contradictory results of Hypothesis 7 and 8. It is possible to still detect 
a trend emerging from the two sets of results. The first is that party affiliation matters to 
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the results. One concludes that affiliation with the Republican Party conditioned the 
effect of authoritarianism and gender. Neither variable was significant. It is probable that 
Republican economic ideology is ubiquitous enough that preferences do not vary much 
among adherents.  
On the other hand, authoritarianism influences economic ideology in the 
Democratic Party. In Hypothesis 7, authoritarianism produces sentiments to regulate 
business. However, it reduces support among Democrats for taxing millionaires in 
Hypothesis 8. Both results should not manifest at the same time in a highly partisan 
context. It appears most likely that the results vary due to the nature of the dependent 
variable. The regulation of business is a cold, programmatic variable, and lacks the 
trappings of social conflict. The taxation of millionaires is a social issue as much as it is 
an economic issue in the logic of social identity theory. If so, the outcome of Hypothesis 
8 for Democrats still contradicts expectations. In addition to the contradictory results for 
Democrats for Hypothesis 5 and 6, one must conclude that the conception of 
authoritarianism was misconstrued. Authoritarianism was not the general tendency to 
conform to any entitative group as predicted. 
Final Thoughts 
On the whole, the results of these tests demand one revise the use and 
consideration of models articulated in this inquiry. The onus falls foremost on the concept 
of authoritarianism given the nature of this inquiry. Authoritarianism produced limited 
results, and often these results manifested against expectations. One reconsidered how 
authoritarianism and gender had already influenced partisanship prior to the hypothesis 
tests to account for the failure of an interactive relation to manifest. This reconsideration 
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still portends poorly for the model of authoritarianism. While it neither sabotages nor 
supports the conception of authoritarianism through the tenets of a need for certainty and 
group identity outright, the balance of probability still rests against this conceptualization. 
One expected some demonstration of its inference pattern in the partisan hypotheses if 
authoritarianism actually structures association with entitative social identities like party 
affiliation. The presence of an interactive relationship in the cultural preference scales do 
not marshal in favor or against the conceptualization either. Those two hypotheses did not 
activate salient identities. Neither do the economic ideology hypotheses, but authoritarian 
Democrats still took the Republican stance of not taxing millionaires in Hypothesis 8. 
Additionally, authoritarianism activated support for the party of authoritarianism, the 
Republican Party, in the partisan hypotheses 3, 5 and 6.  
One must adduce that authoritarianism does not induce groupism with any 
entitative group given the influence of partisan identities. Instead, authoritarianism 
induces conformity through entitative identities if the group has the appropriate structure 
to it. The cohesion of the Republican Party, with its hierarchy and unity of purpose, fits 
this description. The Democrats, with their leveling tendencies and tolerance for dissent, 
do not fit the description. This rationale would explain, for instance, why Republicans 
become stronger partisans as they become stronger authoritarianism whereas Democrats 
do not. Consequently, it explains why the interactive relation between gender and 
authoritarianism did not materialize outside the cultural preference hypotheses where 
partisanship was not salient. The effect of authoritarianism is conditional on the party 
affiliation from sorting, and partisanship likely overrides individual gender cues within 
each party. In this way, the relation between variables were not properly hypothesized 
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despite the continual acknowledgement of the importance of partisanship throughout. A 
relation between authoritarianism and gender likely exists insofar as both are bifurcated 
by parties, but the original thesis is not the norm outside matters of idealized social 
arrangements and abstract cultural preferences. 
This rationale partially explains the negative results of the economic ideology test, 
as a result. It is possible that elite positioning and cue-taking in the mass electorate are 
conveyed well enough to individuals across the range of the authoritarian spectrum that 
one does not observe a difference in preferences. The ability of elites to give cues to the 
mass electorate on ideological economic positions makes the disentangling of 
authoritarianism and partisanship difficult. Johnston demonstrates that engagement 
significantly increases the uptake of economic positions from elites among authoritarians 
(2018, 227). It is probable to assume that authoritarians are already more engaged than 
non-authoritarians.  
The effect of partisanship to override other consideration then was not properly 
stated herein. Authoritarians may absorb elite cues better than non-authoritarians; 
however, the cohesion of the Republican Party is strong enough that non-authoritarians 
are able to perceive and register the party’s position on economic ideology. On the other 
hand, it cannot explain why authoritarian Democrats behaved as expected. These 
respondents sought slightly higher regulations on business than non-authoritarian 
Democrats, but also opposed taxing millionaires. They also had warm affection toward 
the Republican Party while being cold toward their own party. The body of evidence in 
social identity theory militates against such a conclusion. One will need additional testing 
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on policy issues to better understand the conditional nature of party affiliation on 
authoritarianism and its interactive relationship with gender. 
One caveat to the dismal conclusions presented so far is that the data for them 
come from the 2016 election. The 2016 election was as polarizing as it was acrimonious. 
However, one could argue that the cleavages of authoritarianism and gender had not yet 
fully developed. The Trump presidency and the Me-Too movement made the divide 
between the sexes and across the authoritarian spectrum much more salient. It is possible 
to argue that the initial results found in this inquiry are encouraging considering the 
interactive relation between gender and authoritarianism was already manifesting to a 
degree before the 2016 election. The same hypotheses and the same experiments may 
yield more significant results if one uses the 2020 ANES data when it becomes available. 
In this way, one would have more cause to keep or discard the reflections posited for the 
failure of the hypothesis tests. 
The question of datasets raises more points to address. One presents two more 
methodological issues to diagnose. First, the ANES, while it offers a broad range of 
questions to operationalize, only offers questions in a polite, sterile manner. This 
formality did not hinder testing the thesis within the topic of cultural preferences or 
partisanship, but it did hinder testing the thesis within the context of economic issues. It 
was argued that economic questions gain currency when placed in the context of social 
conflict. However, the broadest question to closely matching this logic was for 
Hypothesis 8 with the taxation of millionaires. A different data set or changes to the 




Second, a change to the ANES or future datasets could also add further questions 
to better uncover the nature of the authoritarianism. This paper posited that 
authoritarianism was a dynamic, and one was able to test for authoritarian predispositions 
using the CRV scale. However, the CRV scale is only valid for white Americans, which 
limits the study of a crucial concept to one population. The study of conformity must 
develop to meet the demands of the present moment. This inquiry attempted to rise to that 
challenge by forcefully theorizing authoritarianism as a psychological compulsion 
towards conforming. The inclusion of the need for closure as the impetus for one’s 
predisposition may have been too ambitious overall, but authoritarianism did prove to be 
statistically significant in many hypothesis tests by itself. If the need for closure excels at 
explaining the compulsion for conformity, the variable has the benefit of having a 15-
question to measure this impulse across ethnic categories (Luttig 2018). Future research 
should include both the CRV scale and the 15-question scale to measure the need for 
closure to compare their validity, and propel the collective understanding of 
authoritarianism forward. 
To conclude, an understanding of authoritarianism remains elusive. The human 
mind is a black box, and it may remain impossible to definitively ascribe reasons for the 
compulsion to conform. However, this dissertation conceptualized a model of 
authoritarianism given the most recent understanding of it in the literature. To this end, 
one investigated the role of gender in the authoritarian dynamic. Gender norms and social 
roles influence how individuals view themselves and their place in society. One 
anticipated gender to interact with the authoritarian dynamic to influence political 
preferences. One expected an interactive relation to be the norm in this regard due to the 
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unique development of affective partisanship, and the absorption of gender and 
authoritarian cleavages into the party system. The initial results herein bias against this 
understanding of the relation between gender and authoritarianism. It appears to be the 
case that gender and authoritarianism do interact as anticipated absent overt partisan 
consideration. In this way, one should conduct more tests with a broader range of 
dependent and independent variables.  
The influence of partisanship derailed the conceptualization of authoritarianism as 
a process of conformity around any entitative group identity. One emphasized the 
conclusions of Luttig and the logic of casual pathway models while simultaneously 
underrating the logic of social identity theory and the established potency of affective 
partisanship in modern politics (2017). Partisanship is a strong social identity. One did 
not error in evaluating its effect on inter-group behavior, but did not properly account for 
it in the logic of the hypotheses. Thus, the absence of the predicted effect of 
authoritarianism and gender among partisan inter-group behavior damages the notion that 
authoritarianism is a central, internal phenomenon of group sublimation irrespective of 
the character of the group. One must further condition expectations on the group identity 
in question.  
However, the implication of gender in the authoritarian dynamic still furthers 
one’s understanding of the psychology of it. While partisanship damages the conception 
of authoritarianism used in this inquiry, gender reveals that authoritarian preference 
formation does not rely solely one’s authoritarian disposition. In the case of Hypotheses 1 
and 2, gender mediated the preferences of men and women over the authoritarian 
spectrum. Hypothesis 1 did not explicitly activate gender identities, either. Even so, 
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explicit matters of gender can cause authoritarian preferences to diverge as Lizotte 
demonstrated (2019). Thus, it lends credibility to the notion that considerations of 
personal identity direct authoritarian impulses on some level. Further experimentation 
will be required to establish the extent to which authoritarians relies on group identities to 
determine their political preferences, and the conditions under which their preferences 
manifest. The scattershot results provide opportunities to modify hypotheses to continue 
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Hypothesis 8 Diagnostics – Taxing Millionaires among Democrats 
 
 
 
